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THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

FIFTY YEARS OF GERMAN AGGRESSION

BY

JEAN CHARLEMAGNE BRACQ, LITT. D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF FRENCH LITERATURE IN VASSAR COLLEGE

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
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INTRODUCTION

THE pages that follow merely describe acts and events which have taken place within the range of the author's recollections. He heard discussions as a boy, in France, upon the war of Italian liberation, and saw soldiers start for that campaign in 1859. His father and one of his neighbors were greatly interested in the Prusso-Austrian war against Denmark, which they considered as the deliverance of poor molested Germans in a virtual German country. Later on, in their own way, they discussed the conflict between Prussia and Austria. For one of these men, a Protestant, Prussia was the representative of liberalism, of humanism, of progress; while for the other, a Catholic, Austria was the custodian of European order, of the best conservative traditions in a tottering society, and the great Power most loyal to the Church. The conversations and discussions which the boy heard were, as a rule, inaccurate in substance and almost always in their conclusions, but they created for him an interest in the problems of central Europe that has been lasting. The Franco-Prussian war taught him what to think of the much vaunted liberalism and pacific spirit of the land of Bismarck. Subsequent history has revealed to him what German leaders, not representing ethically the people, could do to harrow the soul of a neighboring nation and insult her Allies by attempting to discredit them. The writer is conscious of the sterling qualities and of the attainments of the enemies of his native land, but it is their unjust, their aggressive

INTRODUCTION

and their provoking course that he has wished to bring out as well as the casuistry with which German writers have justified the duplicity of their leaders. He has used as a guiding thread the editorial opinions of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, which have always been the work of masterly minds such as Michel Chevalier, Charles de Mazade, the Vicomte Georges d'Avenel and Francis Charmes. These *chroniques* are, as a whole, the most reliable and impartial interpretations of contemporary history, during the last half century, with which the author is acquainted, while the principal French books devoted to the most burning international questions first appeared in this review. His recent re-reading of these luminous and honest statements of contentions among various peoples has convinced him that they constitute a collection of facts, bearing upon the question at issue, of the greatest value. He has secured his evidence from varied and reliable sources. Without surrendering his critical independence, he confesses his readiness to accept, as reliable, the statements of the noblest representatives of France, of Lavisson, of Sorel, of Monod, of Taine, of Renan, of Fouillée, while even the more emotional affirmations of E. Caro and of Pasteur seem to him trustworthy. He has consulted the best sources available to him, and among these he cannot pass over in silence *Le Temps*, which, for nearly a third of a century, has proven to him the best instrument of information upon France and Europe. This is not a book of erudition. It is the simple putting together of facts which scarcely anyone denies today, yet which point to an almost constant aggression against France. It does not bring out the acts of chance individuals, but of the rulers and governing classes beyond the Rhine. At the same time, it

attempts to show that if France has not always been blameless, for she has also her militants and her militarists (this does not refer to her heroic soldiers), as a rule her purpose has been international good-will and peace. She faithfully endeavored to avert the present colossal tragedy. Whatever she has accomplished during the last twoscore years she has done it in the face of an almost constant and exasperating provocation. Her attitude, however, has been such that she can calmly await the judgment of history.

I

BISMARCK BEFORE THE EMS DISPATCH

THAT most remarkable woman, Madame de Staël, did fatal work for France when she idealized the Germans in her masterpiece, *De l'Allemagne*. The book, rendered popular among the liberals of France by the antagonism of Napoleon, had a firm hold upon the national mind. Her pictures of German character and life were accepted as real and as worthy of imitation by her countrymen. The romantic movement, to whose rise she greatly contributed, acted in the same direction; and the writers of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, in its early days, increased the tendency to an extreme idealization of the trans-Rhinean people. Heine in *De l'Allemagne* warned Frenchmen not to take the pictures of the *Sultane de la pensée* too seriously, not to trust these good neighbors too much; but the countrymen of Voltaire, so sensitive to literary influences, continued to think of the Germans as disciples of the author of *Eternal Peace*, men athirst for the invisible realities of the universe, virtual philosophical Quakers. Towards the sixties Victor Hugo speaks of "that august Germany."¹ About 1865, Michelet, Janet, Taine, Renan, About, and all the French liberals looked upon them as embodying the greatest amount of moral rectitude, of idealistic serenity, of scientific calm and ethical excellence yet attained by men.

¹ *Les Misérables*, vol. III, p. 63.

In their eyes the expansion of Prussia meant the spreading of these idyllic virtues.

The war of 1870 was the rending of the illusory veil which opened up to these Germanophiles a new view of the countrymen of Kant—men of iron—led against France by an indomitable hatred, prepared by years of Spartan military discipline and of aggressive purpose, men who waged war with a harshness and a brutality that defy words. The psychological reaction was as depressing as it was sudden. There was, furthermore, the sense that they had been deceived by the Prussians as Napoleon III had been by Bismarck. At first, under the impression that the French Emperor had been the provocator, they accepted their defeat with a certain contrition; but when it became evident to them that the war had been desired, planned and carried on with a remorseless intent by Bismarck, and, what was worse, that the terrible man, to their dismay, represented the spirit of Prussia, there was a violent revulsion of feeling. The people east of the Rhine appeared in a new light in the eyes of their western neighbors. So great was the disappointment of eminent Frenchmen that their attitude toward most foreigners was seriously modified by the recoil of their feelings after the war. Yet the philosophical minds remained fairly calm, though they were deeply hurt, not only by the injustice and horror of the recent Franco-German clash, but by the sense of the deep deception perpetrated upon them by the countrymen of Bismarck and by Bismarck himself. They had come to loathe the heavy complimentary words which they had heard from the Prussians, the honeyed talks of their public men, and all the flatteries of Bismarckian insincerity. They had ignored the depths of racial

antagonism that lay dormant in the Prussian heart, ever ready to be called forth by the Chancellor and his supporters.

Prussia, gradually risen from the Mark of Brandenburg to her present state by sheer military effort, and by the prominence given to her soldiers, endeavored to deceive everyone. She maintained at this time more soldiers proportionally than any other Power in Europe. France, according to Renan,¹ was far from aggressive. She "had become the most pacific country of the world. . . . The military career was abandoned. . . . All activity was in the direction of the social question." When she appeared militant it was because of the action of Prussia creating a mighty military Power in the heart of Europe. Germany, in general, and Prussia, in particular, were hostile to everything French, notwithstanding their unctuous attitude and their flatteries. Four or five times in a century they attempted, and accomplished, invasions of French territory.

The Kaiser, who, in his speeches, constantly refers to Napoleon as if he had been the sole enemy of Germany, and ever mentions the battle of Leipsic where Bonaparte was defeated, never says that during eight years the King of Prussia was the ally of the Corsican to the great harm of German states. All through the early nineteenth century Prussia was watching all possible chances for aggressions and territorial extension. Not to speak of other examples, in 1850 Prussian troops entered Hesse to fight the states representing the authority of the Diet. The Emperor Nicholas of Russia stopped them when he said, "I shall fire on the first who fires."²

¹ *La réforme intellectuelle et morale*, 1871, p. 24.

² Lowe, Charles, *Prince Bismarck*, N. Y. 1886, vol. I, p. 108.

Then there were the wranglings of Prussia with the Diet, which she used when it served her purpose, and discarded in the same way. Prussia was feared and hated by most of the other states of the country, while at home the military class was detested by those who wanted political freedom. Those representing traditional ideas advocated the use of arms to repress the spirit of independence among themselves, but found in external aggressions a better way to attain their aims. In 1856, they were burning to fight Switzerland, a conflict which was prevented by the kindly action of England, and the hostility of Austria.¹ During the Crimean war Prussia remained neutral, thereby gaining the good-will of Russia. During the Austro-Italian war in 1859, she was watching her chances. Bismarck was not yet at the helm of state, but he was already bent upon fighting Austria, and driving her out of the German Confederation. As he said then, "if it is our aim to exclude her from Germany, we can only profit by Austria first being weakened by France."² He urges Prussia, at this juncture, to take the lead of the German Confederation.³ This, as he cynically says, will have to be done *ferro et igni*, by the sword and by fire, already the Bismarckian method.

Neutral in pretension, Prussia called up all her troops, and it looked for a while as if Napoleon III would have to fight on the Rhine as well as along the Po, inasmuch as the Prussians had "bound themselves by word of mouth to assist Austria in any circumstances if she

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 220.

² *Ibid.*, p. 391.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

should be attacked by France in Italy.”¹ If the Italian war was suddenly ended and Venetia was kept by the Hapsburgs it was largely due to Berlin.² For some years Bismarck, either at the Diet in Frankfurt or as ambassador to Russia, had prepared the ground for his belligerent policy. He had won the neutrality of Russia. When, in 1863, after he had become prime-minister, an insurrection took place in Warsaw, he made arrangements with the Czar to help stamp it out.³ While there were deep governmental affinities between the Russian spirit and that of Bismarck he did this under the sense of the value of the co-operation of St. Petersburg. For years he had conquering designs upon Schleswig-Holstein. This is evident from constant references to it in his correspondence.

In 1859 he goes to Paris to gain the friendly attitude of the French Government. The war which he desired and planned against Denmark, he hypocritically represents as a conflict for the relief of oppressed Schleswig.⁴ It was a “national duty of honor” . . . “to protect the German subjects of the King of Denmark against the oppression and constitutional wrongs” which they suffered. How tender the man who later on was to distinguish himself by his inhuman treatment of the *francs-tireurs*, of the Poles and of the Alsatians! He had the Duchies invaded by 12,000 Saxons and Hanoverians, followed by the Prussians and Austrians, but once the Danes defeated, and terms of peace made for the exclusive advantage of Prussia and Austria, Bismarck invited both Saxons and Hanoverians to march

¹ *Prince Bismarck's Letters*, p. 147.

² Lowe, vol. I, p. 259.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 327.

home, whether they were willing or not.¹ It is not astonishing that he was the man most hated by liberal Prussians and by most Germans. Then Austria and Prussia remained sole disposers of the Duchies ceded to them by the King of Denmark.

In securing these results, there was not a country, an international organization, or a ruler that the Iron Minister did not mislead or deceive. England, France, Denmark, Hanover, Saxony, the London Conference, the Diet, Christian IX and the Duke of Augustenburg, all were hoodwinked and mystified by the Prussian leader.² He practiced without scruple what in commerce and in the policies of most countries would be methods of a sharper, a cutpurse, but he speaks of his acts with pride. "When I was made a prince," he says, "the King insisted upon putting Alsace-Lorraine into my coat of arms. But I would much rather have had Schleswig-Holstein; that is the campaign, politically speaking, of which I am proudest."³

After this he found the opportunity of carrying out his purpose to oust Austria from Germany as well as from the newly conquered territories. For that purpose, immediately after his coming to power "the number of infantry was doubled, and the cavalry regiments were increased by ten."⁴ The army was the particular object of his solicitude, as he wished to make it able to cope with the Empire which, as he puts it, "kept his country in a state of vassalage." To that end he had already courted the French Government, which was quite un-

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 343.

² Headlam, J. W., *Bismarck*, pp. 192-225.

³ Busch, M., *Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History*, vol. II, p. 171.

⁴ Lowe, vol. I, p. 289.

friendly to Vienna, and tried to secure its neutrality in the struggle; this was granted by Napoleon.¹ He then turned toward Italy and began to humor her by making with her a generous commercial treaty. Though he had not the least sympathy with the aspirations of the Venetians toward independence in 1859, and his government had prevented it, he now proposes that consummation as an inducement for the countrymen of Garibaldi to unite with the Prussians against Austria. As his advances were accepted, the Italian Government sent General Gavone secretly to Bismarck and concluded a treaty of aggression against Austria. Then, according to the dispatch of the Italian Envoy, Bismarck said, "Which of us is now going to apply fire to the powder?" To Count Barral, the Italian Ambassador, he said, "You would do us excellent service by attacking first."²

Such was the malignant and wicked design of the great Prussian Mephistopheles. "Before the 'first shots fell,' in 1866, he tried a last resource to obviate that war, in deference to the wishes of the King, by proposing an Austro-Prussian dualism in Germany, and an Austro-Prussian alliance against France for the reconquest of Alsace."³ The war took place nevertheless, and the unspeakable stupidity of the Hapsburgs led Austria to take the offensive. Thus he had first made the war inevitable and then succeeded in making Austria appear as the aggressor. She was signally defeated at Sadowa. Bismarck allowed the Italians, defeated at Custoza and at Lissa, to settle their own matters, and

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 284.

² *Ibid.*, p. 376.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 500.

made a most profitable peace with Austria. This war cost Prussia 10,000 men, and Austria 22,000.¹ The ambition and tortuous plans of the Iron Man had cost 32,000 lives, not to speak of the multitudes that were mutilated.

Hanover and Hesse-Cassel shared the fate of Austria. This campaign ended, as almost all the wars of Prussia always did, by territorial extension and indemnities. Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, the free city of Frankfurt and Schleswig-Holstein became a part of Prussia. What, perhaps, was the most important in all this was the securing of Kiel as a naval base.

Having just concluded a war undertaken in the spirit of buccaneers, Prussia now divided the spoils. Bismarck received 400,000 thalers, Roon, the Minister of War, 300,000, and Moltke, the General-in-chief, 200,000.² Thus Prussia has ever rewarded her war-makers. A further result was the triumph of political absolutism. Since 1848, some of the noblest sons of Prussia had protested against the royal tyranny and the despotic spirit of ministers—mostly against the Iron Minister—but, after the policy of fire and sword had been so successful, public opinion changed. “Of Bismarck’s treachery and Straffordism, and all the rest,” says Lowe, “there was now no more talk; in less than a week, success had made his policy not only pardonable but adorable.”³

The aggressive brutal Prussian spirit had triumphed. The intellectualists of the land began to laud the army and to prepare the nation for the greater cultivation

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 391.

² *Ibid.*, p. 412.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

of the Bismarckian spirit and the wider application of Bismarck's policy.

Up to this period, there was no obsequious comedy that the celebrated Prussian Minister had not been willing to play in order to secure the good-will and the neutrality of France. He went to Paris to consult with Napoleon about the possible Prussian attack on Switzerland;¹ he was there, as a minister, attempting to pave the way for the future; he was there many a time, under all kinds of pretexts, but always courting the favors of Napoleon to help his future plans. He had urged his Government to form an alliance with Paris.² He went so far in this direction that he was accused of being an accomplice of the Tuileries. To this he replied, doubtless with a sardonic smile, "If I have sold myself to a devil, it is to a Teutonic and not a French one."³

He succeeded in winning Napoleon completely over. He had signed a treaty favorable to France and made to Napoleon promises of future unmolested conquests so as to maintain the balance of power in Europe and satisfy the imperial vanity. Unquestionably he had agreed to let him take Luxemburg; later on he tried to have him turn toward Belgium, but that Bismarck had made pledges and duped Napoleon is not doubted now by any candid investigator. In 1866, the question of Luxemburg brought the two peoples on the verge of a conflict which was averted by a European Conference. This did not prevent the King of Prussia from being the guest of Napoleon at the time of the Exposition in 1867. When the King left at the end of his visit, he

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 220.

² *Ibid.*, p. 235.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

embraced the French Emperor, with great expression of friendship, saying, "Adieu, dear brother and friend."¹

Bismarck "went about feeling the national pulse and preparing the future."² While he was maturing his plans to attack France, he claimed to have reduced his army to an absolute peace footing³ and that he was only pursuing moral conquests and the natural expansion of Prussia, while at that time his country had three per cent. of her population in the army. Notwithstanding the fact that this population was but two-thirds that of France, her army was numerically equal⁴ and, in training, far superior. Lowe, often echoing the ideas of Bismarck, speaks of the Exposition as "that hollow and high-sounding Carnival of Peace."⁵ It would have been a great Festival of Peace had not the Iron Count been bent on war. For fifty years Prussia has been the great obstacle in the way of translating the best feelings of mankind into the sane and normal relations of peace.

Bismarck continued to work in every direction to carry out his design. He controlled and managed all the great forces of Prussia, and to a certain extent of Germany, to arouse feelings against the "hereditary enemy" France.⁶ Never did a chief of government have his fingers so completely upon the organs of public opinion, if we are to believe Maurice Busch and other German writers, and no one ever made

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 445.

² *Ibid.*

³ III, 73, 51. References like this refer to the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. The Roman numbers indicate the series, those in italic the volume and the other or others the page or pages.

⁴ III, 53, 8.

⁵ Lowe, vol. I, p. 445.

⁶ III, 73, 390.

a more unscrupulous use of them. Thus the French Ambassador handed him a note in reference to the Treaty of Prague in which he had made a promise that never was kept. The next morning all the Bismarckian papers were on fire against France.

He excelled in circulating those half-truths which are the worst form of falsehoods. In 1867, the *National Gazette*, inspired by him, alarmed the population of Germany by the statement that France had concentrated from 60,000 to 70,000 men in the eastern departments, but kept silence upon the 75,000 Prussian soldiers who were close to the French lines and who, upon a sudden mobilization, would have numbered 120,000.¹ "Each of Bismarck's wars," says Professor Ramsay Muir of the University of Manchester, "was preceded by a marvelous 'mobilization of public opinion' through the press."² He thereby succeeded in isolating France. He encircled her with a ring of suspicion and hostility, misrepresenting her real aims while, by intimidation and misrepresentation, he was making treaties with German allies, many of whom were reluctant to join him now and at the crucial moment.

Meanwhile, French opinion had been affected by the development of Prussia, her virtual hegemony of German states, and the well-nigh formation of a great military German Empire at the gates of France. There were Chauvinists who wanted compensations, and, at times, Napoleon had been influenced by them. There were those also who spoke of natural frontiers, that is the Rhine as the Franco-German line, but most Frenchmen sided with the Emperor, who was forced to recognize

¹ III, 74, 404.

² *Britain's Case against Germany*, p. 29.

that, though Bismarck had duped him, he had done so by carrying out in practice the great hobby of Napoleon, the principle of nationalities. In the territorial divisions and ethnological redistributions which took place in different parts of the globe, looking at the peoples who were absorbed by another, France did not ask, "What language do you speak?" "To what race do you belong?" (those have been German tests of nationality) but, "To what nation do you wish to belong?"¹ Annexations, if any are legitimate, must be made with the consent of those most concerned. The soul of national morality, the will, must be the supreme determinant. The French, the Italians and the Germans of the Swiss Confederation, representing three ethnological groups and four languages, the Flemish and the Walloons in Belgium, must be allowed to form a nation if they so choose. All new political accretions must be made after the free choice of the annexed.

Led by these principles the French Emperor had encouraged and helped Italy to secure her independence, thereby strengthening Prussia, helping her ultimately to secure the leadership of German states. Napoleon was also in favor of the gradual unification of Germany, though it must be recognized that he insisted upon compensations to counterbalance the great Power which was just created. Dishonest and dishonorable as were the bargains between Bismarck and himself, in reference to the Duchy of Luxemburg² he ever clung to the doctrine that

¹ II, 91, 387.

² Bismarck denied that he had made this promise. Queen Victoria said to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne: "*Je sais ce qui s'est passé. M. de Bismarck, bien qu'il le nie aujourd'hui, vous a lui-même encouragés à réclamer le Luxembourg,*" Rothan, G., *L'Allemagne*, p. 342.

peoples have the right to dispose of themselves. Bismarck was bent upon using the sword to realize German unity and that under the domination of Prussia. Napoleon gave him a free hand, under the impression that he was advancing the cause of international liberalism in that part of the world. Duped, and ever duped, by the Prussian Minister, he clung all along, with some inconsistencies, to his favorite doctrine. After Sadowa, when he mediated between Austria and Prussia, he secured the insertion in the Treaty of Prague of article V, which stipulates that "the people of the northern district of Schleswig, if by free vote they express a wish to be united to Denmark, shall be ceded to Denmark accordingly."¹ This important article, signed by the Prussian Government "In the name of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity,"² which contemplated fair play and justice to the Danes, never was executed, although again and again Napoleon endeavored to have it done.

In the great national movement of Italy the masses desired unity. In some parts of the country, when the people met one another they raised the forefinger of the right hand for their salutation and said *una*,³ thus by their greetings expressing, in a symbolic way, their deepest national hopes of unity. His share in the realization of the Italian ideal is one of the few noble achievements of the *Coup d'état* man. He seconded their efforts in carrying out the national purpose, but with inconsistencies and contradictions at times, so that he neither satisfied the Italians nor the French. Thiers and Guizot represented this as an act of signal folly, to help the

¹ Treaty of Prague, Aug. 20, 1866.

² *Ibid.*

³ Maxime du Camp, *Expédition des Deux Siciles*, p. 28.

building up of a great state next to France in the Italic Peninsula. He had also to face the opposition of the national clergy, who never forgave him the sacrifice of the temporal power of the Pope. He trusted the *Risorgimento* because it was the spontaneous rising of a people testifying to its sense of oneness and of a common historic purpose. It asserted its desire in a democratic way, by the ballot. Italian unity was built upon *plebisciti*.

He acted similarly at an earlier date, when Savoy and Nice were annexed. The Savoyards were French and the Niçois mostly so. They lived on the west side of the Alps, which seemed a natural boundary. Napoleon had the power to take these territories, yet there was a consultation of the people, who, by an overwhelming majority, expressed their wish to be an intrinsic part of France. Would Bismarck have dared to have a *plebiscitum* in Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Frankfurt and Schleswig when he annexed them? His principle of national movements was might. For Danton's motto: *De l'audace, encore de l'audace et toujours de l'audace*, he would have substituted, "The Sword, the Sword again, the Sword forever."

After Sadowa Napoleon had lost many of his illusions in reference to Bismarck's determination to secure German unity and Prussian domination at any cost. The French Emperor was not more honest than his antagonist; he was at this period a timid and idealistic dreamer. At times, he was talking and acting like a pacifist, though the name had not yet been invented.¹ Had he not

¹ The honor of coining that term belongs to a Frenchman, M. Emile Arnould, notary at Luzarches, Seine-et-Oise, who has been indefatigable in the cause of the judicial settlement of international difficulties.

proposed the reunion of an international congress to settle, in a friendly way, all the great pending questions of the times?¹ Bismarck, on the other hand, was a hard, harsh, unscrupulous and realistic statesman marshaling press, clergy, scientists and intellectualists, society and commerce like a general. "His statesmanship," says Lowe, "is of the military order."² His combativeness is constant. The man who, as a student, fought twenty-eight duels,³ remained an unscrupulous fighter all through his career. He fought Prussian intellectuals, fought Prussian democracy, fought the Pope, fought the Orders, fought socialism. He had long since decided to fight France. That seemed to him an essential part of his colossal plans, and yet he wished to hide the fact that he was the provocator. As Sorel puts it, "To unify Germany, to dominate the Southern states, to secure the vote of military credits, to obtain the help of Russia he needed to be attacked. War was indispensable to him and he could not undertake it."⁴

The movement of German unity was losing ground; a conflict with the "hereditary enemy" would revive it, but it was essential, says again Sorel, that the war should be declared by France. In his *Memoirs*, speaking of the cause for which he damned his soul—if man ever did that—Bismarck tells us that he had reached the conviction that "the gulf which diverse dynastic and family influences and different habits of life had, in the course of history, created between the South

¹ Novicow, J., *L'Alsace-Lorraine, obstacle à l'expansion allemande*, 1913, p. 48.

² Vol. II, p. 478.

³ Vol. I, p. 17.

⁴ Sorel, A., *Histoire de la guerre Franco-Allemande*, 1875, vol. I, p. 49.

and the North of the Fatherland, could not be more effectually bridged over than by a joint national war, against the neighbor who had been aggressive for many centuries.”¹ He wanted the unity under the control of Prussia. The end justified the means.

“So, paradoxical as it may seem,” says J. Novicow, “the greatest obstacle to the unification of Germany came from Prussia. If Prussia had been a liberal state, the unity of Germany could have been secured much sooner and much better. But when the Germans heard a King of Prussia declare that the imperial crown offered to him by the Parliament of Frankfurt had been picked up in *the mud*, because it was offered by the delegates of the *German people*, there were reasons to doubt the possibility of realizing German unity.”² The greatest obstacle was indeed the humiliation of democratic Germany, irritated by the contempt of a King by divine right who referred to the “imperial crown,” so offered, as “the iron fetter whereby the descendant of four and twenty Sovereigns, the ruler of 16,000,000 subjects, and the Lord of the loyalest and bravest army in the world, would be made the mere serf of the Revolution.”³

A Prussian sovereign can rarely ever be taken at his word. The fact is that on that same day the news of the victory of Austria at Novara reached Berlin. The fear of Austria this day was the beginning of Prussian wisdom. However, the obstacle to German unity was not in France, but in Prussia itself and among the German states. Bismarck would unite all the recalcitrants by a

¹ *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman*, vol. II, p. 99.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

³ *Lowe*, vol. I, p. 89.

war with France. That he did. As Mr. James W. Headlam states it, Bismarck "boasted that but for him there would never have been a war with France."¹

¹ *Bismarck*, p. 460.

II

THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH

THE late King of Rumania, in his autobiography, has related for us how Bismarck had endeavored to direct him toward the throne of Spain and how he refused to move in that direction.¹ When the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain was announced Bismarck expressed surprise, but we know now that he advocated it and did all he could to push it forward.² On this account the Governments of Paris and Berlin were brought to explanations. The King equivocated by saying that this was not a political but a family affair. Bismarck speaks of what he called a simple family gathering to decide the matter, but we know that at this meeting there were the King, his son Frederick, Antony and Leopold of Hohenzollern, Bismarck himself, Roon, Moltke, Schleinitz, Thile and Delbrück. As M. Matter says, "this resembles a council of war rather than a family affair."³ The Governments of France and Prussia were then brought to the verge of war, and finally to war itself.

Bismarck maneuvered to bring this about while causing Prussia to appear before public opinion as on the side of reason and justice, and France as the aggressor. To judge of his success, one has only to open such books

¹ III, 128, 684.

² Matter, P., *Bismarck et son temps*, vol. III, p. 13.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

as Washburne, E. B., *Recollections of a Minister to France*, N. Y., 1887, or the files of British and American newspapers. The moral condemnation of France was unanimous. He knew the political value of moral appearances. The King was as just as a Hohenzollern could be and more pacific than his Minister, hence he yielded to the complaints of France; but, unfortunately, by the unreasonableness and stupidity of the Tuilleries, Napoleon fell into Bismarck's traps and asked for the renunciation to the Spanish candidacy for all time. Even then, circumstances favored the French Emperor, and the last interview at Ems of the King with the French Ambassador was such that Bismarck regarded the matter as virtually settled. King William sent him a dispatch which embodied such a conclusion and great was Bismarck's dismay. He has related with an unblushing cynicism the way in which he made the Franco-German war unavoidable. The three documents in which he confessed his crime harmonize well with all the evidence which we possess upon this supreme misdeed.

At the crucial moment, in the controversy between Berlin and Paris, Bismarck, who was on his estate in Varzin, rushed to Berlin. On his arrival he received dispatches showing him that the two Governments were on the way to a fair understanding. He invited to dinner Count von Roon, the Minister of War, and Count von Moltke, the General-in-chief, who shared his desires for a war with France. At the time of the Luxemburg Affair, Moltke was in favor of an immediate attack. "Today," he said, "we would have fifty chances, in one year from now we would no longer have more than twenty-five."¹

¹ Rothan, G., *L'Affaire du Luxembourg*, 1882, p. 297.

The three men had a common aggressive aim. When they heard, by a dispatch, of the withdrawal of the candidacy of Prince Leopold Hohenzollern, and of the really peaceful spirit of the King and of the French Ambassador, Benedetti, they were dismayed, and ceased to eat. Bismarck took the dispatch and mutilated it in such a way as to arouse the French and the Germans alike.¹ "It will be known," he says, "in Paris before midnight, and not only an account of its contents, but also an account of the manner of its distribution, will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull . . . it is important that we should be attacked, and this Gallic overweening and touchiness will make us (appear) . . . that we meet the public threats of France."² He expected a similar effect from the telegram in Germany, and it did follow. When Bismarck had thus transformed the King's dispatch his guests "recovered their pleasure in eating and drinking and spoke in a more cheerful vein."³

This virtual forgery was cleverly sent to the press everywhere, except to Paris. Special editions of the *North German Gazette* containing the inflammatory message were distributed gratis in Berlin.⁴ "The telegram was published at nine o'clock and by ten the square in front of the Palace was crowded with an excited multitude cheering the King and shouting, 'To the Rhine! To the Rhine!' "⁵ Very soon the poor mistaken crowds in Paris yelled, "À Berlin! À Berlin!" The trick was

¹ Busch, *Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History*, 1898, vol. II, p. 174.

² Bismarck, *Autobiography*, p. 101.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁴ Lowe, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 514.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 515.

played. The people of Germany, even those that hated Bismarck and Prussia, were made to believe that France forced war upon them, and Frenchmen that their Ambassador had been insulted at Ems.

Nothing is more instructive than Bismarck's direct statement when he wished to vindicate his claims as maker of the German Empire. "The King," he says, "was at Ems. I was at Varzin when, in Paris, there was the outcry against the candidacy of Prince Leopold Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain. The French acted entirely like men who had lost their head: I speak particularly of the Government, with Émile Ollivier at the helm. Ollivier was in no way at the height of the situation, and he did not dream of the harm which he did in the *Corps législatif* with his imprudent bravadoes. The situation was then extremely favorable for us. We were really challenged, and, as for a long time we had been convinced that we would have to settle our quarrel with France, the present moment seemed to us marked to unsheathe our sword. I therefore left Varzin for Berlin to consult there with Moltke and Roon upon important questions. On the way I received the following telegram, 'Prince Charles Antony of Hohenzollern has, for the sake of peace, withdrawn the candidacy of his son Leopold, everything is all right.'

"I was greatly surprised at that unexpected solution, for I asked myself the question: 'Will there ever be such a favorable opportunity?' (to fight.)

"As soon as I was in Berlin, I called Rolandt and said to him, 'Telegraph to my house that I will return in three days.' At the same time, in a dispatch addressed to His Majesty at Ems, I sent my resignation as Prime-minister and as Chancellor of the Confederation. In answer, I

received a reply whereby the King called me to Ems. For a long time I had clear ideas upon this situation and I said to myself, ‘If I go to Ems everything will come to nought. At most we shall reach a rotten compromise, and the only great solution (war with France) will escape us. I must do everything in my power to have His Majesty come to Berlin. Here better than at Ems the King will feel the pulse of the nation.’ I therefore exposed to him in the most respectful manner the motives which prevented me from going to Ems; my presence in Berlin was, at that time, absolutely indispensable.

“Happily, the French, short-sighted and arrogant, did at that time everything that they could to sink the new chariot deeper into the mire. They asked to have the King sign a document which would be tantamount to a profound humiliation.¹ The King asked my advice by telegraph. I answered him with a good conscience, ‘It is impossible to sign.’

“I had invited Moltke and Roon to dine on the evening of July 14th, and we spoke of all eventualities. We all shared the hope that the senseless course of France, that the unheard-of invitation addressed to our King, would set aside the danger of a weakish transaction without glory. (That is, a peaceful solution.) Then—we were still at the table—came a dispatch from Ems which began as follows:

“‘The news of the renunciation of the Hereditary

¹ Unreasonable as Benedetti’s request was, he did not use the brutal forms which are implied in Bismarck’s words. There is a gentleness in Benedetti’s language which contrasts with the Teutonic harshness of the Chancellor. Had the acts of the French Ambassador been all that Bismarck says, that even would not have justified a step which meant war.

Prince of Hohenzollern having been officially communicated by the Spanish Government to that of France, the French Ambassador, at Ems, has again addressed to His Majesty a request to be authorized to telegraph to Paris that His Majesty the King pledged himself forever to refuse his consent in case the Hohenzollerns should resume their candidacy.'

"There followed a long statement, the sense of which was that the King referred to what he had already said to Count Benedetti, who had received his answer with gratitude and that he would communicate it to his Government.

"Thereupon, Benedetti asked again to be received by the King, were it only to hear once more from the lips of His Majesty the confirmation of what he had said in the promenade. Then the dispatch added:

"However, His Majesty refused to receive once more the French Ambassador and sent him word by the aide-de-camp that "His Majesty has nothing more to communicate to the Ambassador."

"After I had read the dispatch, Roon and Moltke in a similar way dropped their knives and forks upon the table, and pushed back their chairs. There was a long silence. We were all profoundly depressed. We had the feeling that the affair was sinking in the sands.

"I then turned to Moltke and asked him this question: 'The tool which we need for the war, our army, is it really good enough so that we could begin war depending upon the greatest probability of success?' Moltke had a confidence as firm as a rock: 'We never had a better tool than at the present moment,' he said. Roon, in whom it is true I had less confidence, fully confirmed what Moltke had said.

"‘Very well, then, continue to eat undisturbed,’ said I to my two guests. I seated myself at a little round marble table which was at the side of the one where they were eating. I re-read the dispatch, took my pencil and scratching out deliberately all the passage in which it was said that Benedetti had asked for a new audience, etc., I allowed to remain only the head and tail. Now the dispatch had an entirely different air. I read it to Moltke and to Roon in the new form which I had given it.

“They both exclaimed, ‘Splendid! That will produce its effect.’

“We continued to eat with the best appetite.

“I ordered immediately that the dispatch be sent as rapidly as possible, by the telegraph offices, to all the papers and to all the missions.¹ And we were still together when we began to receive the desired information upon the effect the dispatch had produced in Paris. It had burst like a shell. After having made a most humiliating request to our King, the dispatch made the French believe that their representative had been treated rudely by him. All the loungers of the boulevard were of the opinion that such a thing could not be endured. The shout ‘To Berlin! to Berlin’ was uttered by those howlers of the crowd. There was the effect intended.

“The effect was the same here as there. The King, who, yielding to my pressing representations, interrupted his cure at Ems and returned to Berlin, was completely surprised by the clamorous joy which the people manifested everywhere as he passed. He did not understand what had taken place. The indescribable enthusiasm which burst with furor in Berlin seized and shook deeply

¹ To all the representatives of Prussia abroad.

our old master. His eyes grew moist. He recognized that this was truly a national war, a popular war which the people demanded and had to have.

"Even before our arrival in Berlin we had received from the King the authorization of mobilizing at least a part of our army. When the Prince Royal left the train, he purposely spoke very loud in the station of the mobilization at hand; the enthusiasm increased even more. When we reached the Castle, His Majesty was disposed to mobilize all the army.

"The sequel you know. There is a point in it concerning which Gramont, in his *Mémoires*, expresses his sincere astonishment. He could not see the reason why, after things had taken such a pacific turn, the belligerent current had triumphed. 'A sinister apparition came to view. Suddenly everything is changed. What had happened? Here was Bismarck (arriving) in Berlin!' That is just about what one reads in the *Mémoires* of de Gramont. I quote from memory. In any case, I was the 'sinister apparition.'

"I add that I was authorized to make what erasures seemed to me absolutely necessary. I had the freedom to publish the dispatch *in extenso* or by extracts. I have not regretted to have made extracts."¹

The following conclusions grow out of Bismarck's accounts:

1. Bismarck left Varzin because he wanted the war.
2. He was cast down when he heard of the withdrawal of Prince Leopold's candidacy.
3. He, von Moltke and von Roon were dejected when

¹ The author was not able to get access to the Vienna *Free Press* of Nov. 20, 1892. The text here given is from *Le Temps* of Nov. 23.

the Ems dispatch arrived, and showed that the question with France was virtually settled along the lines of peace, or might be.

4. He would not go to Ems because he had not worked up those around the King, while in Berlin his press and his followers had done the work of excitement.

5. De Gramont and Émile Ollivier, bombastic and swashbuckling as they were, never used in the *Corps législatif*, even by exception, such language as that of Bismarck in the Reichstag during the subsequent years that he remained in power.¹

6. A fact which proves that Benedetti was not provoking or arrogant is that he received the King's answer "with gratitude."

7. The King not only did not insult the French Ambassador, as the mutilated dispatch had reported it to the French, but he was courteous to him, and at last did really receive him in keeping with the Ambassador's respectful request.²

8. The intent in mutilating the dispatch is that it was "an opportunity that never would recur again" to fight.

9. He kept only "the head and the tail" of the dispatch, leaving out what was essential to its understand-

¹ In a conversation with Lord Loftus, Ambassador of Great Britain to Berlin, Bismarck gave him to understand that he was about to address a challenge to France on account of the utterances of de Gramont in the Chamber of Deputies. *Letter of Lord Loftus to Lord Granville, July 13, 1870.* Had not the Ems dispatch expedient succeeded, he would have found other pretexts for a war.

² Mr. James W. Headlam, speaking upon this, says, "Both were anxious to avoid war, and the King to the last treated Benedetti with marked graciousness; he had while at Ems invited him to the royal table, and even now, the next morning before leaving Ems, granted him an audience at the station to take leave." *Bismarck*, p. 338.

ing. It was a fraud and a practical forgery which he did not date from Berlin but from Ems. It was sent as the King's dispatch.

10. Without forgetting the stupid levity of the Tuilleries, as the noisy agitation of small French cliques, we must assert, as Bismarck has done, that he was the great decisive personal factor that brought the war about. He was proud of it. As he says, "I have never regretted to have made extracts."

As the war began, the would-be aggressor of Switzerland, the author of the Danish war, the manipulator of the Austro-Prussian war, the mutilator of the Ems dispatch followed his sovereign to the battlefield. He "had some days previously partaken of the Sacrament in his own room."¹ After performing this act inaugurated by Him who said, "Do this in remembrance of Me," he entered the war of his own making which cost the lives of 200,000 Germans and of 300,000 Frenchmen, maimed multitudes for life, and tore away 2,000,000 people from the land they loved. In a moment of despondency and probably of remorse, October 21, 1877, he said, "There is no doubt, however, that I have caused unhappiness to great numbers. But for me three great wars would not have taken place, 80,000 men would not have been killed and would not now be mourned by parents, brothers, sisters and widows."² "Eighty thousand men . . . killed!" How difficult for Bismarck to tell the truth! Busch relates that during the Franco-German war his chief overtook some *francs-tireurs* that were prisoners. He

¹ Busch, M., *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, N. Y., vol. I, p. 8.

² Busch, M., *Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History*, vol. II, p. 164.

spoke to them with great harshness. "I told them," he said, "You shall all be hanged, you are not soldiers, you are assassins."¹ These men patriots, though belonging to free corps, defending their country against invaders, and about to die, were insulted by him who had sent so many thousands to an untimely death. Gladstone made a signal mistake when he called Abdul-Hamid *the* great assassin. When Vaillant, the French anarchist, exploded a bomb in the Chamber of Deputies the *Hamburger Nachrichten* reproached the socialistic organ, the *Vorwärts*, for the lack of indignation in its columns on account of this crime. This paper answered that the noted anarchist was less criminal than the forger of the Ems dispatch, whose hands were stained with the blood of hundreds of thousands of men.

¹ *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, p. 61.

III

THE CONFLICT

FRENCH victims of this act were long in realizing the extent to which they had been deceived. The *Affaires étrangères* made protests. Benedetti gave his own account of what had happened at Ems. De Gramont furnished his version of the events that led to the fatal war. Sorel, in 1875, made it morally certain that Bismarck had been the great factor in rendering the war unavoidable. Liebknecht was the first in the press to reveal the "nameless crime." Von Roon and von Moltke, with great discretion, gave an account of the night of the supreme misdeed, but the Germans continued their accusations against France. At last, the Iron Chancellor himself made the confessions which we have placed before our readers. Of course the men most guilty in bringing about this catastrophe, Bismarck like the Duc de Gramont,¹ von Moltke² and others, men of a bygone age who had not even the excuse of belonging to the fatalistic school of history, repeated the commonplace statement that the war was inevitable. A fact beyond question is the statement of von Sybel, repeated in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, that the people of France did not wish the war any more than the people of Germany.³ Sorel had pointed out the same fact.⁴ The

¹ III, 98, 728.

² V, 21, 275.

³ III, 128, 685.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 197.

act of Bismarck was at once followed by a wide spreading of legends in Germany about the insults and intended humiliation of Prussia by the French Government, of the courtesy of Benedetti to the King, all springing from the false impression created by the Ems dispatch. The Iron Chancellor cleverly secured the same unity among the public men of Germany as that which exists now. There was a general recital of the horrors of the old French invasions and of their new aggressive aim. On July 18, four days after the horrible deed, Bismarck issued a circular to be sent to the representatives of North Germany which Sorel calls "*injures officielles* in the manner of barbarian heroes"¹ who insulted each other before beginning their fight.

Calumny was ever a weapon of the Chancellor against those whom he wished to attack. During the eight years that he represented Prussia at the Diet of Frankfurt he keeps on denouncing Austrian intrigues,² Austrian aggressions, Austrian representatives.³ He tells how non-Prussians "gambled and drank, philandered, intrigued and danced."⁴ His portrait of the Austrian Count Thun is equal to some of Voltaire's satires of his enemies.⁵ His sketch of Herr von Prokesch is the perfection of a character seen through the prism of Prussian hatred and drawn with sulphuric acid.⁶ He snubs them, slanders them, and when he does not assail their morals, it is their dress or their manners that he attacks.⁷ The imperial

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 201.

² Lowe, vol. I, pp. 122, 123, 125, 157.

³ *Munroe Smith, Lowe*, vol. I, p. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

house of Austria does not fare any better. "The Hapsburgs have really been great through plundering old families—the Hungarians, for instance. At bottom they are only a family of police spies who lived upon and made their fortune by confiscations."¹ In this he was imitated by other Prussians. Treitschke said, "I am German and a Protestant, do not expect me ever to approve a single act of Catholic and despotic Austria."² Slanders had prepared the work of needle-guns at Sadowa.

In his conversations Bismarck never fails now to blackmail the French whom in former days he has so flattered. Here are a few Bismarckian pearls. "France is a nation of ciphers." The French "are nothing more than 30,000,000 of Kaffres."³ "They have barbarians for comrades, and from their wars in Algiers, China, Cochin China and Mexico, they have become barbarians themselves."⁴ "Strip off the white skin of such a Gaul and you will find a Turco."⁵ Still speaking of the French at large they are "an uncleanly people,"⁶ "a nation full of envy and jealousy that had been mortified by the success at Königgrätz, and could not forgive it, though it in no wise damaged them."⁷

Frenchwomen are not spared. "I have traveled a good deal through France, during peace, too, and I don't recollect that I ever saw anywhere a single nice-looking

¹ Busch, M., *Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History*, vol. I, p. 273.

² III, 145, 692.

³ Busch, *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, p. 146.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 586.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

girl, but I have seen frightfully ugly creatures often. I believe that there are a few, only the pretty ones go off to Paris to make their market there.”¹ Did he not go so far as to say that he thought that when Jules Favre went to discuss the conditions of peace with him, “he was painted white”?² The countess, his wife, writes to him, “I am afraid there may be no Bibles in France, so I will send you a psalm-book by the first opportunity, that you may read the prophecy against the French: ‘I say unto thee that the wicked shall be rooted out.’”³

The German university professors were bitter beyond expression; they used their vast erudition to unearth facts about the past of the French or arguments against them. The celebrated men of the country acted likewise. Wagner lost all sense of truth and of justice. Strauss, speaking of the successes of the German army, considered them as just chastisements of the French for their “thirst of rapine.” According to him, it was not the literature only that was corrupt, it was the very nation itself. Before the war the good Germans had “no idea of the rottenness of French society and of the dissolution of all moral ties.”⁴ This last aspersion called forth, and deserved, the most pungent sarcasms of one of the gentlest of men that France ever produced, Ernest Renan. Mommsen in Italy made a similar onslaught upon the hated Gauls, when speaking of “French immorality,” of “moral dissolution,” “absence of family spirit,” and of “permanent frivolity.”⁵ The Prussian

¹ Busch, *Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History*, vol II, p. 116.

² Busch, *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, p. 186.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 587.

⁴ III, 97, 548.

⁵ III, 40, 269.

Machiavel crowned his infamous course by another abominable performance. In his former diplomatic conferences, seeking the neutrality of France, he had unquestionably promised compensations along the Rhine, then he threw over Luxemburg, and finally led the French to turn their eyes toward Belgium. He and Benedetti sought practical solutions. They reached conclusions upon this matter; Bismarck asked the French Ambassador to write them down. It was he that had made the proposal, Benedetti had been but a scribe. On the 25th of July, a few days after the declaration of war, he published this document as a proposal of France to seize Belgium.¹ The effect of this act was prodigious in discrediting France. These calumnies did their work among neutrals. The Russians were with Bismarck at the time, but when they learned the truth they were greatly incensed against Prussia.² So it was later on in England and in America.

The war itself was a conquering march through France. The fact that France had no treaty of alliance with any Power shows that this war was unexpected by her and that she had not planned it.³ The French were unprepared, but the Prussian campaign had been carefully contrived long before. After the Luxemburg Affair, Prussian officers, in many garbs, sometimes as peddlers, as tourists and at other times as commercial agents, were studying the land, preparing maps that were far more perfect than those of French officers. When Moltke went to Paris with the King of Prussia he took "strategic walks" in the neighborhood of Paris.⁴ He

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 423; Headlam, *Op. cit.*, p. 281.

² Novicow, p. 262.

³ Ollivier, Émile, *L'Empire libéral*, vol. XIV, p. 106.

⁴ Lowe, vol. I, p. 445.

had studied the year before the whole French frontier. The whole plan of invasion was carried on with precision, with energy and with indescribable cruelty. The shelling of the Cathedral of Strasburg, the almost complete destruction of Châteaudun, the burning of Bazeilles, the sending of bombs into the Latin Quarter of Paris, the disregarding of the Red Cross flags over the Hospital of the Val-de-Grâce, the striking of the Pantheon, the wholesale destruction of *francs-tireurs*, the systematic plundering in the occupied provinces, the trains loaded with booty sent to Germany, all this is still vividly remembered. Wars, cruel in themselves, have always traits of cruelty that make one shudder, but the Prussian war by its harshness took one back to the methods of warfare of bygone days. The army which, after Sadowa, had seen Bismarck share the spoils of war, helped itself upon French soil most liberally. This has been recorded by most reliable witnesses, among whom are Lavisse as well as Gabriel Monod, men whose testimony is above suspicion.

Bismarck could be petty in his acts. As France and Germany were in the last days of the conflict, did he not endeavor to substitute German instead of French as the language of diplomacy? All the Governments which he thus addressed answered him in their own vernacular.¹ Henceforth he sent his dispatches in French. This war was not only deprived of sincere motives but of chivalry and of all generosity. Already at Sedan he had treated Napoleon with hardness. He would not allow him to see the King until the military commanders had exacted

¹ Busch, M., *Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History*, vol. I, p. 383.

from him the severest possible terms.¹ Similarly with Jules Favre when the French patriot appealed for easier terms and stood his ground, "Too late!" he said, "the Bonapartists are before you." "We are resolved," said he, "to make peace with the best contracting party we can find; the Emperor, the Prince Imperial with a Regency, or Prince Napoleon; and if you do not agree to our conditions we have in Germany about 100,000 excellent French troops captured at Metz, who are still wholly devoted to the Imperial cause."² This was not absolutely true.

To Thiers, who spoke of appealing to Europe, he replied, "If you speak to me of Europe, I will speak to you of Napoleon and of the 100,000 bayonets which, at a wink from us, would re-seat him on his throne."³ The envoys had to yield to what the Russian sociologist, Novicow, calls the "Peace of Damocles,"⁴ which he characterizes as "one of the most fatal turning-points of European history,"⁵ the Treaty of Frankfurt. Speaking to a group of citizens of this city on his way to Berlin, Bismarck said, "I bring you a peace of fifty years,"⁶ whereby he meant that France was bled and exhausted, incapable of recovering before half a century. He had needlessly humiliated her, after his obsequious attitude of former years, by the foundation of the German Empire at Versailles. He had unnecessarily hurt her feelings by the entrance of the German army into Paris.

¹ Busch, M., *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, pp. 108-110.

² Lowe, vol. I, p. 625.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 632.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁶ III, 138, 102.

He demanded six and obtained five billions of francs¹ as well as Alsace and Lorraine. When the agreement had been reached Bismarck asked about future commercial relations; the delegates said that their instructions were to keep the *status quo*, but, said Jules Favre, "Bismarck opposed this with downright vehemence, declaring that he would rather recommence the war of cannons than expose himself to a war of tariffs."² Germany secured the rights of the most favored nation. Bismarck almost always showed his worst side to his enemies.

At this time there was genuine mutual hatred between the two peoples; that of the Germans was deepened by traditional legends and falsehoods recently circulated by their Government. The French were still thinking and talking of humaneness, of the higher laws of war, of immanent justice which deepened their sense of horror of a war after Treitschke's heart and which ought to have pleased Bernhardi. They could only vindicate outraged justice and some of them talked of *revanche*. The small but noisy set that was temporarily to win some popularity had not yet arisen. The Déroulèdes were exceptions. The best citizens of the country, having silenced every *Miles Gloriosus* of the last days of the Empire, were pondering over their discovery of a new Germany with its gospel of violence—they who had thought her the champion of reason, of justice and the friend of anti-militarism—they who had considered Prussia as representing "the future and Austria the past"³—they who, when the news of Sadowa reached

¹ As a matter of fact Germany received 5,567,000,000 francs in three years.

² Lowe, vol. II, p. 5.

³ Napoleon quoted by Lowe, vol. I, p. 234.

them, made great displays of flags and of illuminations¹ were now burning with violent indignation.

Bismarck, mistaken in his policy in reference to Germany, and overexacting in reference to France, did nothing to allay this wounded national sensitiveness. The Treaty of Frankfurt was hard. Had it been more oppressive, Europe would have protested. Deprecations not a few were already heard in England and in America. However, when circumstances demanded the interpretation of the Treaty, he ever made it harder than the text warranted. He took advantage of the Commune to assert that the Germans would be the judges of the time of their departure from Paris, though the terms of the Treaty were explicit.² He made himself the only and absolute interpreter of the text. Through General Manteuffel, he drove such a sharp bargain with the French Government, for the support of the army of occupation, that millions were practically added to the colossal indemnity and remitted to the Prussian and Saxon war offices.³ The French soldiers who, during their captivity, had committed some misdemeanor and those prisoners members of the free corps, not under but approved by the French Government, were still kept in German fortresses. Bismarck showed no leniency toward them.⁴ He wanted to exercise a sovereign fear over Frenchmen. Two German soldiers had been killed in a brawl, and the juries, right or wrong, rendered verdicts of not guilty.

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 392.

² I, 93, 555.

³ Von Moltke, *Speech in the Reichstag. Essays and Speeches and Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 68.

⁴ De Broglie, *La Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron à Berlin*, 1896, p. 14.

This decision in keeping with the institution of the country were valid, but Bismarck threatened at once to disregard it and to do his own police.¹ He sent a dispatch to that effect to the French Minister and at the same time gave a copy of it to his papers, in which there were commentaries most galling for France.² On June 16, 1871, the very day that Emperor William made his triumphal entrance into Berlin, Bismarck learned that a zone which had been reserved to the German troops had, as Jules Favre stated, been entered by French soldiers through a misunderstanding. Dismounting from his charger, he scratched a note informing the authorities that if the troops were not withdrawn they would be attacked at midnight. To the Chief of the Corps of occupation he also sent the following telegram, "If the French outposts advance further, attack them."³

Owing to the habits of economy and thrift as well as the earnest patriotism of the people the Government under Thiers was able to pay the war indemnity before the time mentioned in the Treaty. A clause of it authorized this, but none referred to the immediate removal of troops after the payment. For the great German Shylock that was not in the bond. Advancing the payment, it was expected by the French that, as a corollary, the German soldiers would also hasten the time of their departure, but he demurred. M. Thiers asserted that the terms of payment and occupation were inseparable, as they were extreme terms—that if France could not defer the payment of her obligations she could anticipate the dates fixed by the Treaty, and that Ger-

¹ De Broglie, p. 16.

² Matter, *Op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 354.

³ Lowe, vol. II, p. 7.

many being paid she should remove her troops from the six departments still occupied.

This situation resembled that of the Prussians in France after Waterloo. They remained in France until 1818, and would not have left, even then, had it not been for Wellington.¹ Strange to say, in order to allow the advanced payment followed by the German evacuation of the country, a consummation which by peaceful peoples would have been devoutly wished, Bismarck wanted compensations.² In the steps taken for the restoration of normal relations between the two countries, he ever reminded the vanquished of his might, of what he could have done with it and of what he could do now. For him Prussian might, then German might, was right.

After this Bismarck was rewarded with the title of Prince and with the gift of the domain of Friedrichsruh, officially valued at 1,000,000 thalers, but which in reality was worth 3,000,000.³ His attitude toward France hardly changed. He was rarely fairer or friendlier. He had all along his fingers upon the Keyboard of German public opinion, in the management of which he was a master. It was not in vain that early in his career he had been intrusted with the management of the Prussian Press Bureau,⁴ and had made it a perfect tool of governmental purpose. By it, he so kept in touch with national feelings that the people shared his aims. On reading Maurice Busch's *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, and seeing the extent to which the Chancellor's Secretary wrote articles for the press everywhere, ever seeking

¹ I, 96, 308.

² I, 95, 694.

³ Matter, *Op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 283.

⁴ Lowe, vol. I, p. 153.

to bring Germans to the aims of Bismarck, one realizes the extent to which he had made the press a tool of his policy. What most astonished Germans was that the French were not discouraged, that they paid no homage to their conquerors, that they did not passively accept their defeat and become reconciled with their victors.

They were disappointed that the French did not accept the final decisions of brute force, but appealed to the immanent justice of the universe, the nemesis and the rewarder of history.

The way in which the bruised Frenchmen reasserted their energy, and offered fourteen times more money than Thiers needed to pay Germany, a fact which aroused the admiration of the whole world, excited rather bitter feelings on the other side of the Rhine. France, defeated, mangled and crushed, healed her national wounds like a healthy being. The English Teutophile, Charles Lowe, who so praised Bismarck, speaks of the "truly Antaeus power of her recuperation."¹ She rebuilt her finances, displayed a new energy, and a new intelligence in her education, reinvigorated her moral ideals, made over her industrial life, extended her colonies, which, later, became an object of German envy, restored her army to an adequate condition in keeping with the defensive duties of a great Power, and by her sterling worth resumed her place in the councils of nations. While the war hounds were barking on both sides of the frontier, though much louder east of the Rhine, she was devoted to the evolution of her national life and to the framing of institutions in keeping with her present needs. For the third time in her history, having found the monarchical form of Government inadequate, she

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. II, 51.

was trying republican institutions, with which Bismarck had not the least sympathy. He would rather sign a treaty of peace with the impossible Comte de Chambord than with Thiers. When the heir to the throne of the Bourbons declined to accept the tricolor flag and hence could not be King, Bismarck, speaking sarcastically to the monarchical French Ambassador, said, "You will have to keep Adolphe I"—referring to Adolphe Thiers. Gontaut-Biron replied, "Yes, provided he has no heir."¹

Notwithstanding such sallies, half sarcasm, half humor, he continued to annoy France. At the election of Maréchal MacMahon to the presidency, the great German statesman demanded that the chief Magistrate of France should himself notify his rise to power to the Emperor of Germany. He further asked that the Ambassador of France have new credentials. He had induced Russia and Austria to take the same stand. It is customary in monarchies to renew at the death of the King the credentials of ambassadors, because the sovereignty resides in the monarch, who is its representative, while in a republic the sovereign is the nation, which does not change.² The explanations given by the Iron Chancellor showed that he was decided to meddle with French internal matters. When Gontaut-Biron made remonstrances Bismarck threatened to withdraw his ambassador from Paris and that Russia and Austria would follow the same course.³ He went so far as to say that he would not recognize Gambetta as president of the Republic were he elected.⁴ He demanded that the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

² Broglie, *Op. cit.*, p. 109. Matter, *Op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 375.

³ Broglie, p. 111.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

French Government, which had already warned French bishops to be moderate in their language if they spoke of the *Kulturkampf*, should pursue and repress them.¹ Dr. Windthorst and his supporters rightly denounced the Chancellor's silencing French bishops as "an unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of France."² That he should have been unfriendly to freedom of discussion in his own country was perfectly proper, but that he should force a neighboring state to adopt the same attitude is inadmissible. The episcopate of France constituted an insignificant minority out of touch with the nation. The Government was unfriendly to their criticisms and to their acts, but notwithstanding that the Chancellor identified them with the nation which he threatened with war. "I declare," he said, "that if France supports the Catholics in Germany I will not wait to have her ready. That she will be in two years: I will seize before that the favorable opportunity."³ He would have done it, but European sentiment and the attitude of two European rulers saved her.

¹ Broglie, p. 163.

² Lowe, vol. II, p. 61.

³ Broglie, *Op. cit.*, pp. 166, 188.

IV

THE AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

As we have already seen, before attacking Austria in 1866, Bismarck wanted that country to join Prussia in an aggression against France.¹ It was on some of his later proposals to Vienna that von Beust spoke of Bismarck's treaties of alliance, as *des chiffons de papier*. After the Franco-German war, the two adversaries upon the battlefield of Bohemia, Emperor William and Emperor Francis Joseph, who had not seen each other since Sadowa, met at Ischl, in Austria, while Bismarck himself and von Beust conferred together at Gastein, preparing an understanding to be followed by concerted action. Unconsciously the Chancellor was working toward what seemed a great federation or federations of Europe. An honest federation without any aggressive thought behind it would have been a great boon for the world, and a most gratifying step forward towards the union of the civilized states which is bound to come. Such was not Bismarck's aim. He brought into that combination the Emperor of Russia. Thus the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs and the Romanofs formed what was known as the "Three Kaiser League." The three rulers had met at Warsaw, in 1860, to discuss the European situation.² In 1872 they met again in Berlin, where there were the usual festivities, imperial embracings and conferences.

¹ III, 73, 523.

² Lowe, vol. I, p. 265.

Whatever one may think of this trio of Powers, and much good could have been said about it, one cannot avoid the conclusion that its chief object, at this time, was the isolation of France. One of the laudatory historians of Bismarck sums up the character of this reunion as follows: "The Meeting of the three Emperors marked the first stage in the consummate policy by which Bismarck sought to isolate France from the rest of Europe, and thus minimize the danger of a war of revenge."¹

This policy was pursued to the bitter end, and, two-score years later, it failed because of its unjust purpose and its subterfuges. Some German writers said, ironically, that the League was for French happiness, to prevent Frenchmen from doing foolish things² and to preserve peace, which the French were far from disturbing. On the morrow of the war, the attorney general Renouard, in his address at the reopening of the *Cour de cassation* of Paris, spoke upon "Justice above Force." He closed with these words: "We, the vanquished of yesterday, dare to assert, in the face of the world, witness of our recent defeats, that the resentment of our wounded pride does not extinguish in us the intelligence of eternal verities: peace is good, war is criminal. Our beloved fatherland can give no more striking sign of her renascence than by not sacrificing to her rancor the cause of civilization. Let her disdain from demanding to force the revenge that she hopes; it is worthy of her to seek in the supremacy of justice the reparation of her ills and the return to her of all her children."³

¹ Lowe, *Op. cit.*, vol. II, 22.

² III, 122, 954.

³ Dreyfus, F., *L'arbitrage international*, 1894, p. 372.

It would be easy to multiply passages like this showing the spirit of leading French citizens. In spite of that Bismarck formed his League, which was so strong that its members freed themselves from the most elementary rules of international courtesy. Their purpose was to paralyze France, and paralyzed she would not be. She so acted that she soon regained the respect and the esteem of the Powers, who had begun to understand Bismarck's maneuvers, and to know how he had risen upon the stepping stones of others' dead selves to higher things—that his international combinations were not for the development of the best European life, but machines subserving his ambition. France attempted none, and devoted herself to the duty of building up her republican institutions, for which he did not lack contempt. "A republic," he said, "will, with great difficulties, find an ally against us, a Monarchical Government."¹ The genius which was embodied in the Iron Chancellor was capable of making some mistakes. Nations cannot be indifferent to the interests of their growing democracy whatever be the form of their Government. France needed peace, wished for peace, and worked for peace. Gambetta said in 1880, "If our hearts beat it is not for an ideal of bloody adventures, it is that what remains of France should remain entire, and that we may depend upon the future to see if there is an immanent justice which comes on its chosen day and at its chosen hour."²

Frenchmen were in constant fear of seeing the helmeted men reappear in the East. Menaces were frequent, not to say constant. In 1874, von Moltke, asking

¹ II, 6, 925.

² Bérard, V., *La France et Guillaume II*, p. 42.

for more war credits in the Reichstag, said, "What we have conquered in half a year by arms we must defend by arms for half a century." He adds later on, "After its wars Germany has caused herself to be feared and to be esteemed, but she is not loved." True enough! He draws pictures of the terrible armaments of France. Forgetting the Bismarck dinner and the Ems dispatch, he says, "What is borne to us from across the Vosges is a rabid cry of revenge for the reverses which France herself has courted." By a singular contradiction, he recognizes that the majority of Frenchmen "is thoroughly imbued with a sense of the absolute necessity of, above all, preserving peace."¹ On another occasion, in the same hall of imperial legislation, discussing socialism, he evokes needlessly the apparition "of the *professeurs des barricades* and the *pétroleuses* of the Commune of 1871."² The Germans used the French as the Spartans did the drunken *Helotes* for the education of their children. The Communists suggested mistaken ideas to Moltke; some were Communalists demanding local government, some of them held doctrines of communism, but the greater number had nothing to do with any new social theories whatsoever.

The effect of his speech before a conservative German audience was telling. As his examples of the outcome of socialism were taken from Paris and the French it is needless to say that it wounded the susceptibilities of masses of the countrymen of Thiers who were no friends of the destroyers of the Tuileries or of the murderers of Archbishop Darboy. In another instance he speaks with an unblushing daring of the war. "In 1870 there

¹ *Essays, Speeches and Memoirs*, vol. II, p. III.

² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

was as yet no united and powerful Germany in the heart of Europe, and the war, with which France took us by surprise, was waged principally with a view to preventing its establishment.”¹

There we have two positively erroneous assertions. First, France did not force a war upon Prussia and, second, she was not opposed to a spontaneous and peaceful unification of Germany. Every statement made by German leaders, and every argument built on it, led to one unfair and unfriendly conclusion. Bismarck was even afraid that French finances could not long bear the strain of French military burdens² and like his friend, Moltke, was certain that war was forthcoming and ought to be anticipated. Wilhelmstrasse discussed questions of the French army as if France had been a German protectorate.³ The German Ambassador in Paris, von Arnim, did not hesitate to criticize the country and her politics.⁴ Bismarck accused him of having “facilitated, if not directly caused, the change of government by thwarting his efforts to keep M. Thiers in power.”⁵

The German press was most aggressive. In 1875, it reached a high pitch of excitement which was far from spontaneous. M. Tardieu has summed up the trend of their grievances as follows: “To finish once for all with France is not merely opportune. It is a duty Germany owes to herself and to humanity. Europe will never be tranquil as long as a struggle is possible, and there will be this possibility of a struggle as long as the blunder

¹ *Essays, Speeches and Memoirs*, p. 116.

² *Ibid.*, p. 205.

³ Broglie, *Op. cit.*, p. 224.

⁴ V, 14, 19.

⁵ Lowe, vol. II, pp. 39, 50.

made by the Treaty of Frankfurt remains unrepaired. For it leaves France in a position to survive and re-commence the duel. Germany is troubled by the consciousness of having only half-crushed her enemy and of being able to defend herself only by sleeping with one eye open.”¹

It is well known that Bismarck had been for some time bent upon a new invasion of France. The old Emperor, listening to a speech of the Prince prepared for the opening of the Reichstag in 1874, declared that that speech was a “menace” to France. He insisted that it should be modified in a pacific sense. He said, later on, to Prince Clovis von Hohenlohe: “I do not want war with France, I am too old to undertake anything like that, but I fear lest Bismarck may lead me to it little by little.”²

In 1875, he intended to attack France and to “bleed her white,” but was prevented by Queen Victoria, through the energetic action of Lord Derby,³ and by the Czar. In 1887, he wished again to provoke her and had even attempted to secure the neutrality of St. Petersburg in advance,⁴ but the Czar was bent upon a pacific policy. He realized all along that the great German’s purpose was to strike France. By a strange coincidence, the two Powers which were bound ultimately to be her friends stood by her then. Bismarck’s hostility changed in form, but remained unabated. As the French Ambassador opposed many of his anti-Gallican designs, he ceased to be *persona grata*, and was attacked by the

¹ *France and the Alliances*, 1908, p. 124.

² Matter, *Op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 380.

³ *Journal des Débats*, Nov. 27, 1893.

⁴ Mévil, A., *De la paix de Francfort à la Conférence d’Algésiras*, 1909, p. 5.

Bismarckian papers. According to them, he conspired against the Empire, he had become a center of intrigues, he had endeavored to secure the favor of the Emperor over and above the head of the Chancellor, who wanted his recall.¹ In a letter to M. Decazes, the Ambassador exclaims, "That man does not forgive me the service which, with honor, thank God, I have rendered my country."² The Prussian Richelieu could hardly bear the wise and judicious policy advocated by the Ambassador and practiced by France which foiled his belligerent purpose.³

He ever finds occasions to show his unfriendliness. In 1894, as he received a deputation of German teachers, he speaks of the teaching of history in the German schools and at once proceeds to criticize bitterly the French methods—that the Gallican teachers are incapable of imparting to their pupils anything like impartial and objective history—that they are very deficient in their knowledge of geography, etc. France under the Republic never had a blind interpretation of national history like that of Treitschke, nor has Germany any popular text-books of history superior to those of Gabriel Monod and Lavisson, while the geographical text-books of Vidal de la Blache and Foncin—to mention only these—are equal to the best elsewhere. He accuses the French of waging a systematic war upon German securities. It is true that French financiers were unfriendly to national investments among the countries of the *Triplice*. They were unwilling to have their savings used against them by their avowed enemies.

¹ Broglie, *Op. cit.*, p. 259.

² *Ibid.*, p. 266.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

Right or wrong in so doing they were only following the object-lessons of Bismarck, who, when temporarily opposed to Russia, did the very thing with which he reproached the French. He repeated *ad nauseam* that France would attack Germany. In order to meet this fictitious danger the peaceful German taxpayer, trusting his leaders, consents to pay the taxes, but hates the French whom he makes responsible for this burden, and the Chancellor attains his twofold purpose, the credits and the culture of antagonism to France.

The red rag of the *revanche* is constantly held before their eyes. At times his accusations, made in public or made in print, are exhibited in posters; one of them was placed on the walls of Metz.¹ When the Government publishes alarming news one may be certain that a military project is in the air, and when negotiations are going on in Paris the press may be furious, but as soon as the arrangements are concluded it is almost silent. If the Reichstag refuses to vote the seven-year army bill, he conjures the members with the pictures of the Red-breeches about to cross the Vosges.² He speaks of "her hatred against all her neighbors" and of her being "the most turbulent nation that exists." He wanted to secure his vote. He knew that a mighty army is not only efficient for the purpose of obtaining a territory from a neighbor in time of war, but also to gain concessions in time of peace. In other words he wished to make it an instrument of intimidation. He was so provoking that Boulanger owed some of his popularity to the fact that while every public man in France was pacific, he dared, after one of Bismarck's bellicose

¹ III, 59, 237.

² III, 88, 210.

speeches, to answer him with energy.¹ However, as soon as Boulanger saw the popular effect of his challenge, he put his musket on his other shoulder and proclaimed that Boulangism meant peace. Like all demagogues he knew what the French people desired most and that he promised to them. "The fall of Boulanger," said Bebel in the Reichstag, "proves that France is not disposed to allow herself to be stirred to war and to go into it led by an adventurer."

The Germans have often expressed the regret that they are not loved by their western neighbors, without ever imagining that they themselves may be at fault, or that the French are a peaceful people. We are not here speaking of a group of individuals, of irresponsible cliques such as exist in every country, but of the men who were at the helm of things. They were proper and correct with their trans-Rhinean peers. On the other hand, Bismarck was haughty, arrogant. During the palmiest days of the *Drei-Kaiser-Bund*, his attitude was exasperating. He practically demanded that France should not help the Carlists of Spain and recognize the government of Marshal Serrano.² His stand toward Belgium in 1875 was menacing and the brave little state had her Bismarckian scare.³ He remonstrated with Italy because of the protection which the Quirinal, by the Papal Guarantee Law, gave to the Vatican.⁴ Spain, after the great consideration shown her to draw her people into the alliance, had her turn when the controversy about the Caroline Islands arose. For awhile

¹ Barclay, Sir Thomas, *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences*, p. 91.

² Lowe, vol. II, p. 59.

³ II, 9, 222.

⁴ II, p. 332.

he was hard and unyielding,¹ but at last the question was referred to the arbitration of the Pope. It was in the same spirit that he annoyed the Americans at Samoa.² In 1889, he showed his dictatorial spirit against Switzerland, because she gave shelter to German Socialists. With the support of Russia and Austria, at the time, he demanded from the Swiss the suppression of the right of asylum for socialistic fugitives and practically the limitation of Swiss sovereignty, though this was sanctioned and guaranteed by Europe.³

Again, he annoyed France by the use he made of the acts of the French Catholic Clergy. It has ever been repugnant to the Catholic Church to bend, or bow, before any political Power, and at times it has been her glory to face the mighty courageously, and, as in Belgium, to have a Cardinal Mercier stand for justice and humanity. What was contemptible in the Iron Chancellor was his cunning use of the rantings of some French bishops to alarm Italy, as if France intended to restore the temporal power of the Pope, a step which no French Government, not even that of President MacMahon, would have dared to take. Bismarck used French clericalism to fight German Catholicism at home, and to gain his ends in Italy. He took advantage of the erratic action of the Clergy to arouse Italian anger. He made the bishops representatives of the people of France, and then caused Frenchmen, many of whom at Magenta and Solferino had shed their blood for the independence of Italy—men still the best friends of the land of Cavour and Garibaldi—to appear as foes. This maneuver brought Italy into the

¹ III, 71, 235.

² III, 92, 477, 950.

³ III, 94, 236.

Triple Alliance with its crushing military burdens, a step which many Italians regretted then and regret even more now. By this time Russia had virtually slipped out of it, and was gravitating toward the French *rapprochement* which ultimately was to ripen into an alliance.

By his international combinations—less reliable than he thought—he created periods of continental anxiety that were detrimental to Europe and harmful to France.¹ Ever resourceful he worked, at times, in two ways to attain one result. Thus he and a representative of the Dual Monarchy offered Italy to take possession of Tunis.² The purpose was to arouse France and thereby send Italy toward Berlin and Vienna. Later on he encouraged the French to take it and they did, but his gift of Tunis served the same purpose. It embittered the Italians, though, among them, there remained those who could show their gratitude to France for her past services by approving her protectorate over Tunis. He intended, according to M. Tardieu, to use his new allies for the purpose of irritating and provoking France.³ He adds later on, "Italy was a puppet in the hands of Berlin."⁴ He followed the same course in Egypt. At times he sided with France and encouraged her to hold her ground and at other times he urged England to "take Egypt."⁵ He hoped that the Land of the Pharaohs would prove a bone of contention between the French and the English nation. He tried to draw Spain into his combinations. The German Crown Prince went to Madrid, where he worked for the German cause. King Al-

¹ III, 89, 235.

² III, 103, 889.

³ *France and the Alliances*, p. 91.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁵ Lowe, vol. II, p. 244.

phonso XII returned the visit in Berlin. William I appointed him colonel of a Prussian regiment, but it was stationed at Strasburg in the conquered country. The festivities on that occasion were such that a few days later the new Prussian colonel was greeted in Paris with hisses and groans, though, before, the Parisians were very friendly to him. Was this feast in Strasburg accidental or was it the purpose of the Chancellor to exasperate his neighbors again? It is impossible to tell.

In 1881, Rumania was apparently drawn into the same movement.¹ Inviting M. Bratiano to join the *Triplice*, he said, "We want peace, we are a league of peace; and if you desire peace, you may find support with us; but if war is your object, then you must go to others."² An alliance was reached, but the Rumanians demurred and the project had to be abandoned.³ King Milan, who was practically driven off his throne, and his reckless son who was murdered, disloyal to their people, also entered into the movement,⁴ but the Servians soon realized who their real friends were. Mr. Lowe, who, all along, has characterized the Bismarckian efforts as meant to isolate—he might have said, strike—France, speaks as follows: "The German Chancellor . . . had thus gradually imposed his pacific will on all European diplomacy, and gathered the nations of the Continent into a Peace League to which it was discreditable, and even dangerous, not to belong."⁵ The Bismarckian iron net was thus woven about France with a patience worthy of a better cause. Charles de Mazade, in 1883, wrote,

¹ Lowe, vol. II, p. 149.

² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

³ III, 109, 477.

⁴ Muir, Ramsay, *Britain's Case Against Germany*, 1914, p. 141.

⁵ Vol. II, p. 155.

"France is at present surrounded by a sort of circle created with as much cleverness as power in such a way as to compress her."¹ Indeed the *Triplex* ever protested that it loved peace, but it caused to rest over France menaces of a conflict that were more alarming because of their indefiniteness. Prince von Bismarck could indeed have created a large instrument of peace, but that which he evolved ultimately crumbled because of its unquestionably belligerent purpose.

One of Bismarck's successors, von Bülow, hints that the people who had joined this great alliance were drawn together by a sense of "common dangers,"² and there is the implication that they arose from France, but what could she have done had she wished, to Servia, to Rumania, to Spain, to Italy, to Austria or to Germany herself, bristling with armaments? The new Chancellor could not mention the least evidence of a French purpose to attack a single one of these peoples. France needed all her strength to cope with her overwhelming home problems. These "dangers" were simply fanciful creations of a German political leader who used them to help or justify an aggressive course. This gentleman has boundless faith in the *Dreibund* even when reduced by the secession of Russia, Spain, Servia and Rumania. He views it "as the resumption and the prolongation of the Holy Alliance of bygone days"³ and as "a mighty fortification dividing the continent into two."⁴ "Rarely, if ever, has the history of Europe witnessed so solid an alliance."⁵ In 1902, dealing with the same subject, he

¹ III, 60, 707.

² *Imperial Germany*, p. 69.

³ V, 7, 477.

⁴ *Imperial Germany*, p. 67.

⁵ VI, 23, 273.

says, "We will continue to maintain Germany so strong that our friendship shall be precious to each and that it may not be indifferent to anyone to incur our enmity."¹ In all his utterances there is a threat. "So solid an alliance," "the masterpiece of statecraft"² of Bismarck, received a strong blow, first by the Franco-Russian Alliance, then a second one by the Franco-Italian Entente and a third one from the Anglo-French Agreement. The remaining partner, Austria, is the prisoner of Germany, which now commands at the Ballplatz.

With the extension and apparent progress of the *Triplice* Bismarck did not fail to keep the French national nerves unstrung. In 1884, someone spoke to him of the possible drawbacks arising from the fact that Germany had no navy. He replied that if Germany had grievances there should be no need of going so far, and that the gates of Metz opened into France.³ Later on came the Schnoebelé incident. This man, an agent of the French Government, had been made liable for some of his acts. He was living in France. While there, however, German officials drew him, by deceit, into their territory and there arrested him.⁴ Frenchmen had no sympathy with the victim of this police system, but resented strongly the methods employed to seize him and, not without misgivings, demanded his release. The country was for a few days in a terrible suspense. The year was scarcely over, when along the frontier of the Vosges Mountains a German guard fired upon Frenchmen, killing one and wounding another on French soil.⁵

¹ V, 7, 477.

² Lowe, II, p. 116.

³ III, 64, 235.

⁴ III, 81, 222. Matter, *Op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 551.

⁵ III, 85, 950.

French protestations probably contributed to the character of his next great speech. On February 8, 1888, in the Reichstag he treats France with insulting contempt. "One does not always wage war through hatred," he said, "for were it so, France ought to be ceaselessly at war, not only with us, but also with England and Italy; she hates all her neighbors."¹ These were the senile rantings of a great man whose successors were to find France surrounded by "*un cercle d'alliances et d'amitiés, toutes faites de courtoisie et de cordialité.*"²

¹ Matter, *Op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 539.

² Pichon, S., *Discours*, Paris, Feb. 24, 1907.

V

THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS

WHEN Bismarck resigned, in 1890, Frenchmen could not but rejoice that their great enemy had ceased to be the Chancellor of Germany, and also that, later on, he and the Kaiser were no longer on friendly terms. They were far from the time when the Crown Prince, after his grandfather's death and when his own noble father was dying, spoke at a banquet of "Germany, with its chief killed, its lieutenant-colonel deeply wounded, gathering round its standard bearer, Bismarck."¹ Now the Prince, having come to power as King of Prussia and Emperor of Germany, soon indicated his purpose of being absolute. On March 5, 1890, at the banquet of the provincial Diet of Brandenburg he said, "I will break as a piece of glass those who will oppose me." Soon after he inscribed on his portrait *Sic volo, sic jubeo*. At the Rhinean Diet on May 4, 1891, he said, "There is only one master in the country and that master it is I." Later on, in Munich, he inscribed the following pretentious sentence, *Suprema lex regis voluntas*.² These assertions were a greater expression of absolute personal power than when Louis XIV said, *L'État, c'est moi*. These were uttered in France while Louis XIV was young, in an age of ignorance, but the Kaiser was speak-

¹ III, 86, 950.

² *Le Temps*, Nov. 17, 1891.

ing at the end of the nineteenth century, in enlightened Germany. What was worse than his formulae of divine rights, or what *Le Temps* called *césaropopism*, he assumed the position of "standard bearer" and he dismissed Bismarck "like a lackey."¹

There followed a painful period when the young Kaiser, who had displayed a certain harsh attitude toward his parents, been ungrateful toward the Chancellor, draping himself in the splendor of his authority, defiantly looked at the recluse of Friedrichsruh and practically wished to seal his lips. The latter had held the imperial helm for twenty-eight years and had not only made Germany but made her to his likeness. He had infused his ideas, good and bad alike, into the life of the Empire. Humanly speaking he was . . . "*aussi grand qu'un front peut l'être sous le ciel.*" In spite of his wrongs, of his crimes, even, no one in the Hohenzollern House had a right to depreciate his work, which, from many points of view, was great. He was sensitive in this direction and remained fearless in his criticisms of those who attacked him. The warnings which he received from Berlin moved him but little. When the Imperial Government resorted to persecutions such as its attitude at the time of the marriage of his son, he remained stoically inflexible. The moment the Kaiser endeavored to lessen his fame as the builder of the unity of Germany, and the statement was made that it was the work of Emperor Friedrich III, Bismarck made the confession which was published by the Vienna *Free Press* and which we have reproduced.² This confession ought to have done away with heaps of German literature, mountain high, which

¹ These are Bismarck's own words.

² P. 21.

repeat the falsehoods about the aggression of France in 1870.

With the elevation of Wilhelm II to the supreme imperial rank matters changed but little. Frenchmen did not modify their attitude, nor did the Emperor and his military caste. After the death of his father he wrote to a friend, "The way is the same, and now, full speed! Go ahead!"¹ At times he seemed to be disposed to win over the French, but some of his attempts were all but happy. The visit of his mother to Paris is a case in point. She had gone to urge French artists to take part in an exhibition in Germany. Her going was like the arrival of the Kaiser in Copenhagen, at the death of King Christian IX, when he was not wanted by anyone. Had German artists made a proposal like the one referred to above, it would have been eminently proper, but for the mother of the reigning sovereign to do it was construed as an undue attempt to break through a dignified moral reserve which was legitimate. "She deeply wounded French feelings," said Victor Bérard, "when she visited the *Galerie des glaces* of Versailles, where the German Empire had been proclaimed, as well as the ruins of St. Cloud."² Her good heart ought to have saved her from committing such a blunder. The Parisians made her feel this lack of kindness or at least of tact. The Kaiser was irritated. Like Bismarck, he soon took up the harping at the "hereditary enemy."

Nothing can help one better to understand the spirit of the German Ruler than his addresses published in a book, *The German Emperor*,³ by Professor Christian Gauss

¹ III, 98, 714.

² *La France et Guillaume II*, p. 16.

³ N. Y. 1915.

of Princeton University, a book of modest pretensions but of signal worth, as it exhibits in their fair historical framework some of the typical utterances of the Kaiser. There are some 700 or 800 of these oratorical productions.¹ These outbursts of feeling—few of them are anything else—tell us that the army is dominant, the army is the *rocher de bronze* upon which the nation must stand. The judgment of the reader will recoil at the incense burned before the Hohenzollerns, his constant praise—praise that comes only from him—for “my immortal grandfather, His Majesty Emperor William the Great.”² There is much also about the expansion and power of the German people, their destiny shaped by the law of the “Old God,” and a theology not far distant from that of Constantine, of Clovis and, at best, of Saint-Louis, six or seven centuries ago. One constant note is that of the danger from without and principally from France. At first, he endeavored to react against the opinion credited to him that he was militant and warlike, by asserting his determination to keep peace, but war and hatred of France are in the Hohenzollern blood. In 1889, at Aldershot, in England, in a speech of one hundred and eleven words, considerably less than twice the length of the Lord’s Prayer, there are two references to Waterloo and one to Malplaquet.³ Anti-Gallicanism with him, as with Moltke and Bismarck, is an obsession. He cannot keep it at home. It even becomes an article of exportation. On May 6, 1890, plead-

¹ Tardieu, A., *Op. cit.*, p. 162. Professor Gauss has given us only the most important ones.

² Von Arnim addresses William I as follows: “Most illustrious, very powerful Emperor and King, gracious Emperor, King and Sovereign.” *Document from von Arnim’s Trial.*

³ Gauss, p. 50.

ing before the Reichstag for more armaments, he lays stress upon "the military organization of our neighbors, (which) has been broadened and perfected to an unforeseen degree."¹ In 1891, on the occasion of the maneuvers of the Fourth Saxon corps, he referred to Jena and again urged the Germans to prepare against the "common enemy."² In the latter part of 1892, there was another proposal made by him for further armaments.³ No one needed to be told the reason of it. Not to speak of other acts, on July 4, 1893, the *rapprochement* between France and Russia became the basis of his plea—the Germans can ever find a rational pretext for what they want—for an increase of war resources.⁴ Before his access to the supreme honor of the Empire there had been in Germany celebrations of the anniversaries of the war of 1870, during which there were the threadbare accusations against France—accusations that have been so often repeated that their falsehoods have become like infusible crystals in the national consciousness, as if they were indisputable verities. Germany could not have been held to the Prussian and Bismarckian ideals of militarism unless the war spirit was kept up to a white heat by misrepresentations of the neighboring state and cultivated by these war celebrations. In this, confederate states were scarcely behind Prussia. The King of Saxony, at about this time, speaking before some veterans, lets his imagination run loose, and talks as if war were actually on.⁵

The Kaiser, however, is not to be surpassed. In

¹ Gauss, p. 59.

² III, 107, 713.

³ III, 114, 234.

⁴ III, 107, 713.

⁵ III, 95, 472.

September, 1894, he went to Metz on the date of the anniversary of the battle of Sedan. There, standing in front of the bronze statue of his grandfather, he reviewed his troops. It is to this city, wrested from France, and close to the country which the Lorrainers love, that he comes with the Prince of Naples, the grandson of Victor Emmanuel, for his theatrical displays, his peaceful speeches ever spiced with indirect menaces. He thus associates the House of Savoy, for which France had done so much, with his irritating acts. On October 18, the anniversary of the battle of Leipsic, he says: "This inspiring day is one whose memories move the world and which marks an epoch in our German history."¹ This was a reference to France, though she was not mentioned. At times his seconds come in. Von Caprivi, before the Army Commission, the previous year, also held up the imaginary specter of French aggression. He points out the great peril resulting from the movement of Russia toward France. He even saw possible dangers in the direction of peaceful Denmark. Germany ought not only to be able to defend herself, he maintained, but to take the offensive from the beginning of the war, to protect her "brethren from Alsace," newcomers into the Empire, who should not be abandoned to the rigors of the French armies.² Von Caprivi, speaking of the rigors of the French armies against "the brethren from Alsace," gives the measure of his sincerity. Rigors of the French armies against the loved Alsatians, that is splendid! The orators, speaking on behalf of the project, did not fail to recall the siege of Dantzig, the Napoleonic campaign of Eylau, as well as the burning

¹ Gauss, p. 83.

² III, 117, 472.

of the Palatinate under Louis XIV.¹ This shows the spirit, the methods of the men who, having no legitimate wrongs to complain of, must have recourse to such arguments as those of von Caprivi, or evoke such distant occurrences and distort them so as to pose as victims. Never do they refer to the services rendered by France which weakened the hold that the House of Hapsburg had upon them, helped German states oppressed by other German states; nor to the alliance of the King of Prussia, who, during eight years, benefited, at the expense of other German states, by Napoleonic conquests. There is also perfect silence upon the fact that most of the invasions of France proceeded from the East, and that Prussia was foremost in them. In their conversations France is the great disturber. On the occasion of the marriage of the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt and the daughter of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, the Kaiser and Queen Victoria of England were present as well as the Crown Prince of Russia. Everyone talked of peace, but France was spoken of as the only one to arm, when her armaments were not one-half those of her antagonist.² Such was the talk of royalty and militaries, but the best informed people must have been aware that France could not be so dangerous even had she the designs ascribed to her. In 1895, the year of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the victories of 1870, Germany resounded with universal displays of mustered patriotism keeping up the animosity against the Byzantine and decadent Republic beyond the Vosges. France, though not without reminders of her own victories but having no such celebrations, was not infrequently wounded by these uncon-

¹ III, 117, 473.

² III, 123, 235.

trolled effusions of a patriotism raised to a white heat—a patriotism that has two defects, one rests upon error of facts, and the other leads astray by the cumulative repetitions of the same fictitious and exaggerated complaints, getting further and further away from truth.

In 1895, as Bismarck reached his eightieth birthday, the people of Germany organized a great celebration. They wished to honor the man who, in their eyes, had so splendidly served and enlarged the fatherland. They resorted in large numbers to the great Recluse's place of exile, Friedrichsruh. The Kaiser, perhaps conscious of his former unkindness, or anxious to be forgiven by the masses for his injustice towards the former "standard bearer" of Germany, attended the celebration, and presented him with a sword with "Alsace-Lorraine" inscribed on it.¹ The Emperor could find no better way to honor this old broken-down servant of the Empire than to bring him a sword on which was an inscription equally harrowing to the feelings of Alsatians and of Frenchmen. He sought to have his unkind treatment of the old servant forgotten by referring to the bloodshed at Mars-la-Tour.² This did not soothe the wounded feelings of the old Dictator. Henceforth to the end he fought the New Order, attacked the policy of von Caprivi, maligned some of the men who in the past had been his docile tools, revealed his dishonest treaties with Austria and Russia, and showed the depth of his rancor against those who deposed him from what he had considered his omnipotent and eternal seat of Power. Even then he never ceased to show his resentment against the

¹ III, 128, 714.

² III, 128, 715.

land upon which he seemed to have concentrated his hatred.¹

The Kaiser continued in the same course. In 1897, as he addresses his brother Henry, at Kiel, before his departure for China, he cannot refrain from reminding him that the step which he is taking is a consequence of the great victories of 1870 and the establishment of the Empire which followed.² In the autumn of that year, on another anniversary of the battle of Leipsic, his monotonous speech again recalled the conflict with the western enemies of the fatherland. At the following anniversary, he once more reminds his hearers of the work which his father and grandfather accomplished in building the German Empire—for him and for his subjects to do this was to crush France. On April 27, 1903, while President Loubet was expressing pacific sentiments—and they were heartfelt—at a banquet in Naples, the Kaiser was making a most belligerent speech in Karlsruhe. “The recollection of the grand period when the German people has accomplished its unity, the memory of the battles of Woerth, of Wissembourg, of Sedan, the remembrance of the outburst of joy with which the Grand Duke of Baden greeted the first Emperor of Germany will deepen the conviction that God will help us.”³ Four days later at Mayence and two weeks later at Saarbrücken, his orations deserve the famous saying of Alphonse Karr, *Plus ça change plus c'est toujours la même chose.* The battle of Leipsic, not those in which the King of Prussia, betraying other German states, was on the side of Napoleon, stands fore-

¹ *Le Temps*, April 10, 1896.

² Gauss, p. 118.

³ Mévil, p. 152.

most. In 1913, it was to be celebrated with signal éclat, as the centennial of the great event which was also the twenty-fifth anniversary of his reign. An accident to a Zeppelin prevented the carrying out of his plans. The destruction of this aircraft, entailing the loss of the lives of twenty-seven officers and men, hindered him from attending the proposed historic celebration. It is probable that this distressing casualty saved France from being reminded once more of what Louis XIV and Napoleon I, the French Kaisers of old, had done. Again and again, he utters what was, in his eyes, an incentive to German patriotism, and a challenge to France, as when he speaks of his grandfather, "the great Emperor William." "Let us not forget that he lived through and remembered Jena and Tilsit, and that, nevertheless, he never despaired of the future of the Fatherland. From Tilsit we traveled to Versailles."¹ Yes, but that was not the first time. This *idée fixe* of the Kaiser is so deeply rooted in him, that, in sending a message of apology to Sir Edward Goschen for the insults to which the English Ambassador had been subjected when war was declared, he could not avoid making a reference to Waterloo.

All along, the German Government had been increasing the power of its army to vast proportions, frightening the people into consent by the process that we have mentioned. Now it was the turn of the navy. Everyone knows that no armada was threatening Germany, that her great commercial fleet was plowing the oceans, in every direction, with complete liberty and increasing success. After the Franco-German war her ambition was in Europe, but now the field of her aspirations is the

¹ Gauss, p. 230.

world. Then she justified her armaments on the basis of French danger; later on, of Russian and Danish danger; now the enemy is also England, "the great robber-state." She cultivates hatred of Britons. She had long expressed contempt and indifference for colonies. Bismarck went so far as to oppose colonists. This Dr. Carl Peters knew by a painful experience.¹ About the time of the foundation of the Empire, Bismarck said, "For us in Germany, this colonial business would be just like the silken sables in the noble families of Poland, who have no shirt to their backs."² Then the Germans wished merely to develop their military, their industrial life at home, their commerce abroad, and that they did with a felicity applauded everywhere by all men who admire success. Other Powers turned their eyes toward unoccupied fields and made stupendous sacrifices for distant territorial expansion. They had not attained the goal reached by their German competitors in military, industrial and commercial matters, but had legitimately entered into possession of colonies. Towards 1880 the attitude of Germany changed. In 1884, the Cameroon country was seized. In 1885, German Southwest Africa and German East Africa were annexed. The Caroline Islands shared the same fate. Longing for more she cast her eyes upon the possessions of others. According to German cant, she would not attack anyone, she dreamed of no conquests, of no increase of territory, if we heed von Bülow. However, he uncovers the *pot aux roses* when he says, "Between the Greater Britain and the New France we have a

¹ Saunders, George, *Builder and Blunderer*, p. 16.

² Lowe, vol. II, p. 209.

right to a Greater Germany,"¹ and that is doubtless what the Kaiser calls "a place in the sun."² This simply means that as there are no more unclaimed territories, Germany is entitled to those of others.

In 1898, the Kaiser visited Sultan Abdul-Hamid, the cruel murderer of the Armenians and of some peoples of the Balkans. The imperial visitor kissed him and called him "brother." Indeed "a kind of political and personal brotherhood was sworn between the two monarchs, and lasted through the later horrors of the Sultan's reign until he was deposed by the revolution."³ There is no need of saying that this comedy on the part of the Christian Kaiser was royally paid for. It was then that were negotiated the proposals of the Bagdad railroad and were secured privileges which have developed into a stupendous mortgage over the whole Turkish Empire. French prerogatives and concessions were arbitrarily revoked. British and French influences in Constantinople were reduced to nought. His visit to Jerusalem marked a new departure. He virtually asserted a religious protectorate over the Moslem world and announced his determination to disregard that which France had carried on for centuries in connection with the Catholic Church. For a long time she went beyond the religious world and protected Christian travelers in the Levant and the Far East as well as the members of the Orthodox Church now shielded by Russia. She has the right, recognized and defended by the Holy See, to look after all the Catholic institutions as well as after groups of Eastern Catholics, the Maronites, the Melchites,

¹ III, 157, 234.

² Gauss, p. 181.

³ Saunders, G., *Builder and Blunderer*, p. 74.

the Chaldean and Armenian Catholics.¹ The fact that, until recently, she furnished as many missionaries as all the Catholics of the world put together, gave prominence to them. It was thought that the national protectorate was the cause of the influence exerted, while it was due much more to the fact that France has ever been fertile in men of genuine apostleship. Also the Government gave subsidies to missions when most of their work was educational and philanthropic. This protectorate was approved by the Pope and to some extent was under his authority, but the institution itself rests, with most states, upon international agreements.² This protective function doubtless increased French prestige among the Orientals and did much good, though Free-Thinkers are generally opposed to it. They do not question the gains accruing thereby to general civilization, but the whole system seems to them an anachronism.

The Kaiser while in the Holy City announced not only a similar protectorate over Pan-Islamism, but that he had rejected, as far as German priests were concerned, this French Catholic protectorate. The Berlin Congress had recognized in all Powers the right to protect their own subjects, but the same article states "that the rights acquired by France are continued, and that it is well understood that no breach could be made in the *status quo* of the holy places"³ in Jerusalem. It was doubtless the right of the Kaiser to act as he did, but it may be doubted if he would have done so had not the protecting state

¹ *Le Temps*, Nov. 22, 1912.

² De Lanessan, J. L., *Les missions et leur protectorat*, Paris, 1907, p. 6. In this work the author has treated the subject with great fairness and rare competence though not with much sympathy.

³ Article 62.

been France. Be that as it may, a first fruit of this new policy, January, 1897, was the taking of Kiao-Chou in China, under the pretext that two German missionaries had been massacred by the Celestials. The first act of this protectorate was the taking of Chinese lands. This new departure, unimportant in itself, was a part of the unfriendly and aggressive course pursued against Paris by his Government. It did not stop there. France was anxious that Cardinal Rampolla, the liberal Secretary of State under Leo XIII, should be elevated to the visible headship of the Church. This aim had no international bearing. It was thought by the Government that he alone could have kept the French Clergy within proper bounds, and he most probably would have averted the separation of Church and State which Pius X unquestionably precipitated.¹ Austria had given France the assurance that she would not raise any opposition to the election of the Cardinal, but at the last hour she sent in her veto.² This was done at the request of the German Government.

The constant nettling and ruffling of French feelings was exasperating. The Kaiser's speech of the "mailed fist," his hypocritical plea for "a place in the sun," the clamor for a greater Germany, the assertion that, without the German Emperor, no great decision dare henceforth be taken, his intoxication of power and his outspoken desire of domination made the French feel that they had on their eastern frontier a great personal source of danger. In 1900, he declared that the troops which had gone to China were destined to "show that the arm of the German Emperor reached to the farthest ends

¹ See Bracq, J. C., *France Under the Republic*, 1910, pp. 290 and 312.

² Mévil, A., *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

of the earth.”¹ Similarly the book of Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, which reflects the national aspirations, is the work of a man overwrought with the sense of German might and who can scarcely conceal the determination to use it against someone. “Bismarck,” says Novicow, “had to do a stupendous work to bring the Prussian people to the policy of violence which rendered possible the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870.”² Since then the German leaders, thoroughly Prussianized, have even intensified this policy of “Blood and Iron,” but they can no longer pose as men of peace. Books like, Usher, R. G., *Pan-Germanism*; Fouillée, A., *Psychologie des peuples européens*; Cramb, J. A., *Germany and England* or Villard, O. G., *Germany Embattled* have made such a comedy impossible.

¹ Saunders, *Op. cit.*, p. 100.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 369.

VI

A GERMAN QUARREL¹

MEANWHILE, France, after the period of just indignation, and hatred of her soulless conquerors, witnessed a most remarkable movement making for international comity which would have ultimately worked out a reconciliation between her and Germany had not the latter so acted as to deprive it of its potential efficiency. The old idealistic traditions of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, the teachings of Saint-Simonians, the new education fostered and expanded by the Republic, the scientific movement, as well as the tendencies of philosophy, travel and the wide dissemination of intelligence, had profoundly affected French democracy. The movement was international to some extent, but nowhere was it more earnest than in the land of Voltaire and Hugo. The moral sense of the nation recoiled from the ideals of militarists, and from the thought of the international murders that we call war. Fashoda, which at other times might have left a century of bitter memories, because the nation had reached a higher conception of international comity, ultimately led France and England to deal with each other in the new spirit moving men everywhere toward saner international relations. The doctrine of pacifism had now sunk deeply into the national consciousness. Socialists and Radicals, led by what the writer calls a Christian

¹ Popular French saying in speaking of a quarrel without cause.

humanism, made these principles central in their political propaganda. The Liberals were equally earnest. The Government was—and had to be—the expression of national ideals and feelings and, as such, was forced to a friendlier attitude toward all Powers—even Germany. Jaurès, assassinated by a fanatic of the old form of narrow patriotism, would have died a happier man had he seen progress made toward reconciliation with the trans-Rhinean Power.

It was not the fear of Germany but the growth of a more reasonable spirit among various states that led the French Government to sign numerous treaties of arbitration. King Edward, ever a friend of France, fostered better feelings in his own country and paid a visit to President Loubet which was returned by the latter. This was followed by reciprocal courtesies of the fleets, of municipalities and of the members of the two Parliaments. Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, the great friend of peace with honor, or rather of peace with justice, the man who had persuaded President Roosevelt to stop the boycott against the court at The Hague by referring a case to it, organized a group of members of Parliament in view of giving unity and support to the peace ideals of the nation. Meanwhile the two Governments were discussing the imperative Anglo-French difficulties that urgently demanded a solution. Old and diverse were these international problems. M. Delcassé, one of the most distinguished statesmen that France has produced, was the embodiment of conciliation. He laid stress upon the fact that it was easier to solve twenty difficulties than one, because in most problems it is a question of give and take. He and Lord Lansdowne started with the new and advanced point of view that, in their at-

tempts to reach an understanding, each would leave to her competitor what meant most to her. Thus, in Newfoundland, the French Shore was far more important for England than for France. In Egypt, freedom of action was of more value to Great Britain than to her neighbor. In these countries, and at other points, France yielded to her. Similarly, Morocco meant more for France than for England, and so, with definite restrictions, France secured a free hand there. As a whole this adjustment was not only equitable but mutually considerate. When on April 8, 1904, it was made public, it failed to satisfy the jingoes of both countries, but peaceful men everywhere breathed more freely, and felt that a great step forward had been taken by the two Governments for their own peace and that of the world. If the most difficult Anglo-French contentions could thus be settled calmly and peacefully by the new diplomacy, then any international entanglement might be. A great moral victory had been won on the side of reason and conscience.

The German authorities were hostile to the method and to its results. In fact they were skeptical in reference to the possibility of an Anglo-French Agreement. Many of them would have been happy to see the two nations on opposite sides of the Strait of Dover cross swords. The hostility of the two countries was a fundamental postulate of German diplomacy. The Egyptian stick, that Bismarck prided himself to use sometimes in striking England and sometimes in annoying France, was no more.¹ A conversation of M. Delcassé with Prince Radolin, telling him of the nature of the transaction, had failed to

¹ Mévil, A., *De la paix de Francfort à la Conférence d'Algésiras*, p. 146.

bring conviction. France and England waited seventeen days, during which Germany made no objection, before signing the celebrated treaty. It was only then that Wilhelmstrasse saw that this Anglo-French Agreement was a reality.¹ The attitude of the German Government had two phases. First, Chancellor von Bülow made no opposition to it. On April 12, he said, and rightly too: "We have no reason to suppose that that agreement is directed against any Power whatsoever. It seems to be an attempt to cause to disappear a series of dissents existing between France and England by a friendly understanding. From the point of view of German interests, we have nothing to object."² "We have before all," he states again, "commercial interests there, and so it is of much moment for us that calm and order should prevail in Morocco. We must protect our mercantile interests there and we shall protect them. We have no cause to fear that they could be disregarded by any Power."

Let it be noticed that to introduce "calm and order" was the task assumed by France. Furthermore, by her position and experience, she was better prepared than any other people to do that work. When Count Reventlow criticizes the Anglo-French Agreement, from a Pan-Germanistic point of view, the Chancellor heaps cutting sarcasms upon him and defends the stand which he has taken.³ Six months later the German Secretary of State assures the French representative, M. Bihourd, that Germany has only economic interests in Morocco.⁴

¹ Mévil, pp. 145-148.

² *Ibid.*, p. 153.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

⁴ *Yellow Book*, document 192, p. 167.

On the 29th of the following March, the Chancellor has become the *Jupiter Tonans* of German politics. Herr Bebel, opposed to an aggressive policy, accuses him of having changed his position. He answers, "I must remind him that the language and attitude of diplomats and politicians are regulated by circumstances." In 1914, the Great Statesman, speaking of the Anglo-French Agreement retrospectively, says, "Just at this time France was preparing to injure us in Morocco."¹ "In certain French circles the original object was to ignore Germany."² It was "the high-handed policy of France in Morocco which threatened to ignore German industrial and commercial interests as well as our national credit."³ Ever thinking more of Germany than of the facts of the case, he continues, "The treaty was indirectly aiming at injuring the latter country."⁴ "French Moroccan policy was an attempt to set Germany aside in an important decision on foreign affairs, an attempt to adjust the balance of power in favor of France."⁵ The first utterances of the Chancellor were the calm answer of a statesman who, though disappointed by the fact that France and England had become reconciled, and that France and Italy had become friends again, spoke cheerfully of the Agreement.

Again the new relations with Italy were due largely to the broad and noble spirit of M. Delcassé as well as that of Marquis de Visconti-Venosta, who had recognized the artificiality and burdensome character of the *Triplece*. The renewal of the Triple Alliance, in 1902, had been

¹ *Imperial Germany*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 102.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁴ P. 95.

⁵ P. 98.

freed from clauses which were threatening for France.¹ Sig. Prinetti, in the Italian Parliament, and M. Delcassé, in the Chamber of Deputies, asserted that the unfriendly Bismarcko-Crispinian elements of the Treaty had disappeared. France, previously hurt by the former Italian ungratefulness, could have said, "He that is not with me is against me," but now, satisfied with the Franco-Italian treaty, settling the Mediterranean questions, and with the modification of the *Triplice*, she could say, "He that is not against me is on our part." The speech of the Kaiser at Karlsruhe showed not only his ill-feeling toward the Franco-Italian *rapprochement* but seemed to imply that he did not admit of a policy for other peoples not sanctioned by Germany. Von Bülow was aware of the cooling of the Triplician zeal of Italy, but he did not think that she was flirting with France. He referred to it in a witty form: this was merely "*un simple tour de valse.*"

The evolution of English mind and feelings could not be disposed of with a joke. England, walking hand in hand with France, was a fact contrary to all German anticipations, and, ascribing motives like their own to the two participants, there was opened before them the vision of contingencies that were not absolutely pleasant. Italy's partial escape from the *Dreibund* was bad enough, and the change that had come over England was most serious, but both, taken together, justified a certain anxiety that the Chancellor would not admit. Furthermore, public opinion, favorable to a rapid policy of expansion, was annoyed by what seemed a failure. The resolutions voted on March 20, 1904, at Esslingen, by

¹ Mévil, *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

the Pan-Germanists of Wurtemberg,¹ the address voted on May 27, at Stettin, by the Colonial Society² and the unanimous resolutions of the Pan-Germanist Union, June 3, at Lübeck,³ urged the Government to take an aggressive stand in Morocco. The opponents of the Chancellor taunted him in the Reichstag for what seemed a diplomatic defeat. All this doubtless contributed to his right-about-face and his new pugnacious stand.

The attitude of mind and soul which had led the French to work for the Anglo-French Agreement also practically led them to what was a virtual disarmament. Russia had been defeated in September, 1904, and by March, 1905, she was crushed at the hands of the Japanese without any hope of recovery. England was but loosely pledged to stand by France, which was in the throes of the separation of Church and State. This was the time when, at the request of von Bülow,⁴ the Kaiser went to Tangier and made the speech which was meant to exasperate France and England, and possibly to bring on a fearful war.

The writer loves the sincerely religious of all creeds, and the earnest worshipers at all shrines, but he dreads the pious effusions of German political leaders. Bismarck, notwithstanding the mutilation of the Ems dispatch and many other villainous performances, said, "We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world."⁵ Von Bülow naturally turns to religious gush.

¹ *Yellow Book*, doc. 141, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*, doc. 162, p. 136.

³ *Ibid.*, doc. 166, p. 138.

⁴ V, 26, 269; von Bülow, *Op. cit.*, p. 98; Tardieu, A., *France and the Alliances*, p. 24.

⁵ III, 103, 885.

He speaks of the "happy dispensation of Providence"¹ and of what "Providence has granted us."² In a speech at Bremen, on March 22, 1905, the Kaiser urged his hearers "to hold fast to the conviction that our God would never have taken such pains with our German Fatherland and its people, if he had not been preparing us for something greater." Then, with characteristic German contradiction of pride and humility, he adds, "We are the salt of the earth, but we must also be worthy to be so."³ Nine days later, the Kaiser reached Tangier, in great pomp, to perform the task laid upon him by his Chancellor. There are evidences that he hesitated long, and that even after he had reached Tangier he dreaded the fatal words that might bring about the irretrievable. At last he made his speech. "I am pleased," he said, "to make the acquaintance of the pioneers of Germany to Morocco and to be able to tell them that they have done their duty.

"Germany has great commercial interests here. I shall advance and protect our commerce, which shows a satisfying increase, and for that reason shall insist upon equal rights with all Powers, which is only possible through the sovereignty of the Sultan and the independence of the country. For Germany both of these must be unquestioned, and I am, therefore, ready to intervene for them at all times.

"I hope that my visit to Tangier declares this plainly and emphatically and that it will call forth the conviction that what Germany undertakes in Morocco

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, p. 297.

³ Gauss, p. 239.

will be negotiated exclusively with the sovereign Sultan.”¹

In all, the Kaiser was two hours in Morocco,² but, had nothing else happened, his speech would have put back the potential reconciliation of France and Germany for half a century. The speech was interpreted everywhere as a menace both to France and to England.³ What made his statements unpardonable is that he did not frankly state the deep underlying motive of his course, and that what he said was largely untrue. The “great commercial interests” of Germany amounted to 9,500,000 of francs a year on the basis of the returns of the four preceding years. France and Algeria had a trade of 33,000,000 and England 31,000,000.⁴ Professor Gauss neatly stated the case when he said that German “trade there did not amount to as much as that of an ordinary department store or to that of a fairly successful merchant.”⁵

At first the Germans claimed to have none but exclusively economic interests in that country, but if that had been true the Tangier Speech was the greatest possible blunder. “The German Government,” says Novicow, “has caused a stagnation of affairs which has made its subjects lose ten times more money than the trade with Morocco would have brought them in a century.”⁶ The twaddle about the “sovereign Sultan” does not bear examination. As to the absolute disregard of Germany in the Anglo-French Settlement, it is true that the Quai

¹ Gauss, p. 242.

² V., 26, 946.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 950.

⁴ Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algésiras*, p. 499.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 241.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 228.

d'Orsay had made no formal notification to Germany, but M. Delcassé, with perfect correctness of manner and frankness, had communicated the substance of the Agreement to Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador in Paris, a fortnight before it was signed.¹ In the French *Yellow Book* one is obliged to recognize that the great Prime-minister had not forwarded an official communication of the document to the German Ambassador, though he had made an informal one.² It is certain that Wilhelmstrasse knew all about it. Berlin waited a whole year, made no remonstrances, friendly or otherwise, showed not even those cant courtesies upon which states and individuals are so punctilious in the case of strained relations. In June, 1905, "the Germans," says M. Tardieu, "knew that M. Rouvier was willing to do more than pay the price of their good-will in Morocco."³ If Germany's intentions were peaceful why did she not speak? Why did she not ask explanations? Why did she choose the moment when Russia was overpowered by Japan, and when France was torn asunder by what looked like a possible revolution, to spring forth like one in ambush for a chance? Were there in the act of France any valid reasons for a people bent upon peace to abandon diplomatic action, and to resort to a theatrical, discourteous threat like that of Tangier? None, none whatsoever. The Tangier Speech was *une querelle d'Allemand*. Professor Gauss puts this conclusion into a neat English form: "Germany was evidently picking a quarrel with France."⁴

¹ V., 27, 948.

² Doc. 142, p. 122.

³ *France and the Alliances*, p. 187.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 240.

VII

FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO

ALMOST all the German references to French colonies, since the beginning of the present war, have been greatly misleading. The colonial expansion of France has been determined both by her history and by her environments. For over three centuries, she has done colonial work more and more appreciated by all. The countries which have come under her sway during the last eighty years have, in part at least, been forced upon her, and that is particularly true of North Africa. She purged the Mediterranean Sea of Algerian pirates who seized her vessels, as well as those of other countries, and even descended upon her coast, carrying off men and women as slaves to Algiers. The first action of France was no more of a conquering nature than that of Commodore Decatur at Tripoli. However, she felt compelled to push her action further. The Algerian conquest was long, ever to be renewed, and when it was considered ended it had to be begun again. She, at times, contemplated giving up the task. In the last days of the Orleanists, P. Christian published his *Afrique française*, in which he eloquently protested against such a fatal consummation. Today Algeria is one of the finest colonies of the world. This led, perhaps not by straight roads but led, to the protectorate over Tunis. The depredations of its inhabitants upon the Algerian frontier and the movements which led

Austria to Bosnia, England to Cyprus, doubtless contributed to accelerate this action.

The expansion of the North African and of the West African colonies in their hinterland brought about the creation of a colonial dominion extending from the Mediterranean to the Congo. Not to speak of her other colonial possessions, some of which date from the seventeenth century, France has, there at her very door, an extensive colonial empire,¹ though some of these territories seem to have but a trifling value. This shows the unreliable character of the statements of learned Germans, American university professors, when they tabulated colonial reports and said that since 1870 she had increased her colonies by so many square miles and Germany by only so many. What is the value of thousands of square miles of Saharan sands? Nations, like individuals, have their course determined by their aptitudes and uses of opportunities. Germany chose military, industrial and commercial power, and when she has attained a goal far in advance of others in these domains she comes and asks those who have toiled in other directions to give up the fruits of their efforts. She asks it in a brutal way, as by the Tangier Speech. Again, nations may have an especial policy like that of England of old in Newfoundland, where her fisheries were reserved for English fishermen from home, and thereby increasing the number of her seamen, and through that developing the greatest navy that the world has ever seen. However, when Britain no longer found it profitable to follow her former course she could not ask the French, in Newfoundland, except by special

¹ See Bracq, J. C., *The Colonial Expansion of France, National Geographic Magazine*, vol. XI, no. 6, June, 1900.

agreement, as was done, to surrender prerogatives shaped by the first policy. Similarly, Germany was signally indifferent to colonies for a long time, and now she is bitter because she has not done what others did.

Unquestionably, Morocco looked to her like a desirable field for a colony and to the French it seemed, at first, like a most enviable morsel to be added to the French colonial empire. There were, however, such dangers associated with it that the most thoughtful Frenchmen were averse to such an acquisition. On other grounds, Socialists and Radicals clamored against the idea of having either a protectorate over it, or of proceeding to its annexation. Its general condition was forlorn. Anarchy reigned supreme. In the eyes of all, government meant violence and plunder. The Sultan had lost almost all his power. To reconquer it for him, or to win it for France, looked like a gigantic task. Generally, Frenchmen were opposed to any form of action which would lead even to a partial control. They found a great danger in the very extension of this French Mediterranean colonial Power. North Africa is peopled by a very capable militant population ever ready to resort to arms. Formerly, these North Africans, divided among themselves, were in a continual state of civil war, and security to the outside world came from their intense particularism. With French rule, they have, willy-nilly, lived under the *pax Gallicana* and some of their sons have acquired considerable French culture through the *lycées* and the *Medersas* for the Islamic Clergy. These natives, formerly at variance with each other, have, in later times, shown signs of a growing common moral and religious consciousness. There is among the most intelligent a sense of oneness which has never existed before.

Their belligerent spirit, which has been weakened by the new life introduced by France, is frequently reawakened by appeals from Mohammedan communities outside or by local fanatics. A secret Moslem society, the *Maghreb-inian Union*, with headquarters at Alexandria, has long worked to unite the Pan-Islamic forces in North Africa under the auspices of Germany.¹

The annexation of Morocco would have accentuated the evil. Before long, according to an eminent authority, M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, there would be 14,000,000 Arabs and Kabyls against, at most, 1,150,000 to 1,200,000 Europeans, and thirty Moslems for one Frenchman.² This increase might imperil French colonies. Furthermore, Jaurès and his followers made the most violent opposition to the taking of Morocco in any way whatsoever.³ There was no national desire to possess that territory, but when it became evident that the Germans were aiming at a foothold there, the sense of a greater danger loomed up. The aggressive spirit of the Germans, so dangerous in Europe, would be even more so in Africa. The French army in Algeria, and Tunisia, would have to be increased, and the chances of German-French friction would be multiplied. To quote the words of Sir Thomas Barclay, a man very friendly to Germany, writing before the present war, "Beyond the latent feeling about the lost provinces, there was at the time no hostility on the part of Frenchmen to Germany."⁴ Looking at the matter calmly—for the population of France exhibited a great deal of self-control at this time—it was

¹ *Le Temps*, Nov. 2, 1912.

² V, 43, 22.

³ V, 43, 709.

⁴ *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences*, p. 267.

better to take chances with the Arabs and the Kabyls than with the men who were clamoring for the "Greater Germany," and complained that their territories were insufficient for all their needs; as if all progressive nations did not depend upon other countries to supply some of the increased wants created by our civilization.

England was compelled to take the same attitude as France, and for many similar reasons. She had more than four times greater economic interests there¹ than the Germans. She had and could have kept her ascendancy over the Sultan. Englishmen had done much for the introduction of Western civilization in that country. There was also the question of Gibraltar. England could hardly have countenanced the establishment of the helmeted men on the opposite shore. As someone has said, "Morocco was mortgaged with the question of the Strait"² guarded by the impregnable English fortress. Spain, somewhat cramped between two strong neighbors, did not wish to see the advent of a third one, Germany. An *entente* with the Castilian Government was recorded on October 6, 1904. Italy had already approved the Anglo-French Agreement as a compensation for a free hand in Tripoli. The unanimity of these Powers grew out of the fact that this was the culminating point of a great historic status, during which the nations had made great sacrifices and through which the world had been greatly benefited. They were all at one about the essential work to be done in Morocco, to put an end to an impossible life there and to open the land to all. These Powers recognized that France, on account of her position and experience, was better equipped and better qual-

¹ Tardieu, *La Conférence d'Algésiras*, p. 499.

² Ménil, *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

fied than any other Power for this work. Again Germany had in former years showed a singular indifference to the land of the Sultan. In 1880, Bismarck, in a report to the Kaiser, said that Germany should encourage France to go to Morocco.¹ When the Count de Saint-Vallier went to see him about the protectorate over Tunis, he expressed the hope that France would also annex Morocco. "We can but rejoice at that,"² said he. The land of the Kaiser, as we have seen, had but scanty interests there, created by the recent emissaries sent to prepare the way for the future action of her *Weltpolitik*.

We have already said that Morocco was not really a country with a regular government. There were only sections of the territories that accepted fully the authority of the Sultan, who at times seemed more like a mediæval baron robber than like a modern ruler. His sway was at best nominal over the greater part of the land. His subordinates did what they had seen their Prince practice and that in cruel ways. Absence of government and lawlessness reigned supreme. Neither the property nor the persons of the natives, nor the belongings nor the persons of foreigners were in security. No one has summed up the situation better than M. André Tardieu when he says, "For the last ten centuries it has been the lot of Moroccan Sultans to have continually to conquer their subjects, and the special occupation of the subjects has been that of disobeying their sovereigns. To tell the truth, the notion of sovereignty does not exist. Where there is no hierarchy, it is impossible that there should be any moral notion attaching to revolt. Morocco is a

¹ VI, 6, 718.

² Matter, *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 512.

country of feudal and theocratic anarchy; and the disturbances that have occurred there in recent times are merely a fresh manifestation of tendencies that have long existed. It is Europe alone which, first through mental assimilation, and subsequently through political interests, has created the unity of Morocco. In such unity there has never been either reality or totality. What does exist is a Moorish empire with which other Powers treat; but inside the empire one finds merely tribes who, in battles or else in incessant negotiations, seek their personal profit only.”¹ To carry out his aggressive purpose, the Kaiser maintained this fiction of a government as if it had been real.

The *Yellow Book* published in December, 1905, is an eloquent defense of the friendly attitude of France toward Morocco. A long list of grievances, plunders, murders speaks well for the patience of the stronger Power.² To remedy this, France did not assail the Sultan, but endeavored to help him. On that long frontier of nearly a thousand miles, after so many incursions of Moroccan tribes and marauders into Algeria, she could have found many pretexts for invasion. She had by the treaty of 1845 the “right of pursuit” whereby she could track Moroccan intruders into the country. She had made several punitive expeditions into the Sultan’s territories,³ but as a whole she acted as a friend ready to help him to solve his own difficulties. Several treaties show a mutual understanding between the two Governments. The amicable disposition of France is shown by the fact that

¹ *France and the Alliances*, p. 108.

² See documents 1, 3, 4, 25, 44, 46, 47, 48, 54, 67, 68, 79, 80, 83, 84, 114, 115, 118, 125, 128, 136, 144, 148, 221, 225, 240, 264.

³ Tardieu, *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

several times she allowed the Sultan's troops to cross her territory on the way to restore order¹ or Moroccan subjects pursued by enemies to find refuge in Algeria.² She rendered many other services.

The French policy of peaceful penetration was already being carried out at the beginning of this century. Some French officers were endeavoring to put some order in the Sherifian army at Fez. French customs officers were organizing the fiscal service in the various parts. The chief of police of Tangier was a Frenchman, his two helpers were Algerian Moslems but appointed by the Sultan. He was to decide upon who would be their successors. This work was done quietly without hurt or shock; it was to be an evolution and not a revolution.³ The Anglo-French Agreement was really the continuation of this which was already opposed at Fez by German agents. The Sultan had borrowed some money from French banks for important public works. French officials had displayed much energy for the release of the American subject, Perdicaris, captured by the brigand Raisuli. The most imperative and reasonable reforms contemplated by the Agreement had received at least a partial application. The French aim, according to M. Tardieu, was directed by three guiding principles, "Morocco's integrity, the Sultan's authority, commercial liberty."⁴ As M. Delcassé said, "Far from lessening the Sultan's authority we were particularly anxious to enhance his prestige." "We are endeavoring to give the country (Morocco) security to assure

¹ *Yellow Book*, docs. 26, 29, 69, 86, 92, 95, 97, 188.

² *Ibid.*, docs. 59, 69, 124, 193, 201, 218, 250, 354.

³ *Le Temps*, Aug. 17, 1904.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 120.

ours," hoping that it "would know our presence by the benefits that would accompany it. France seeks her advantages only in the harmony of interests and for the benefit of all."¹ M. Delcassé has all along endeavored to introduce a real idealism into international relations. No French statesman, more than he, has shown the danger from a narrow patriotism and a national selfishness. No one ever was more opposed to the spirit of conquest and domination according to the Bismarckian method. M. Delcassé has been at one with modern sociologists who have proclaimed the evil of national greed and the beneficence of general good-will. In dealing with international problems, he always saw the reasonableness of conflicting claims. In the spirit of conciliation he proceeded to just concessions. A Hay or a Root, only even gentler, he wished to have French action permeated with a lofty form of humanitarianism good for the Moroccans as well as for the world at large. The Tangier Speech put an end to all this.

On its own side, the German Government sent at once Count von Tattenbach to Fez to work upon the feelings of the Sultan.² Agents in different parts of the country tended to keep up national anarchy.³ As a matter of fact Germany has generally been indifferent to the wrongs endured by small and backward nations. She did not side with the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Servians or with any of the peoples so outrageously treated by the Turks. She has ever been against the oppressed, hand in hand with the massacrers. She never took an important part in opposing indescribable wrongs in the

¹ Mévil, A., *Op. cit.*, p. 174.

² V, 27, 236, 474.

³ *Ibid.*, 480.

Congo, or in the Turkish possessions, as the United States, England and France have done. Philanthropic considerations of the well-being of the natives in Morocco never entered the mind of the Germans. Their representatives posed as the defenders of Islamism. In his address in Damascus the Kaiser spoke as the protector of the Moslems. "May the Sultan,"¹ he said, "and may the 300,000,000 of Mohammedans throughout the world who reverence him as their Caliph, be assured that at all times the German Emperor will be their friend."² He has been popularly presented to the Turks as "Hadji Mohammed Guilloun."³ It was therefore easy for Count von Tattenbach, imitating his chief, to get close to the Sultan of Morocco, to convince him that his country was in the hands of the French, that the German Turcophiles were his friends—he sadly learned the contrary later on—and that they would be the deliverers of his empire. He worked with him, and finally succeeded in convincing him of the importance of a European conference to settle North African matters.⁴

Meanwhile the German Government was seeking in Paris to undermine and overthrow the great minister who had made friends for France, and had introduced a new spirit into international relations. All kinds of falsehoods were circulated to show that France at Fez had claimed to act by virtue of a mandate from Europe—that she was about to send an ultimatum to the Sultan demanding that he should accept French terms,—that M. Delcassé had tried to form combinations against

¹ Abdul Hamid.

² Gauss, p. 129.

³ *Le Temps*, Jan. 19, 1915.

⁴ V, 27, 951.

Germany, that he had done his work with England in an underhanded way—charges which do not bear examination. There were threats softened by the suggestions that if M. Delcassé were thrown overboard, Germany would be more conciliatory. There were even hints of war. Dernburgs were sent to Paris to conciliate the Radicals and to have the *Minister of Foreign Affairs* removed. The official diplomacy of Prince Radolin was supplemented by an officious one headed by Prince Henckel von Donnersmark, who worked in every way to win his point.¹ The pacifists headed by M. Rouvier, thinking that Germany was in earnest, sacrificed the great minister.² European opinion interpreted this act as a victory of von Bülow. The great English dailies expressed their regrets, and the *Daily Chronicle* had a heading, “A Victory of the Kaiser.” As soon as the latter received the news of M. Delcassé’s downfall he drove in great haste to the residence of the aggressive Chancellor, and announced to him his elevation to the rank of Prince.³

Before this there were two possible courses open to the French Government. One was, with the help of England, help that had been offered, to resist Germany. This was the Delcassé policy which was rejected. The other was to yield as much as possible to Wilhelmstrasse, showing a spirit of peace at any price. This was the course taken by M. Rouvier. France in her concessions went to the borderland of cowardice, but that did not modify the attitude of Prince von Bülow. As a matter of fact Morocco was a mere pretext. What astonished

¹ Mévil, *Op. cit.*, p. 273.

² *Ibid.*, Chap. V.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

the yielders was that the Chancellor, having won his point in the matter of the great Minister, was more than ever pressing the Moroccan question, and demanding a conference. Five days after the resignation of M. Delcassé, Prince von Radolin had an interview with M. Rouvier urging the question and concluding with these threatening words, "You must know that we stand behind Morocco."¹

Von Bülow, appealing to various countries, had but little encouragement. The Government in Washington, after looking into the matter, asserted its disinterestedness in the question. President Roosevelt and Secretary Taft gauged at once the true purpose of von Bülow.² Had the advice of M. Delcassé been followed a conference would have been impossible. The Powers at large, while perhaps not absolutely satisfied with every part of the Agreement, approved it. The Quai d'Orsay could not accept at once the idea of a conference. Its inquiries from the defenders of the proposal as to the specific aims and methods and the particular questions to be discussed were met by a cold mutism and a suggestion that France should inquire at Fez. This way of doing was in perfect keeping with the previous action of Prince von Bülow and in fact it was a new manner of waging war. Before the Algeciras Conference, he had another thrust at France, made another menacing speech in the Reichstag, and asked more money for armaments upon land and sea.³ The substance of the speech was a repetition of that of the Kaiser at Tangier. After all this, the Kaiser, his Chancellor and the German provocators had yet the monumental boldness to pose as friends of peace.

¹ *Yellow Book*, document 269, p. 232.

² Mévil, p. 230.

³ V, 30, 954.

VIII

FROM THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE TO THE DELIVERANCE OF FEZ

M. ROUVIER had thought that Germany would yield after the resignation of M. Delcassé, but she did not. On the contrary she became more exacting, and finally France accepted the principle of a conference which in reality was nothing but a German intervention. This conference convened at Algeciras on January 16, 1906. The delegates of von Bülow had explicit instructions to leave to France only the frontier, to give Spain the Mediterranean coasts, to secure for Berlin or for German allies or for some neutral Power the police of the ocean.¹ For officers, they had Austria propose representatives of neutral Powers that could easily be influenced, such as Switzerland or Holland.² With the beginning of the session the language of the German Government was hard, imperious and menacing. Germany wanted to dictate what should be done. She tried hard to *faire la pluie et le beau temps*. She rejected with haughtiness offers of arbitration made by Italy, Russia, America and Austria.³ Before the Conference the Germans endeavored to place their claims upon the basis of the Conference of Madrid in 1880, but German jurists were the first to discover that the Conference which

¹ Bérard, *Op. cit.*, p. 212.

² *Ibid.*, p. 213.

³ Tardieu, *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

dealt then with a special issue had no bearing upon the present difficulty.

A striking change in the attitude of Germany is that from the first she attempted to internationalize a problem which really concerned three Powers, and this was done by the most nationalistic nation of Europe. Novicow has shown that "since 1871, the Germans have not, with the exception of the postal-union, taken a single step for the organization of Europe."¹ All at once, in Algeciras, they were seized with zeal for the interests of all. They began to talk of equal treatment as if France had had no more rights in the land of Abd-el-Aziz than Belgium, Holland and Sweden. Did not England, with her peculiar position at Gibraltar, the key to the avenue of her Eastern Empire, have more claims than Germany in deciding what should be done with the bankrupt and collapsed Moroccan state? Was not Spain, with her establishments on the coast of the country, more concerned than the United States? Was the combined work of France, England and Spain of no moment and were the services which they had rendered to civilization to give them no special recognition? Was Germany, so long indifferent to colonies and never having done anything on behalf of the Moroccans, entitled to the same treatment as France, who had so long been annoyed by her Moslem neighbors, and who, by treaty, enjoyed in Morocco all the prerogatives of England as well as her own?

After much useless opposition the agents of von Bülow were forced by the spirit of the Conference to admit France's special rights. Italy, England, Russia, the United States, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 243.

Holland, were thoroughly won over to the side of Rouvier's representatives, while Morocco and Austria were with Germany.¹ This last statement must be modified. M. Tardieu says that "although devoted to Germany, she (Austria) could not go against plain evidence, and had exercised a conciliatory action, which now and again inclined distinctly in favor of France."² Morocco was representing mere nominality and nullity as a state. In spite of all, the representatives of the Powers were under the impression that French claims were as fair as they were moderate.³ Germany was at times inconsistent. She recognized some special rights to her antagonist in Morocco and at the same time wished to secure the internationalization of everything. She wanted to have a "general inspector" chosen from the diplomatic corps of Tangier to look after Moroccan matters and at the same time stood for the independence of the Sultan.⁴ Finally the Conference voted that France and Spain should be intrusted with the work of pacification and organization.

Most of the Powers realized that behind German action there was a bold, aggressive and pugnacious purpose, and so they decided on behalf of the two Powers who had really the greatest interests at stake there. Germany gained no prestige, but, rather, emerged crest-fallen. Her press was full of severe denunciations. There was as usual the stereotyped complaint that Germany could not have her "place in the sun." There was intense bitterness against Russia,⁵ while Italy was

¹ V, 32, 77.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

³ V, 32, 717.

⁴ V, 32, 718.

⁵ V, 32, 957.

greatly censured.¹ What was more painful for Germany than the *fiasco* of Algeciras was that she began to have misgivings about the *Triplice*. Italy was in favor of an alliance of peace, while Germany, by her methods and action, was for a *Triplice* of war.

The great German nation began to feel, what she had so long imposed upon France, a sense of isolation that was positively depressing. Von Bülow, who kept up a brave countenance, was obliged to recognize in a speech in the Reichstag a certain *entente cordiale* of the Western Powers unsympathetic to Germany and on that account dangerous.² A similar movement, inaugurated by Bismarck, the purpose of which was to isolate France, was praised by Prince von Bülow, but this one which menaced no one was characterized by him as follows: "A policy which would have for its purpose to create a ring of Powers to isolate and paralyze us would be a very dangerous policy. The foundation of such a ring is not possible unless there is exerted a certain pression; a pression creates a counter-pression; pression and counter-pression may easily produce explosions."³ The *Entente* was the child of the *Dreibund*, of the *Triplice*, and above all of the violent and aggressive course of Prince von Bülow. In his mind, the German coalitions were legitimate, but a coalition of the other Powers was wrong. For him the only international morals must be German ethics. What is right for Deutschland is wrong for some other country. Instead of recognizing that the cause of this international friction was

¹ V, 33, 218.

² V, 36, 717.

³ Quoted from Bérard, *Op. cit.*, p. 243.

himself, he concluded with the great expression of Prussian faith in force, "Let us keep our sword sharp."¹

The task intrusted to France was specially difficult, as her government was censured alike by Jaurès and his supporters as well as by the Germans. She was doomed to be blamed either for overdoing or for failing to do. One fact, however, which we must notice is that the privileges granted to France by the Powers at Algeciras were not essentially different from the previous ones assumed after the Agreement. If we examine the instructions given by M. Delcassé to M. Saint-René Tailleur when he went to Fez to announce to the Sultan the great historic Anglo-French understanding, and if we look at the Franco-Spanish Agreement of the same year, both contain a pledge to respect "the integrity of the Moroccan Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan."² The mission of pacifying Morocco was rendered harder by the Germans, who had excited the natives—they who needed so little incentive to rise against anyone—against the French. The German war-machine to create public opinion in their favor, or against their antagonists, the machine that sent Dernburg to the United States, Baron von Schenk to Athens, Prince von Bülow to Italy, that has secured members of the German Embassy to help Dr. Dumba to disorganize American industries, that has sent emissaries to India, to Egypt, to Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and especially to the colonies of France and Great Britain,³ was at work and carried on efforts to make the French task impossible.

¹ V, 36, 718.

² Tardieu, A., *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

³ *Le Temps*, March 7, 27, and July 3, 1915.

The natives were furious against these Frenchmen whose aims were represented to them in sinister colors. At all points in the Sultan's country, they were annoyed, insulted, ill-treated and several lost their lives. Dr. Mauchamp, who practiced medicine, was assassinated by Moslem fanatics.¹ At Casablanca, on the west coast, Frenchmen were outrageously treated, and their work—they were building a breakwater—was destroyed so that French soldiers were landed to protect Europeans and the French consulate. As these mariners came in sight of the city gates, though there was a pre-arrangement with the authorities, Moroccan soldiers began to fire upon them, and a reckless mass of native fighters, from the country, came in not only to attack the French, but also to give vent to their deepest instinct, plunder. The French defended themselves and then protected the city.² They did what the Americans were compelled to do in Vera Cruz, but did not do what the Germans have done in Louvain.³

This incident, common enough in the history of colonies and protectorates—the French could not honorably have acted otherwise—at once aroused the German military element and the German press.⁴ Did they ever imagine that in such a country and with such a people, the French could do their work and not meet “bloody points with bloody points”? Again France and Spain were intrusted with restoring order, but Germany kept on interfering. Thus when the two brothers, Abd-el-Aziz, who was in power, and Moulai-Hafid, who was a pretender, were

¹ V, 38, 709.

² V, 39, 947.

³ Supposing that the Belgians attacked them, which is most improbable.

⁴ V, 41, 235.

fighting, Germany received the delegates of the latter.¹ Again, when the former was defeated Germany sent her Consul, Herr Vassel, to Fez to work upon the new Sultan's mind. At the same time she sent a note to the Powers urging them to recognize Moulaï-Hafid. She acted as if there had been no Conference at all. She had given Abd-el-Aziz the greatest assurances of friendship, proclaimed his independence *urbi et orbi*, asserted in the Tangier Speech that he was the only ruler that she would recognize, persuaded him to resist France, but now when fortune betrayed the hapless ruler, Germany not only dropped him but she urged other nations to support his brother.

This resembles the treatment of President Krüger. When, in 1884, a Boer delegation, anti-English in character, was received in Berlin, it was entertained with lavish hospitality at the Emperor's expense. Krüger "sat at the Emperor's table next to Bismarck, and talked about the glorious future of the Dutch and German races in South Africa."² On January 6, 1896, the Kaiser telegraphed to him, "I beg to express to you my sincere congratulations that, without help from foreign Powers, you have succeeded with your own people and by your own strength in driving out the armed bands which attempted to disturb the peace of your country and in re-establishing order and in defending the independence of your people from attacks from outside." When, later on, at the hour of great bitterness and sorrow, the vanquished President of the South African Republic wished to see him, Wilhelm II declined. He has related in the *Daily Telegraph* interview how he made plans for the

¹ V, 45, 474.

² Lowe, vol. II, p. 235.

defeat of the Boers. These plans were sent to London. It was in following them that Lord Roberts achieved victory.¹

Similarly the poor Sultan was thus betrayed by those who had pledged themselves to stand by him, and who now attempted to help his brother against him. France was indifferent as to who the Sultan was in the first place, but she was loyal to him until it was demonstrated that the Moroccans had transferred their allegiance to his brother. Even then Paris insisted that the defeated ruler should have his life spared, and be treated with kindness and becoming dignity.² She even provided him with means to lead a decent existence.

Berlin kept up its policy of irritation. In 1908, the Kaiser, in his interview with a reporter of the *Daily Telegraph*, stirred up his own people by references to the Boer war and by his moral color-blindness in his boast of what he had done for England; but he managed to say things about France that would damage her in British eyes—things which, according to Mévil, were most erroneous.³ During the year his Government recurred to the Moroccan Question. After the decision of the Conference, Germany again objected that one Power should have a more favored position in the Moorish Empire than any other.⁴ She really tried again to take Morocco out of French and Spanish hands. According to the Conference, all Powers were to be upon the same economic basis, but not upon the same basis of

¹ Gauss, p. 272.

² V, 47, 476.

³ *Op. cit.*, chap. I.

⁴ V, 47, 712.

influence. The Chancellor asked for more. In November of the same year an incident occurred that intensified the bitterness of feeling created by the action of Berlin.

The French were at Casablanca, having restored order in the city and in the Châouïa. The occupied country was under martial law. As is shown further on, the Germans had long been hostile to the Foreign Legion, a French corps of foreign volunteers. Now it happened¹ that six of these men, in order to desert their regiment, had placed themselves under the protection of the German Vice-consul. On September 25, 1908, when he attempted to smuggle them on board of a German steamer, the men were recognized by the French authorities, who endeavored to arrest them. There was a serious scuffle of both parties. The German Vice-Consul raised his cane to strike a French officer, and the officer, in the legitimate performance of his functions, took up his revolver. At the time when Vera Cruz was under martial law, let us suppose that the German Consul of that city had tried to help American soldiers to desert from the American army, and had attempted to smuggle them on board of a German steamer, what would Americans have thought of such acts? Would not the consular immunities have appeared slight as compared with the wrong of helping to disorganize the American army? So it was at Casablanca. The deserters, whatever their nationality, were French soldiers. They had become so by a free regular engagement. Of their own free will they had entered the French army. What made the matter more delicate, the deserters were not all

¹ *L'Illustration* says that there was in Casablanca "a real agency of desertion" under the protection of the German Consul. Nov. 28, 1908, p. 355.

Germans. There were an Austrian, a Swiss and a non-German Pole. One of them was a French subject recently naturalized German. In reality there were only two Germans. Another report speaks of three Germans.¹

The trans-Rhinean press and Government took up a very menacing attitude. It demanded the immediate release of the men as well as an apology. It was intimated that in the case of refusal Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador, would be immediately recalled. The Quai d'Orsay asked that, as several contradictory principles were involved in the question, the whole matter be referred to The Hague Court, with the understanding that if France was blamed she would apologize and *vice versa*. This was finally accepted. The award of the Court, which was favorable to France, deeply wounded her opponents beyond the Rhine. The relations of the two countries were far from improved thereby.

The persistent aggressive ill-will of Germany against France continued with the exception of a period of nearly two years during which Berlin would have been happy to array her against England. There came a time when it was realized that all the initiatives of Berlin had been checked and its hostile combinations against France had largely failed. Prince von Bülow put on a brave countenance, but he was painfully reminded by his opponents in the Reichstag that his maladroit and hostile moves had been far from improving Germany's international situation, and that the opposite was true. The alliance of France with Russia had been strengthened. Among important treaties signed there was one

¹ Oppenheim, L. F. L., *International Law*, 1912, p. 503.

of arbitration between Paris and Tokio, June 13, 1907. On August 31 an agreement, most earnestly seconded by France, was made between England and Russia.¹ The hostility of these two Powers had hitherto been considered as a permanent statical force in European affairs.

Nothing at present proves that the Germans were concerned in the unfortunate occurrence between Admiral Roszdestvensky's fleet and British fishermen off the Dogger Bank, but it is strange that the rumors that led to it emanated from Germany.² France not only helped the pacific settlement of this deplorable incident, but contributed to an understanding between London and St. Petersburg.

A fact of the greatest importance for the two nations dwelling on either side of the Pyrenees was the marriage of the King of Spain with an English princess. The *Entente* with England greatly facilitated that with Spain. It was not pleasant for Wilhelmstrasse to hear, in 1907, of the treaty between Japan and Russia, a treaty completing that of 1905 and sealing the reconciliation of the two peoples. This not only freed the land of the Romanofs from any anxiety in the East, but, during the present war, Japan has proven an inexhaustible source of supplies. Wilhelm II had doubtless hoped great things from the Russo-Japanese rivalry, but at this point his hopes were baffled.³

All along, the restless and aggressive spirit of Germany forced upon the *Entente* Powers the conviction of a common danger, and that, sooner or later, one or all

¹ V, 52, 84.

² Saunders, G., *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

³ *Ibid.*

of them would be attacked. This consciousness strengthened the *Entente* itself. The Germans on the other hand had the feeling that they were encompassed by unsympathetic nations. They made others responsible for a situation which they themselves had created.

In 1909, an agreement indicating good-will on both sides was signed in which Germany pledged herself no longer to oppose France in Morocco. The two Governments and their representatives had not found practical formulæ for carrying out the understanding, but that was no proof that it could not be done. Early in 1911, while French officers were doing a work agreed upon between Paris and Fez for the training of the Moroccan army so as to render her capable of establishing order in the country, a small colony of Europeans had been gathered at the capital. Suddenly it was learned that masses of natives from several points threatened the lives of all Europeans in this city as well as those of the authorities. To allow fanatics to massacre these peoples would have been a crime. It would have given the lawless hordes a free hand in one of the few spots of the country where there was yet what, with charity, we may call Government. Something had to be done. As soon as preparations were made to relieve the Europeans in Fez the official German newspapers began their menaces.¹ The troops started for their work of deliverance and reached the city when it was no longer tenable. Both Europeans and loyal Moroccans had fallen, cut off from their base of supply and from the possibility of national relief. French troops did not enter the city, but remained outside to do their work of pacification. Again it must be reasserted that France did not wish to go to Fez. It

¹ VI, 3, 476.

is a characteristic of such enterprises that they compel, by unexpected accidents, nations to do what was absolutely contrary to their desires at the outset. This is what the Radicals and Socialists of the French Parliament had feared all along.

IX

THE AGADIR PROVOCATION

GERMANS have peculiar ways of their own. They often dispense with diplomatic courtesies which, in time of strained relations, make the continuance of international life possible. They who are so sensitive have done things which, with people of a similar spirit, would have meant war at once. The sudden sending of the *Panther* to Agadir on the coast of Morocco early in July, 1911, was a most warlike challenge. The Government in Berlin informed the French Minister of Foreign Affairs of the fact after the vessel had been sent. There was no disturbance on the coast,¹ so that this was without excuse. It was the repetition of the Tangier Comedy. What France and England in answer to this ought to have done would have been to send their own men-of-war and have done everything which the German aggressors did, but such a course would have been fraught with momentous possibilities. It was said that this move on the part of Wilhelmstrasse was intended to please Pan-Germanists, and that the Government at their suggestion had already chosen Agadir as a future German port. This step was considered by many of them as a virtual seizure of that part of the disputed Moorish Empire. Other apologists of Germany said that the *Panther* incident was a means of compelling the French to negotiate, but the Quai d'Orsay had been ready at all

¹ *Le Temps*, July 3, 1911.

times so to do. M. Jules Cambon, whom many will remember for his splendid services in Washington, had long endeavored to discuss the question, and, as a matter of fact, he had actually had conferences on the subject with von Kinderlen-Waechter,¹ so that this explanation is inadequate. The Agadir *coup* was the obvious disregard of the Cambon Agreement of 1909 and an unfriendly challenge to the *Entente*. By this agreement Germany had pledged herself not to interfere "with the consolidation of order and peace in the Sherifian Empire"² towards which France was working. According to this, had the Germans had any special interest to defend in Agadir they ought to have referred the task to France. It was understood that if difficulties arose the two Powers would consider them and settle them in the spirit of mutual concession, nay, in the spirit that had made the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 a possibility. The most elementary international courtesy demanded that Germany should have announced her intentions and have acted, in keeping with the Cambon Agreement, for the carrying out of the decisions of Algeciras.

There were Germans who justified the Agadir *coup* by the fact that there were French soldiers at Fez.³ Agadir in their eyes was the counterpart of Fez. These vindicators of this unfriendly course seem to have forgotten that when the Cambon Agreement was signed, in 1909, there were French troops at Oudjda, and that thousands of French soldiers held the Châouïa. This was not an unusual fact. Furthermore, General Moinier went to Fez to save human lives and France had prom-

¹ VI, 4, 472.

² *Accord du 8 février 1909.*

³ See p. 331.

ised to withdraw these Fez men as soon as possible. She intended to do there what she had performed in Syria in 1860.¹ Even then this attempt to whitewash the opprobrium of Agadir ignored the fact that the Sultan of Morocco was sovereign. Germany had been loud in her assertions of his independence. Now this sultan, exercising the fullness of his rights, called France to his aid and she went, saving thereby the lives of the authorities as well as those of Europeans doomed to be crushed by a Moroccan Boxer Movement. She was ready to recall her forces from there, but had it been otherwise, so long as the Sultan and the Makhzen² approved the Germans could not find in that situation any excuse for the Agadir *coup*. It was a violent reopening of the Moroccan Question which confirmed absolutely in the French heart the sense of the aggressive intentions of the Teutons.

In the eyes of Europe, at large, it was unmistakably an act of provocation from a Power that deemed itself capable of whipping the whole world. For Russia it seemed a *casus foederis*. England, though less outspoken, was deeply alive to the great European danger. France was willing to talk, to negotiate and to compromise for the sake of peace. Her statesmen, calm and resolute, were the very opposite of the de Gramonts and the Émile Olliviers of the last days of the Second Empire. They were even then reasonably conciliatory. The two Governments took up the whole Moroccan Question. By this time Germany had given up all talk of the sovereignty of the Sultan, the integrity and independence of Morocco and the internationalization of the Question. She had ceased to pose as the defender of the rights of

¹ *Le Temps*, July 3, 1911.

² Practically the ministers of the Sultan.

all. Now it was merely a matter of bartering for her own advantage. The Cambon Agreement was forgotten, the decisions of Algeciras were set at naught. Her former contentions had practically been set aside, now she was after a bargain. France ought to have refused to consider the proposals and to have appealed to a new conference. She could have shown the unreasonable demands of Berlin and made the Powers the judges of her use of the trust placed in her hands in 1906. Von Kinderlen asked, at first, one half of the French Congo next to the ocean¹ as well as the right of pre-emption which France had over the Belgian Congo in order to cease all opposition to France in the land of the Sultan.

Everyone acquainted with Morocco knew that the prerequisite of all reforms was peace in the country and that peace, according to the decisions of Algeciras and the Cambon Agreement, was to be established by France. It was impossible to open the economic life of Morocco to European trade until a political order of some kind was established; but as soon as France tried to face the imperative issues in that direction Germany intervened. Again, in order to have the French bring about the pacification from which the whole world would benefit, she asked the compensations stated above. Moreover, what right had she, in that respect, that did not belong to other Powers? Why should not the United States or Sweden have made similar claims? It is true that France was having a virtual extension of territory, but did Germany say a single word when England annexed the Transvaal in 1902, or when Japan took Corea? Did she protest against the British protectorate over Egypt by virtue of this selfsame Anglo-French Agreement?

¹ V, 4, 716.

Did she offer any objection when Spain really took possession of the northern coast of Morocco from Ceuta to Melilla? No. No. No. The reason for her action was her national aggressive spirit against the "hereditary enemy" and her burning desire for new territories. Her hard harsh attitude can only be explained on the ground that she expected that the British would abandon France to her own fate. She was sorely disappointed.

England saw clearly where the Franco-German wrangling would lead. The British press sounded a strikingly united warning to the Goths. On July 4, Sir Edward Grey had a conference with Count Wolff Metternich in which he did not conceal his displeasure over the Agadir provocation. The British political leaders uttered no uncertain sound.¹ On July 6, Asquith called the attention of the Parliament to the seriousness of the German pretensions in Morocco.² On July 21, Lloyd George gave the threatening Teutons to understand that their course was shocking the deepest sense of fair-play of the Britons. Balfour spoke for the Unionists in the same strain. Ramsay Macdonald voiced the feelings of the labor-party—all were most outspoken, and gave Germany to understand what the course of England would be. There was a united front against the aggressiveness of Berlin. The Germans, who had thought the British hopelessly divided upon everything, found them intensely of one mind upon this issue. The helmet men who had so long delighted in showing their swords, their German swords, as a menace resented like exhibitions on the part of others. The furor of Pan-Germanists was great. In 1908, they had used with Russia the bluff of force

¹ VI, 4, 949.

² VI, 4, 953.

successfully on the occasion of the annexation of Bosnia; they attempted a similar arrogant act with Morocco, and wished to dictate their will, as law. The French withheld their opponent, and the British Lion gave an unmistakable growl which practically meant, "Hands off from France!" The Kaiser and his subjects understood. They realized that they must give up all territorial ambition in the Sherifian Empire.

In that interesting book, *Imperial Germany*, a book to which the writer has so frequently referred, Prince von Bülow makes a most eloquent plea *pro domo sua*, and that with no excessive modesty. He offers a brilliant defense of his administration, not as an historian, but as a Prussian politician. No book, not even Bernhardi's *The Next War*, gives such an insight into the psychological and ethical conceptions of Prussians. We say Prussians, because we repudiate the idea that all Germans are Bernhardians and Bülowans. He recalls the statement made by someone that after M. Delcassé's overthrow, which brought to the imperial chancellor princely honors, Germany ought to have come to an understanding. "It is a question," he replied, "whether France was at all inclined to pay an acceptable price."¹ There lies the explanation of the rattling of the German saber in Tangier, at Algeciras and at Agadir.

Von Kinderlen asked one-half of the French Congo and French reversionary rights over the Congo Free State. These rights, to which, in case that country should pass into other hands than those of the Belgians, France would have a first claim, Germany coveted. For a long time Pan-Germanists had spoken of Belgium as an essential part of Germany. In addition to one-half

¹ P. 100.

of the French Congo, Wilhelmstrasse wished to secure these potential claims of France in the heart of Africa. In the case that brave little state were annexed, having secured the French reversionary rights, the Congo Free State would become a German possession, while the conquest of Belgium would not entail the transfer of these colonies. Unquestionably the Teutons had already some plans to seize that country, and were stretching their hands forward so as to have at the same time the Congolese possessions. This was not all. "The open door" was promised again. They wanted much more. Before Algeciras and even after they worked to reserve all concessions exclusively for the Sultan, but now, they wanted to have from the French some of these concessions, such as railroads built by Germans and operated by Germans—not to speak of other privileges among which was that of having protégés—natives enjoying German citizenship, protection and exemption from fiscal burdens.

France was willing to abide by the terms of the Algeciras Conference, liberally interpreted, that is, bearing in mind the contingencies arising in different parts of the country and meeting them squarely. She was willing to open the country to civilization. She was ready to help the natives to do the work for themselves, and to evolve toward a modern state, if a Mohammedan community has ever attained such an end. She was willing to do the work which would increase the possibilities of German trade in Morocco as she had done in Algeria and Tunisia, where things "Made in Germany" had a great sale. She hesitated long to dispose of territories that had been won by her noble explorers and kept by men who, as a whole, have done heroic service. Her rights of pre-

emption to the Congo Free State were for her intangible. Furthermore, the German claims were ever followed by new requests from Germany.

At last the threats of British leaders seriously modified the attitude of Berlin, though matters had become so serious that a financial panic ensued.¹ The Germans became more conciliatory and at last the two Governments came to an understanding.² The delay in reaching this goal weighed heavily upon Europe. To put an end to German claims, France reluctantly established a protectorate over Morocco, but this involved the sacrifice of over 100,000 square miles of the Congo colony. This settlement was not the result of fear. The great barometer of French feelings, the Bourse, had scarcely any ups or downs. It was not, either, an act imposed by the sense of the justice of German claims, but by French love of peace. The Germans secured territories in which they had never performed any service, had never spent a dollar or lost a man.³ A fact which shows their quarrelsome spirit is that hardly had the treaty been signed when they claimed islands in the Congo River, though the text carefully stipulated "*jusqu'à la rive.*"⁴

This treaty excited the most bitter dissatisfaction of Pan-Germanists. They naturally blamed everyone but themselves, though Chauvinists are the same the world over. When it was presented in the Reichstag it excited the hilarity of Socialists as well as of numerous malcontents, among whom the Crown Prince was conspicuous. The Minister of Colonies, von Lindequist,

¹ VI, 5, 475.

² VI, 5, 710.

³ VI, 5, 471.

⁴ VI, 6, 239.

was so disappointed that he resigned.¹ The impression left by these proceedings was painful for their admirers abroad. Public opinion in Russia and in Great Britain had crystallized into a profound conviction that Germany courted war. In France, the Tangier Speech and the long silence that followed, the German tactics for the overthrow of M. Delcassé, the maneuvers at the Algeciras Conference, the Agadir incident bold and bad, the surrender of a large part of the territories acquired mostly by the heroic labors of Savorgnan de Brazza, the brutal ways of dealing with a land in which the *suaviter in modo* ever takes precedence over the *fortiter in re* struck deeper than the Teutons thought or perhaps meant. Shortly after this, however, the Kaiser posed as a pacifist when he said, "We have given a new proof of our willingness to settle international points of dispute amicably wherever this can be done in accordance with the dignity and the interests of Germany, through the conclusion of our agreement with France."² How clever! The great miracle of our day is that there are still people who believe what the Kriegsherr of Germany says.

From this time on to the present war, Germany armed even more than in the past. In three years, three laws for the increase of armaments and men were passed. Von Bethmann-Hollweg repeated the old Prussian Comedy before the Reichstag. He made the statement that he had discovered beyond the Vosges "a revival of Chauvinism."³ Indeed there was something new in France, a new consciousness of danger uniting parties and creeds, leading men to reject pacifistic tenets at the

¹ VI, 6, 472.

² Gauss, p. 306.

³ VI, 14, 948.

sight of the German danger. There was indeed a new spirit awakened by the long German provocation. Incidents of an irritating nature deepened these feelings. In May, 1913, the descent at Lunéville of a Zeppelin with a party of German officers who, before coming there, had flown over many of the fortified cities along the frontier did not seem accidental. These men asserted that, owing to a fog, they had lost their way. That may have been true, the Government accepted it as such, but it is not unreasonable to doubt it. The Nancy incident, when a few Frenchmen annoyed some Germans on a Sunday evening—a rare occurrence in view of the situation—made the German press furious, though absolutely silent concerning the Lunéville Affair. The French authorities punished the prefect of Nancy, and the contemptible policeman who had failed to do his duty in protecting the young insulted German underwent a severe penalty. The new German Minister of Foreign Affairs denounced violently this insignificant brawl, which resembled all such quarrels that take place constantly on the frontier of all civilized peoples, and viewed it as a manifestation of "French Chauvinism," repeating the very terms which von Bethmann-Hollweg had used a few days before. The French Government took efficient measures so that nothing should be done in France which would irritate the Germans. This applied to theaters, to comic papers and to military life. At an earlier date a French general who had spoken freely about Germany was punished by being sent from Eastern France to Algeria.¹

Among other provocations of the Germans during this period, they carried on a campaign of unpardonable

¹ V, 46, 239.

slanders against the Foreign Legion to which reference has already been made. It is a body of foreign volunteers who have generally served in the colonies and especially in North Africa. All that is asked from them is good service, good behavior and no question is raised in reference to their antecedents or to their nationality. As many of the men have a past which it is better to forget, the rules of this corps are severer than in others, but not inhumane. If it is discovered that a man enlists before he is of age, he is dismissed at once. The same thing is true with what pertains to their health. A great sense of fairness tempers the severity of their life with justice and humaneness. What kindled this German antipathy is that a large number of Alsatians joined the *Légion*. In spite of great exertions in Germany and in Alsace against this military institution, more Alsatians entered the Foreign Legion in 1912 than in any single year since 1870.¹ Misrepresentations availed nothing. The people in whose army there has been such cruel treatment of soldiers that when the Red Rosa called for witnesses to defend her statements 1,100 came forth —the people that made no protest against the massacres of Armenians by Kurds, or those of the Balkan populations by the Turks, were seized with a most holy zeal for the poor victims of this organization. In April, 1913, there was a play in Berlin against the Foreign Legion patronized by representatives of the army and navy, to arouse popular feelings. Some Germans who had taken service in this corps came forward to protest against these slanders. The alleged statements that France had recruiting agents in Germany were baseless. These men could never be found and what was a most perfect refuta-

¹ Gauss, p. 100.

tion was that France had more volunteers for the Legion than she needed. Herr Zimmermann, a state official who had thoroughly looked up the matter, said that every time that the German administration had made inquiries, the conclusions had always been that these assertions were groundless.¹ It is easy to see the purpose of this campaign in which, by the side of the irritating challenges of Germany, there was a pin-prick policy calculated to exasperate France.

¹ VI, 21, 475.

X

THE ALSATIAN QUESTION

A GREAT source of irritation to France was Alsace. The Treaty of Frankfurt has, ever since 1871, cast its fatal shadows upon central Europe. The country taken by the might of the conquerors has remained in the German organism like an infusible substance which their mighty genius cannot assimilate. The survival of national loyalty is sometimes extraordinary. "If an ignorant nation like Bulgaria," says Novicow, "did not abandon her national aspirations after five centuries it is easy to see what those of the Alsatians will be."¹ It is not only the Poles, the Schleswigians, the Holsteinians but also the Hanoverians, the Nassovians, the Hessians and the Frankfurters that were incorporated in spite of themselves into Prussia. Many there were, and there are still, in the Empire who hate Prussian domination. Alsatians likewise hated the Prussian character and the Prussian method of holding men as if they were possessions. Nothing is more pathetic than the noble stand of the deputies of the annexed provinces at Bordeaux and their eloquent protestations. "Before any deliberation of the National Assembly, we, Alsatians and Lorrainers, gathered together in Bordeaux, wish to protest vehemently against even the very idea of a cession whatsoever of the least part of our territory, we are

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 355.

French and we want to remain French. . . ." ¹ Eleven days later, another protestation, " Abandoned in spite of all justice and by a hateful abuse of force to foreign domination we have a last duty to perform. We declare again null and void a pact which disposes of us without our consent.

" The vindication of our rights remains forever open to all and to each in the form and in the measure which our conscience shall dictate to us." ² In ten years 100,000 Alsatians—chiefly young people—left the country,³ a few of the rest were won by favors, but the greater number became more and more unreconcilable. The efforts to win them have been colossal failures. This was particularly visible at the polls. At the elections in 1881, the German candidates had 13,000 votes, the Clericals 20,000, but the protestators had 133,000. In 1887, 18,000 were given to the Germans while the protestators elected all their candidates and had 630,000 votes.⁴ The Prussian mind cannot understand that force, brutal force, is a poor instrument of conquest. " It is the Prussian Government," says again Novicow, " which by its oppressive laws prevents Posen from being Germanized." ⁵ The same thing might be said of Alsace.

France has rapidly drawn to her new peoples. This an English writer has luminously set forth in an admirable passage which we quote. " This power of attracting loyalty from neighbouring conquered states is one of which France may fairly boast, for she is almost alone in Europe in its possession. The Germans cannot con-

¹ Feb. 18, 1871.

² Florent-Matter, *L'Alsace-Lorraine de nos jours*, 1908, p. 84.

³ Matter, P., *Op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 489.

⁴ Florent-Matter, *Op. cit.*, pp. 87, 90.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

ciliate the Poles even as much as the Russians can, and have been resisted by the Magyars for centuries, with ultimate success. They are hated by the Bohemians, and have never succeeded in making themselves endurable to any section of the population of Italy. The Russians cannot absorb the Poles, and are not liked by the Finns; while the Spaniards have never been able fully to digest the Basques, and could not keep the Portuguese after sixty years of union, and this though Lisbon is the natural capital of the entire Peninsula. The Danes never removed the deep distaste felt for them by the Holsteiners, while the Norwegians to this day, after seventy-three years of alliance, regard the Swedes, their own Norse kinsfolk, with the deepest suspicion and dislike. Our own failure in Ireland is at this moment the governing factor in English politics; and though Scotland is more than friendly, the fusion of the two Kingdoms, such as France has always insisted on in all absorbed States, would be next to an impossible revolution. France only has secured a loyalty at once complete and obedient, and the fact is the more remarkable because France has the power of exciting bitter national enmities. If all her neighbours regarded her with liking or even with tolerance, there would be nothing wonderful in the success of her annexations. . . . It is when annexation is complete, and bitterness should grow rancorous, that in all white subjects of France it begins to die away. . . . Government by France after annexation is always honorific. It is insolent during an occupation, but absorption once decreed, logic secures that there shall be no inequality, that laws shall be the same, that votes shall be equal in force, that even the mob of Paris shall respect the new citizens of France, the fresh children of

the Republic. That attitude is carried straight through in the smallest as in the highest detail, so that a Savoyard who succeeded as Deputy or Senator would have just as good a chance of the Presidential chair as if he were a Parisian, as he would also, if successful in a little way, have just the same chance of gaining permission to open a tobacco shop; and it removes much, if not all, the bitterness of conquests. No Frenchman is looked down on in France, the status of Frenchmen being, for any one who accepts it, a kind of civil consecration. . . . France can, in a very special degree, assimilate absorbed peoples, and this is one of her greatest political resources, and one of which she has the greatest reason to be proud.”¹

The peoples in France, drawn within the national orbit, have been assimilated and nationalized through kind and generous treatment. The authorities never dreamed of robbing these populations of their essential liberties, such as that of language, for instance. The inhabitants of Provence, still using their vernacular with the French, have become almost bilingual. Some of them, though loyal to the old *Langue d'oc*, have become incomparable prose writers in French like Daudet and Aicard, not to mention others. The Basques still use their very ancient tongue. The Bretons enjoy the language and the poetry of the French Welsh, and in the northernmost part of French Flanders the people hammer away at their Germanic Flemish, while the French language penetrates slowly, very slowly but surely, among all. A broad-minded Government would have favored a bilingual culture which is so potent in the life of a nation, but in Alsace French was ostracized

¹ *The Spectator*, Sept. 10, 1892, p. 343.

everywhere. Some local newspapers have had a permanent ironical heading. "French Inscriptions Hunting."¹ It was prohibited in all postal documents for Alsace and Lorraine. It was interdicted upon all public signs. A hairdresser was prevented from having his sign, *Coiffeur*, he had to put *Friseur*. Milliners could no longer have the sign, *Modiste*, which was replaced by *Modistin*. *Restaurant* had to be transformed into *Restauration*. The *Café du Griffon* was obliged to drop the *du* and became *Café Griffon* and *Café italien* was compelled to have its adjective begin with a capital because it gave the name a German appearance. *Café impérial* was interdicted by the police, it was too French. A restaurant posted its bill of fare, the *Menu du jour*, which had the advantage of being artistic. It was tabooed. *Cigarettes françaises en vente ici*, posted upon a cigar store in Savern, had the same fate.² The police of Strasburg allowed eight French plays a year, each one approved by the chief of police. This privilege was revoked.³ The singing of the *Marseillaise* was prohibited even in the city of Strasburg where it was composed. The tricolor bows, which young Alsatian women wore on their hair, were violently snatched by the police.

The *Eden-Theater* of Strasburg wishing to play *La Vivandière*, an operetta representing the life of the French Revolution, the police objected to the French flag in it. After awhile a compromise was reached and the Dutch flag was used instead.⁴ There was also the disbanding of all kinds of societies with French sympa-

¹ Florent-Matter, *Op. cit.*, p. 188.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 188-192; *Les Annales*, March 7, 1915.

³ *Ibid.*, May 30, 1915.

⁴ Florent-Matter, *Op. cit.*, p. 235.

ties, such as choral unions, literary circles, dramatic associations, botanical and zoological societies and even those harmless organizations, societies of mutual help.¹ The Club of Alsatian and Lorrainer Students was closed.²

The teaching of French was suppressed in the schools, its use in the courts, and everywhere the language was pursued with a relentless spirit. The names of citizens in public records had to be Germanized; Guillaume became Wilhelm, Jean was written as Johann and Albert assumed the form of Albrecht.³ Even the inscriptions upon the clothes or the caps of employees and porters in private establishments had to be in German. This did not accomplish its purpose. In 1895, 159,532 Alsatians reported that their mother tongue was French; in 1900, it had become 198,173. Several newspapers, either published in German or in two languages, during the Second Empire have now become French.⁴

The Alsatians were made to feel that everything which they cherished was to be eradicated from their hearts, and above all their great national hope. No wonder that they did not love their conquerors. Already in 1871, Busch speaks of "the inexplicable attachment of the Alsatians for France; of their voluntary Helotism, and their infatuation which prevents their seeing and feeling that a Gaul regards them only as Frenchmen of the second class, and treats them in many respects accordingly."⁵ As far as common, uneducated Frenchmen were concerned, there may be a little truth in Busch's statement in reference to Alsatians, but the élite of France

¹ III, 96, 692.

² *L'Illustration*, June 24, 1911.

³ Florent-Matter, *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁵ *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, p. 130.

had the greatest admiration for them. They were given important positions in the educational, the scientific and the historical world. They have had such popular literary men as About, Erckmann-Chatrian and eminent artists. Some of them have succeeded in every high domain that demands intelligence and character. This is particularly true of the army. Five years ago Jules Claretie made the following statement: "At the present hour there are 76 generals of divisions or of brigades coming from Alsace-Lorraine whose names stand on the books of the French army."¹ The fact which is evident from Busch's statement is the attachment of the Alsatians to France. That "inexplicable attachment" already existed at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1709, a Prussian Minister, Schmettau, wrote to Prince Eugene and to the Duke of Marlborough, "It is evident that the inhabitants of Alsace are more French than the Parisians, and that the King of France is so sure of their affection in his service and for his glory that he has ordered them to provide themselves with rifles, pistols, halberds, swords, powder and lead every time that he hears that the Germans intend to cross the Rhine, and that they rush in masses toward the bank of the river to prevent or at least to dispute the passage to the German nation, at the evident peril of their own lives, as if they were going to a triumph."²

Miss Ruth Putnam has pointed out the inconsistency of a German historian who speaks of Alsace brought "back to the newly founded German Empire. That a *newly founded* institution could receive *back* territory it

¹ *Quarante ans après*, p. 194.

² Quoted from Matter, P., *Bismarck et son temps*, vol. III. p. 227.

was too young to have lost, sounds a trifle illogical.”¹ Yes, it is more than illogical, the statements of German writers do not correspond to reality. “There never was,” says Dr. Matter, “any *Reichsland* under the name of Elsass-Lothringen: that geographical expression has existed only since 1871; up to their assimilation by France the territories of this region were partitioned and varied. Belfort and the Sundgau, objects of contention by princes in the course of centuries, were united to France in 1648; Mulhausen, a Swiss city, gave herself freely in 1798; Colmar and the cities about were in reality annexed in 1673; Strasburg became French in 1681; Metz entered into its new fatherland with Toul and Verdun in 1552. Until the time of their annexation, these territories were distinct, rival, and such a city as Saint-Marie aux Mines was divided by a frontier which made two hostile parts of its population. It was the work of France to agglomerate these divers parts, to assimilate them into one same nation, and to breathe into them the same patriotism: there were no longer Alsatians or Lorrainers, peoples of the plains or of the mountains, but Frenchmen.”² Their treatment by the Germans, so different from that of their fathers, closed their hearts to their conquerors. Their open, frank nature did not conceal the fact. At the time of the discussion of the septennate of Bismarck, some one of his supporters said that if the bill was not passed the enemy would invade the Reichsland. An Alsatian member of the Reichstag sprang up and exclaimed, “The enemy has been among us for more than sixteen years.”³

¹ *Alsace and Lorraine*, 1915, p. 177.

² Matter, P., *Bismarck et son temps*, vol. III, p. 227.

³ III, 88, 210.

One of the harshest measures was the closing of the Alsatian frontier to those who had made their option for France. Again and again, when aged parents were passing away, asking to see once more their loved sons, the latter were held at the frontier by a stern order requiring the imperative passport, and not infrequently if the required permit came at all it would be after the old father or mother would be under the sod.¹ In the Treaty of Frankfurt there is a clause stating that subjects born in the ceded territories are free to keep their property there. The right to own property ought to include the right to visit it, and to use it, but such was not the interpretation of German officials.² One of the outcomes of the Franco-Russian Alliance is that as soon as it had become a reality the hard régime of passports was ended.³

There were periods of calm as there were spasms of violence. The furious treatment of the caricaturists, Zislin and Hansi, who had sketched so skillfully the foibles and ridicules of the conquerors, excited protests everywhere. What the authorities called treason, and wished to punish like treason, should have called forth the heartiest laughter of healthy men. Who were ever more often exposed to the sarcasms of satirists in every part of the world, and deservedly so, than the French? They have never thought of bringing the clever artists before the courts and condemning them to a long imprisonment because they had exaggerated in a very clever way French weaknesses. Hansi was referred to the Court of Leipsic. He was charged to have, in *My Village*,

¹ III, 20, 475.

² III, 96, 682.

³ *Journal des Débats*, Oct. 6, 1915.

excited the Alsatians against the German régime and prosecuted for high treason.¹ Then comes the Savern incident² which called forth the horror of men with a large heart in every country. To assail men as Col. von Reutter and Lieutenant Forstner did, "sabring and persecuting the civilians, who were driven almost to revolt by the overbearing arrogance of the military,³ carries one back to the régime of the brutal violence of olden times. Yet these men were exonerated by their military judges.⁴ At an earlier period Marshal von Manteuffel did not see the sad irony contained in his statement, when he spoke of the Alsatians as "the reconquered brethren."⁵ "The reconquered brethren" subjected to this régime!

The spirit of the victors in Alsace in dealing with the vanquished is shown by a few facts taken at random. One of their most ungenerous and tactless acts was the erection of the statue of William I upon the finest square of Strasburg. The Alsatians were thereby challenged in their sentiments toward the Hohenzollerns. Kindness of heart would have prevented such a step. When Herr Herzog, Director of Affairs for the Reichsland, visited Mulhausen, someone asked him to be considerate for the people. He answered, "The wishes of the people are absolutely indifferent to me."⁶ One recalls the Prussians crossing Hanover, and Manteuffel's telegram to Bismarck asking how the Hanoverians should be treated, "As friends if one can, if not in a deadly way" was the

¹ *L'Illustration*, May 23, 1914.

² III, 18, 954.

³ Villard, Oswald Garrison, *Germany Embattled*, 1915, p. 55.

⁴ VI, 19, 479.

⁵ Larousse, *Grand dictionnaire*, vol. XVII, p. 206.

⁶ III, 88, 205.

reply.¹ Giving instructions to the chiefs of administration in Schleswig-Holstein, he advises them to deal severely with those undisciplined peoples after the principle, "If thou canst not be loved thou must be feared."² In parts of Germany conquered by Prussia, King William met a cool reception. He reproached his Minister for it. Bismarck answered, "We have no time to make ourselves loved."³ "In annexing Alsace-Lorraine, his primary object," he said, "was not to make the inhabitants happy and contented, but to secure Germany against future aggression."⁴ "Alsace must forever be and remain the glacis of the Empire."⁵ Apart from the heartlessness contained in these statements, they were rendered much more hateful by revealing the stiff, hard and harsh ways of the conquerors. The French treatment was different. When, at various times, most of the sections of Alsace-Lorraine came under the French flag, they were won over by considerateness. An Alsatian member of the Reichstag eloquently voiced the recollection of French rule in his appeal for a fairer treatment of his people, "Make," he said, "for the Alsatians and Lorrainers a home in which they will be at ease and can forget a happy past. The German Empire could only gain by following the example of France. You possess the language, you have force, but there is something that is not in you, it is generosity. What we ask is not generosity but equity."⁶

¹ V, 14, 753.

² V, 21, 245.

³ III, 73, 541.

⁴ Lowe, *Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 382.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

⁶ VI, 1, 957.

The régime of German harshness, alike in every one of the conquered territories, equally severe with the Danes, the Poles and the Alsatians, did but little to advance the conquerors' cause. One is astonished to hear the Kaiser say, in a speech at Strasburg, July 30, 1908, "The people of Alsace-Lorraine have given me such an expression of their love and loyalty." In this he must have mistaken German emigrants for genuine Alsatians. Unquestionably, German leaders believe in this policy when dealing with the vanquished who remain refractory to German expectations. Prince von Bülow would say of Alsace what he has uttered about Poland, "This policy must ultimately reconcile our Polish fellow-countrymen to the fact that they belong to the Prussian State and to the German Empire."¹ The Prince might have added that virtual expulsion and real expropriation of Poles from the home and land of their fathers, will, if continued, be more efficient, but the terrible mistake of Prince von Bülow and of Germans at large is that in their opinion the Poles and the Alsatians *belong*, that they are the property of German states and that behind this conception there is the German first principle that "Might makes Right." That which Germany cannot forgive the Alsatians, any more than the Poles or the Danes, is the survival of their national hopes. They do not forget the iniquity which has denationalized them, and they continue to appeal to the immanent justice which dominates history.

The question of Alsace remains to be settled. German misrepresentations of the question have been signal provocations west of the Rhine. Prince von Bülow says, "France moves in a circle round the thought of Alsace-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 309.

Lorraine.”¹ Anyone acquainted with the variety and richness of French thought during the last forty years will smile at the statement that France has been hypnotized by such an idea, however noble. Again, “France will not look upon her great colonial empire as a sufficient compensation for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.”² It is not land, but justice to a people that France wishes. The German Emperor is reported to have said to someone, referring to the Alsatian Question, “It is impossible that all the progress of the civilized nations should depend upon knowing if 1,800,000 individuals shall be German or French.”³ The question is not whether or no “1,800,000 individuals shall be German or French,” but whether or no they can be what they choose; whether they can have political freedom or no. Prof. Münsterberg speaks as if France had no other feelings than those of revenge, and again and again repeats his calumnies⁴ as if Alsace were an all-absorbing question, and the only possible solution of which would be war upon Germany. Yes, for over twoscore years France has thought and has thought much of Alsace. There were French militants—not a large number—who would have been willing to attack Germany to redress the Alsace wrong, but the nation at large was not. “Here is the fact,” says Novicow. “Since 1871 France has performed no act showing that she wished to take back the lost provinces by arms. There have been many German bluffs since 1871, there has not been a single French one.”⁵ The spirit of *revanche* has existed if that meant the vindica-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 110.

² *Ibid.*, p. 93.

³ Novicow, *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁴ *America and the War*, pp. 43, 76, 95, 139, etc.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 199.

tion of Alsace, "but," says the same author, "if the Germans think that it has been heroic for them to maintain their claims during 223 years, it would be the opposite for Frenchmen to do the same for 44 years."¹

Everywhere the spirit of *revanche* had died out, when it was revived by the aggressive course of Germany in Morocco, by the ill-treatment of Alsatians and by the colossal armaments beyond the Rhine. The thought of *revanche* had so subsided that, in 1904, Francis de Pressensé challenged the conservatives in Parliament, daring them to put upon their program a war for the recovery of Alsace.² In 1909, *Le Temps*, examining French textbooks used in the schools, draws the following conclusion, "France has lost the hope and even the desire of revenge."³ The great Parisian paper was right, the pacifistic movement had largely swept away the *revanche* aspect of the Alsatian Question, and this would have continued had it not been for the late indignities to which France has been subjected by Germany.

The mass of Frenchmen would not have dreamed of attacking Germany—they had too keen a sense of the immorality and irrationality of war—but they hoped that, with the international readjustments which the Teutons would force upon the world, the lost provinces would recover, as they may do, their freedom. On the other hand the Germans are only too ready to see but one solution for questions of this kind, and that is war. They tried to settle the question of Alsace that way in 1870, and since then they have ascribed like motives to the French. Some of the most civilized nations point

¹ Novicow, p. 192.

² V, 19, 916.

³ V, 54, 477.

with pride to other solutions of international issues either by arbitration or by conciliation. There have been more than 75 cases in which the United States and Great Britain have deemed such solutions the only ones becoming highly civilized states. The arbitration of the Alabama Case between the two countries was a higher index of civilization than the great scientific institutions which are the boast of Teutonic peoples. It is because of the signal German difficulty of rising to such a fair judicial point of view that they cannot reconcile French feelings for Alsace with a French love of peace. Even when they recognize the nobleness of the French attitude they seldom fail to give a suggestion which is far from flattering for their opponents. Prince von Bülow, speaking of England and France, says, "The mainspring of English policy toward us is national egoism; that of French policy is national idealism. He who follows his interest will, however, mostly remain calmer than he who pursues an idea."¹ Let us overlook the "national egoism" of England, and perhaps also the suggestion of the absence of national selfishness among Germans, but after the irritation in reference to Alsace, the Tangier Speech, Agadir and other provocations, France was calmer than her Teutonic opponent. It must be added that all along the sufferings and trials of the Alsatians were sympathetically those of Frenchmen ever ready to listen to "*L'éternelle plainte des vaincus*,"² that is, to protest against the unrighteous decisions of war.

¹ *Imperial Germany*, p. 109.

² Jules Ferry.

XI

GERMAN MILITARISM

ONE fact which makes Frenchmen indignant is the naïve way in which German apologists endeavor to deceive the public, acting and talking as if the thought of war was not an obsession of the national mind. Von Bülow asserts that the German Empire "is and must remain a military state."¹ Prussia has risen to the supreme leadership among other states by war. The French historian, Lavisson, who has written with so much competence and impartiality upon Prussia, truly says, with a point of irony, "The Hohenzollern is someone who ever wishes to have more money to pay more soldiers. He has the habit of acquiring new territories; this habit is so old and so strong that he cannot give it up. Today, he dreams of governing the world."² That the Hohenzollern has been a territory, and largely a German territory, grabber is not an invention of Teutophobists. Bismarck relates how he spoke to his royal master. "I pointed out to the King, for instance, that all his predecessors, with the exception of his late brother, had added to their territories, and asked him whether he wished to follow that brother's example."³ Thanks to Bismarck, he did not.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 338.

² *Le Temps*, Feb. 15, 1915.

³ Busch, M., *Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History*, vol. II, p. 172.

With the Prussians war purpose and territorial extension go hand in hand. The highest distinctions of the Empire are for militaries. The *Kriegherr*, the War-Lord, is the supreme soldier and thereby the supreme magistrate. "God's will placed him at the head of the army." Wherever his sons are, and at whatever age, they appear in their military dress. At great national functions the army officers come before the representatives of the nation. At the opening of the imperial House of Parliament, its members were not the hosts; on the contrary, there was a rope stretched separating them from the dignitaries of the Court, and from the representatives of the army. Everywhere the man with a helmet comes before the philosopher and the scientist. The commonest lieutenant assumes a certain superiority over the rector of a university. The scholar subordinates his work to, and harmonizes his conclusions with, the aims and purposes of the military clique. The historian, betraying his mission of telling the objective truth, ever celebrates the perfections of his race and its military attainments. Even the clergymen have lost all independence in their international judgments. The Reichstag is ten times more military and more responsive to military appeals than any other parliamentary institution in Europe. The late Professor J. A. Cramb speaks of "the annual appearance of very nearly seven hundred books dealing with war as a science," while in England there is published barely a score of books on the same subject.¹ The German army, the military organization, is the central axis of national efforts, the greatest instrument of the will to power, and preparation to fight the supreme end of the nation's life. For Bismarck the army

¹ *Germany and England*, p. 71.

was "Prussia's life-nerve."¹ For Treitschke, it was "the expression of a nation's will to life and must advance with that life." "A nation's military efficiency is the exact co-efficient of a nation's idealism." Bethmann-Hollweg says, "The vital strength of a nation is only the measure of that nation's armaments."²

For the Germans at large war itself has been spiritualized, made divine and paramount, and for some of them a state of things resting upon peace would be immoral. The doctrine of evolution of Darwin explaining zoological relations has been extended to nations who develop through the natural selection of war which brings about the survival of the fittest, the German, "the most perfect creation that history has produced up to now."³ That German wants to be the strongest and that for him means the greatest. He has thrown himself without restraint into a mad industrialism and mercantilism which have dwarfed his spiritual life. He is not so foolish as to dream of liberty, equality and fraternity for all. He does not try to harmonize his patriotism with humanity, as the French have done. He has but little interest in mankind. Germany is the exclusive center of his pre-occupations, *Deutschland über Alles*. It is true that German Socialists have platonically reproved all wars, and held to the principle that peoples have a right to dispose of themselves, but they voted for the increase of armaments, and when the war came, they acted like the other Germans. To the prevalence of these ethics must be ascribed the relative failure of pacifism in that

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 81.

² Cramb, J. A., *Germany and England*, p. 51.

³ Letter of Dr. Adolf Lassen.

country, and its attitude toward the judicial settlement of international difficulties.

Dr. Andrew D. White, ever an admirer of Germany, has shown us, in a masterly way, her attitude at the first Hague Conference. He speaks as follows of the chief of the German delegation: "Count von Münster insisted that arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as no other country is or can be; that she can mobilize her army in ten days; and that neither France, Russia, nor any other power can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival Powers time to put themselves in readiness, and would therefore be a great disadvantage to Germany."¹ Again, "He was out of humor with all the proceedings of the conference. He is more than ever opposed to arbitration.² . . . He came out, as he did the day before in his talk with me, utterly against arbitration, declaring it 'humbug.'³ At the closing of the Conference, after speeches by M. de Staal and others, Count von Münster, as the presiding delegate from Germany, had to make a closing address. "It must have been pain and grief to him," says again the renowned American educator, "for he was obliged to speak respectfully, in the first place, of the Conference, which for some weeks he had affected to despise; and secondly, of arbitration and the other measures proposed, which, at least during all the first part of the Conference, he had denounced as a trick and a humbug."⁴ Another member of the Ger-

¹ *Autobiography*, N. Y. 1905, vol. II, p. 265.

² *Ibid.*, p. 296.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 346.

man delegation, Professor Baron von Stengel of Munich, was especially known for a book which he had written against arbitration.¹ With them was Colonel Schwartzhoff, a man strongly "prejudiced against the Conference." Herr Zorn von Bulach, another German delegate, maintained that an international tribunal is incompatible with the sovereignty of a monarch. These delegates according to Novicow blocked every attempt to solve international difficulties by judiciary processes.² So much for the attitude of the German delegation at The Hague in 1899.

The American diplomatist, already quoted, throws further light upon the position of the German authorities at this time. "It now appears," he says again, "that the German Emperor is determined to oppose the whole scheme of arbitration."³ "There are also signs that the German Emperor is influencing the minds of his allies—the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey, and Roumania—leading them to oppose it."⁴ "There is no longer any doubt that the German Emperor is opposing arbitration, and, indeed, the whole work of the Conference." . . . "I had learned from a high official, before I left Berlin, that the Emperor considered arbitration as derogatory to his sovereignty."⁵ At times, on account of Teuton opposition, the American delegates seem discouraged, but they go on. "Those of us who are faithful to arbitration plans," says the chief of the American delegation, "will go on and do the best we can; but there is no telling what stumbling-blocks Germany and her allies

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 293.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

may put in our way.”¹ The American Ambassador makes earnest appeals to Count von Münster, as if he were more concerned for German moral interests than for those of his own countrymen, but he was struggling for a great ethical issue, and his conspicuous services will be remembered. He wrote a most impressive letter to von Bülow in view of modifying the stand of the German Government. At last he went so far as to send Judge Frederick Holls to Berlin, as a special delegate, imploring the Germans to cease their hostility to arbitration and assuring them that, unless they yielded, the Emperor would be the most hated man in the world.² He did not fail to act in other directions. He urged Baroness von Suttener “to write with all her might to influence public prints in Austria, Italy and Germany in behalf of arbitration.”³ At last the Emperor relented and ceased his opposition, but the attitude of Germany at this time leaves room for no uncertainty. She showed there how fundamentally hostile she is to the rational and equitable settlement of international difficulties, and how, in her mind, the sword is almost the sole *ultima ratio*.

We are told repeatedly that the Kaiser is a man of peace. Hardly a defender of Germany has failed to mention the quarter of a century of peace during his reign, but as Molière puts it, *Le temps ne fait rien à l'affaire*. If it takes two to marry, it takes two to fight. Indeed the Ruler of Germany has said, “It is incompatible with my Christian faith and with the duties which, as Emperor, I have assumed toward the people need-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 299, 302, 311.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

lessly to bring upon Germany the sorrows of war, even of a victorious one.”¹ Notwithstanding that, his utterances are those of a man hypnotized by the army and ever rolling the word, sword, upon his tongue like a sweet morsel. When he wishes to honor Bismarck, who was on the border of the grave, he presents him with “the noblest weapon of the Germans.” His military metaphor of “the sharpened sword” recurs as by a fixed idea. “We Germans,” he says in 1909, “are a people who rejoice in weapons and who lightly and joyfully wear our uniforms, because we know that it preserves peace for us.”²

On July 31, 1914, speaking of the Allies, he says, “they are forcing the sword into my hand,” and on August 1, “We hope and pray that our good German sword will come out of the struggle victorious.” The threats of “the mailed fist,” the demand that his soldiers shall use their “weapons in such a way that for 1,000 years no Chinese shall dare to look upon a German askance,” and the supreme behest to his men that they “give no pardon” and take “no prisoner” are not the ways of speaking of a man of peace. To this “mailed fist” speech Prince Henry replied, “One thing alone draws me on. It is to publish in foreign lands to everyone who will listen and also to those who will not listen the gospel of your Majesty’s hallowed person. This gospel I mean to have inscribed upon my banner, and I will inscribe it wherever I go. . . . I call upon those who are so fortunate as to be my comrades in this voyage to keep this day in their recollections, to imprint the person of the Emperor upon their minds, and to send

¹ Gauss, p. 45.

² *Ibid.*, p. 278.

forth into the world afar the cry: ‘Our most illustrious, our most high and mighty, our beloved Kaiser, King and Lord for ever and ever! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!’”¹ What a valuable document of mental pathology! The categories of the Kaiser’s mind deny at every step his pretensions in this direction. His telegram to President Krüger and his speech at Tangier do not suggest the spirit of “peace on earth, good-will toward men.” At the time of the Morocco Affair he was bold, pushing, conscious of being backed by the mightiest army on earth, resolved to use it.

Militarism and thirst for power are two dominant characteristics of German activity. Every human discovery and every form of progress is at once mortgaged for war purpose. “The constant increase of German armaments by land and sea,” says Professor Muir, “has turned all Europe into an armed camp.”² Dr. David Starr Jordan speaks of Germany which had acquired “a monstrous and menacing military equipment before breaking the world’s peace.” Never has the world seen such an amazing amount of war provisions, the Spandau Treasury, the Kiel Canal, deepened and enlarged for war purposes, the numerous strategic railroads that make it so easy, in time of conflict, to transport ammunitions and soldiers from one frontier to another.³ There were also great exertions to prepare foodstuffs. From 1911 on, the Germans bought large quantities of meats even in France which they gathered in their cold storage.⁴ There

¹ Saunders, G., *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

² *Britain’s Case Against Germany*, p. 132.

³ Prof. E. Doumergue of Montauban speaks of eleven lines of strategic railroads transporting troops to the front. *Foi et Vie*, May 16, 1915.

⁴ Houlaigue, L., *Le Temps*, Nov. 15, 1914.

is an almost encyclopedic world of war preparations from the control of the press, the spying system, the organized agitation in hostile and neutral countries to stupendous strategic activities, secret to an extent that would be impossible in any other country. Had Germany made the same efforts for peace the so-called utopias of pacifists would have become world-wide realities!

After 1870, the imperial rule imposed military service upon all, while France adopted that measure, with innumerable exceptions, only later. The German tendency to larger armaments increased with time. Every international event was turned into a pretext for increased war appropriations. In 1911, 1912 and 1913, legislative acts continued this unreasonable accumulation of means of human destruction, though when the last law was passed the Chancellor said that no one threatened his country. Nevertheless, the army at one vote and by a war levy of \$250,000,000 was increased by 200,000 units and presented, in 1913, an aggregate of 850,000 men in time of peace, while France, with a very much smaller army, had to discount the men of various services, and 60,000 men immobilized in North Africa. Germany's figures represent fighters, the different services were provided with men to be added to the effective fighting numbers. According to various French authorities the relative strength of German and French contingents was something like three to two or at least four to three.¹ If we are to accept the statements of *Le Temps*, Germany increased her war expenses 227 per cent. from 1883 to 1913, that is in thirty years, and France only 70 per cent.

The German hallucination, or perhaps mere pretext,

¹ VI, 14, 231.

of the French revenge has caused them not only to see enemies in the West, but the Russo-French alliance led them to see them in the East also, and the same spirit has revealed to them foes on the sea. The creation of one of the most powerful navies of the world cannot be put upon the score of French aggression, or that a foreign fleet menaced its merchantmen. The colossal growth of her navy cannot be explained on the basis of love of peace. The imperial naval formulæ, "The trident ought to be in our fist," "Bitterly we need a powerful German fleet," "Nothing can now be done in the world without Germany and the German Emperor," were the outbursts of an unsated ambition and of an aggressive purpose. We know that Germany showed a conspicuous unfriendliness to the work of The Hague and also that she refused to accept every proposal—there were many—of England for the limitation of naval increase.¹ We know that during the Greek-Turkish war in 1897, when the Powers were doing their utmost to limit the conflict, Germany lent her officers and furnished implements of war to the Turks. We know that in 1912, when Russia, France and England made noble attempts to prevent and stop the Balkan war, Germany showed a signal indifference, and her officers took a very important place in the Turkish army, while the great Powers of Europe remained neutral. We know that she stood by Austria—perhaps pushed her in 1908, and supported her in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Germany encouraged her, or at least backed her, in the present war. In viewing the facts that we have pointed out and many others besides, there loomed before Frenchmen the sense of a great potential

¹ Muir, Ramsay, *Britain's Case Against Germany*, p. 16.

and unavoidable danger. The disingenuous utterances of the Kaiser irritated them still further. In the Reichstag on August 14, 1914, he said, "Too often have our attempts to come to friendlier relations with the French Republic failed because of her old resentments."¹ Yes, the "attempts to come to friendlier relations" in Frenchmen's eyes were the alliances to isolate them, the Bismarck designs to fight them again, his misrepresentations and those of the Kaiser, colossal menacing armaments, the Morocco challenges, Agadir, and the harrowing treatment of the Alsatians.

There is a German psychological trait, almost exasperating for the French, which throws considerable light upon their provoking acts. This was brought out many years ago by A. Fouillée, in his *Esquisse psychologique des peuples européens*,² and has been put in striking relief—*Horresco referens*—in a conversation of Chancellor von Bülow with Sir Thomas Barclay. "We Germans," he said, "at least the *Gebildeter Stand* (the educated middle class), have history on the brain. It is an intellectual disease which makes Germans see current events out of focus. Far-off happenings stand out in their mind as large as the nearer ones. We see them without the sense of perspective that fixes their true value. The professor and his pupils are as indignant at wrongs inflicted on Germany a century or even centuries ago as they are at what happens today, and publicists seriously write historical books to show up the evil ways of their neighbors, as if they might be precedent for action today."³ This is very true, so true

¹ Gauss, p. 326.

² P. 256.

³ *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences*, p. 270.

that the Chancellor, having become a Prince, is unconsciously to give us many proofs of it. In his book, *Imperial Germany*, he says, "We wish to prevent the return of such times as those of Louis XIV and of Napoleon I and for our greater security have therefore strengthened our frontiers against France."¹ Speaking of the treatment of the Poles, whom the Germans with great cruelty have endeavored to drive away from their ancestral homes, he says, "In the seventh century we Germans abandoned all lands east of the Elbe."² "West Prussia was regarded not as a newly acquired land, but as German land that had been recovered and rightly so."³ Notice, lands abandoned "in the seventh century," the Germans endeavor now to recover by methods unworthy of a civilized people. Decidedly they have good memories. During the Franco-Prussian war and after Sedan, M. Thiers met Ranke in Vienna. He asked the Prussian historian, "Now that you have Napoleon,⁴ against whom are you fighting?" "Against whom?" answered Ranke, "Against Louis XIV."⁵ Von Moltke, in the Reichstag, evokes the specter of Napoleon and his generals as if they were about to cross the Rhine.⁶ He speaks of the *milliard* squeezed by Bonaparte and the robbery of the Hamburg bank by a French General as if they were a matter of yesterday.⁷ One would think from these German ways of viewing things that Turenne

¹ P. 87.

² P. 297.

³ P. 302.

⁴ In a manifesto one German General had said: "We do not fight the French but Napoleon."

⁵ *Le Temps*, March 31, 1915.

⁶ *Essays, Speeches and Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 112.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

and Villars are with General Joffre, that the Palatinate, not Louvain, not Dinant, not Ypres, not Reims, not Arras, not Senlis, is still burning—that President Poincaré, the first servant of France, is still Louis XIV, the former War-Lord, the Kaiser of France—and that French soldiers, the earnest sons of French democracy—not the hirelings and mercenaries of Louis XIV—are ready to renew the awful tragedies of attacking Germany “thirty times in two hundred years,” as the humane von Tirpitz who torpedoed the *Lusitania* puts it.¹ These men who seek in history only pretexts for their aggressive purpose never say that many of the wars were undertaken for the protection and liberation of German peoples, and never have anything to say about their own invasions of the land west of them.²

They do not refer to the unpardonable invasion of France by Prussia and Austria, in 1792, to defeat the men who were endeavoring to free their country from the despotism of the *Ancien régime*. Both were defeated at Valmy by French soldiers fighting for the first time under the inspiring strains of the *Marseillaise*. Prussia and Austria were fighting, not only against those who stood for the rights of France, but for those of man. Two years later they joined the whole of Europe against France. After having been for nearly eight years the allies of Napoleon, and having secured through this compact all possible benefits, they turned against their ally, invaded France after Waterloo, and once

¹ New York *Sun*, Dec. 22, 1915.

² We commend particularly on this subject an essay of that able and courageous member of the French Parliament, Joseph Reinach, *De l'influence historique de la France sur l'Allemagne*, in his *Histoire et littérature*, 1889.

more in 1870 when they worked out the scheme of conquest of Bismarck. In their statement of grievances, they never formulate them objectively or stand definitely by an issue. Finally, they do France a great injustice not only by the misstatement of their case, but by overlooking the generous, broad, human and humanitarian evolution of the last century. One feels that behind German acts and German historiography there is a strong, unreasoning, hostile passion against France. The writer does not maintain that the latter has always been as amiable as she might have been. Amicability is less a right than a favor. France has had a correct attitude, at times frigidly correct, but correct even when Germany was exasperating.

The subjects of the Kaiser do not seem to be aware of the fact that uncultured foreigners know something of the work of the Naval League, of the German Colonial Society, of the Pan-Germanistic Association as well as other organizations which may differ in character, but have the common purpose of territorial expansion and of ethnological accretions at any cost. In broad daylight, publicly, some of these organizations have advocated the annexation of Belgium and of large parts of France. Almost all demanded dominant positions in the North Sea, all the land along the Meuse, the Scheldt, and the Rhine, the mining basin of Belgium for coal and that of Lorraine for iron. Such pretensions among Frenchmen, in reference to other countries, would have met with popular reproof. In the country in which a large party had for its motto at a time when the matter was discussed, "Tonkin for the Tonkinese!" and when recently the same party in Parliament fought with the rallying cry of "Morocco for the Moroccans!" the aims

of Pan-Germanists seemed to belong to another age. In fact they were in keeping with those of jurists, of economists, of sociologists and philosophers pointed out by M. Fouillée, men among whom there is a perfect worship of brute force, the ethical justification of national aggressiveness and a complete acceptance of the doctrine that might makes right.

XII

GERMANY AND RUSSIA

THE Franco-Russian Alliance was peculiarly annoying to the Germans and the characterization of their Eastern neighbors was greatly resented in France. The Kaiser is said to have spoken of them as "Asiatic Barbarians." In the recent apologetic literature of German origin, one meets constantly expressions like the following, "barbaric Pan-Slavism," "the Cossacks ready to crush the culture of Germany," "the uncultured hordes of the East," "the onrush of barbaric masses" who have "the force of blind barbarity"; in the present war, the Germans defend "the cause of civilization as opposed to Muscovite barbarism." Dr. Andrew D. White has done justice to the often quoted epigram, "Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar," which is no more correct than to say, "Scratch an American and you will find an Indian."¹ Those who are so severe with the subjects of the Czar do not tell us that again and again Russia had rendered conspicuous services to Prussia and that she saved her at the time of Napoleon. "Did the Prussians and Austrians," says Professor Paul Vinogradoff of Oxford, "reflect on the humiliation of an alliance with the Muscovites, and on the superiority of the Code Civil, when the Russian Guard at Kuhn stood like a rock against the desperate onslaught of Vandamme? Perhaps by this time the inhabitants of Berlin

¹ *Autobiography*, vol. II, p. 26.

have obliterated the bas-relief in the 'Alley of Victories' which represents Prince William of Prussia, the future victor of Sédan, seeking safety within the square of the Kaluga regiment!"¹

During his ambassadorship, Bismarck did all he could to secure the friendship of the Czar, while later on he avoided irritating him and furthermore helped him to subdue the Poles. In 1866, his neutrality enabled Prussia to crush Austria. When, during the next year, France asked Prussia to carry out Article V of the Treaty of Prague, again Russia gave her moral support to Berlin.² In 1870, she influenced Denmark and Austria, preventing them from joining France. Emperor William, after the war, wrote to the Czar: "Never will Prussia forget that it is thanks to you that the war has not assumed extreme proportions. God bless you. . . ." "Your eternally grateful friend."³ During the Franco-German war, there is no favor that Bismarck is not ready to confer upon St. Petersburg. He "proposed the opening of the Dardanelles and of the Black Sea to all nations. It would probably be agreeable to Russia."⁴ Later on, referring to the same subject, he says, "In the London Conference on the Black Sea Question we are to support the Russian claims with all our strength."⁵ Two or three years later the Germans were profuse in their flatteries to Russia.⁶ "Never place us in the alternative of choosing between you (Austria) and Russia," said he to Count von Andrassy, the Hungarian

¹ Paul Vinogradoff, *The Times*, Sept. 14, 1914.

² III, 73, 391.

³ Mévil, *Op. cit.*, p. iv.

⁴ Busch, *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, vol. II, p. 109.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁶ III, 2, 222.

statesman.¹ In 1878, when the Russians were excessive in their demands from Turkey, someone urged him to do something for peace. He answered that he did not know what he could do, but he exclaimed *Beati possidentes*,² which practically meant, leave them alone, so far so good. During the war he made representations to the Porte at the request of the Russian Government on account of the barbarity of the Turks against the soldiers of the Czar, but had previously declined to comply with a similar request from the Sultan.³

The German press changed its tone completely with the Franco-Russian Alliance. It began to speak of Russia as a Barbarian nation, but, except for a little while, the Iron Chancellor did not modify his attitude. Again and again, he expresses his gratitude to the Russians⁴ and in 1892 he censures von Caprivi because he has prepared a rupture between the two empires.⁵ At times he went to a great length in his courtesies toward St. Petersburg. When Alexander of Battenberg, the handsome Prince of Bulgaria, the victor at the battle of Slivnitze, wished to marry Princess Victoria of Prussia, a project highly favored by the Queen of England, approved by the Emperor and by the royal family, Bismarck opposed this step and carried the day because he did not wish to displease the Czar.⁶ While there were brief periods when his warmth for Russia lost some of its intensity, as at the time of the Berlin Congress and

¹ III, 18, 705.

² III, 26, 228.

³ Lowe, *Op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁴ III, 103, 884.

⁵ III, 112, 473.

⁶ Busch, *Bismarck. Some Secret Papers of His History*, vol. II, p. 414.

even later, he was, to the last, a partisan of an alliance with her and that to prevent a Russo-French *rapprochement* and above all to keep France at his mercy. This attitude he did not modify even during his last days at Friedrichsruh.¹ He knew that had it not been for Russia, he could not have accomplished what he did.² Again and again the German Government endeavored to detach the Czar from France, but all in vain. The Kaiser did his utmost with Russia, embraced the Czar again and again, but the embraces, so potent with the Turkish Sultan, were of no avail. The German detractors of Russia do not realize how justly irritating to Frenchmen were German calumnies of the subjects of the Czar.

Granted that Russia has but lately emerged from political absolutism, have the Germans, with all their assumptions of superiority, reached anything like freedom from personal government? Do they ever give Russians credit for what they have done? The mass of Russians are backward, but where is there a country that like theirs has, without a revolution, transformed 20,000,000 slaves into free landowners like the Empire of the Czar?³ Where is the people that would have given up all at once the use of Vodka, a kind of Russian absinthe, that yielded the treasury 2,000,000,000 francs a year? This indicates a self-control not possessed by nations boasting of their enlightenment. Russia is making progress in many ways. Her education is spreading rapidly. A. Rambaud says that she had 250 lycées and colleges for women when France scarcely possessed any.⁴

¹ III, 129, 237.

² III, 143, 233.

³ Rambaud, A., *Journal des Débats*, Oct. 6, 1893.

⁴ *Ibid.*

She has philosophers and scientists of considerable eminence. Her economist, Novicow, has treated in a masterly way some of the most difficult European problems. Russia has her artists, and Germany never had one more humane than Vereshtchagin, the painter, who attempted the impossible task of making war seem as horrible as it really is. She has her musicians, never more appreciated than now, and the world—very ignorant of the Empire of the Czar—was astonished when, through Melchior de Vogué, came a revelation of the noteworthy literature of the country. It is impossible not to agree with Professor Vinogradoff of the Oxford University when he says, “A nation represented by Pushkin, Turgeneff, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, in literature, by Kramskoy, Vereshtchagin, Repin, Glinka, Monssorgsky, Tchaikovsky in art, by Mendeléeff, Metchnikoff, Pavloff in science, by Kluchevsky and Solovieff in history, need not be ashamed to enter the lists in an international competition for prizes of culture.”¹ One fact which is evident is that in 1866, Austria was not slandered one whit less by the Prussians, while in 1870, France was represented as the incarnation of ignorance and depravity.

The work of Russia in the cause of civilization and humanity cannot be overlooked. The great Russian Jurist, F. de Martens, one of the most conspicuous figures at the First Conference of The Hague, has told us of the services rendered by Catharine II of Russia to the cause of international progress. In 1780, she made the celebrated “declaration of the rights of nations and of neutral commerce which served as a basis to armed neutrality.” Sir J. Harris of England, later Lord

¹ *The Times*, Sept. 11, 1914.

Malmesbury, made fun of it. The Empress answered, "Laugh at my declaration, call it if you like my armed neutrality, my armed nullity. It is a fact which will remain." This principle of Catharine has entered into the body of international law recognized by the world.¹ At the time of the invasion of Hesse, in 1850, by the Austro-Bavarian army on the one hand and by that of Prussia on the other the Czar Nicholas said to them, "I shall fire on the first who fires."² In 1864, Alexander II was prominent among those interested in the Conference of Geneva for the humanization of war. In 1868, he summoned the Conference of St. Petersburg to limit war excesses and to prevent the use of certain projectiles and arms³ and especially of explosive bullets.⁴ In 1875, after the war scare created by Bismarck, the Duke of Cambridge speaking with Ganard of the French Embassy said, "What a week we have just passed! The opinion, however, is that it is all over and that it is Russia that has saved the peace of Europe."⁵

The Czar rendered then signal service to France. He came to hold to the principle of national rights. The Treaty of San Stefano, March 3, 1878, reads, "The final frontiers of the Bulgarian principality shall be traced by a commission which shall bear in mind the nationality of the majority of the inhabitants of the frontiers." The great basis of decision here is not strategy or territories, but respect for the inherent rights of men. "If Bismarck," says again Novicow, "had sup-

¹ V, 18, 318.

² Lowe, vol. I, p. 108.

³ Higgins, A. P., *The Hague Peace Conferences*, p. 6.

⁴ Larousse, *Grand dictionnaire*, 1st supplement, p. 87.

⁵ *Journal des Débats*, Nov. 27, 1893.

ported Russia at the Berlin Congress the whole of Bulgaria, the whole of Servia, Greece and Albania would have been delivered from the fatal Ottoman yoke.”¹ In 1888, at the time of the visit of the Kaiser to Russia, it is said that the Czar already talked with him of disarmament.² It was not Kaiser Wilhelm II, but the Czar Nicholas II, who took the leadership in the calling of the Conference at The Hague in 1899. The sovereign of a great and powerful nation proclaimed there, before the whole world, “the necessity for Governments to bear in mind the aspirations and wishes of peoples, and to try to discover the basis of a lasting peace among them by a decrease of military forces.”³ In his rescript, the Czar, speaking most wisely of armaments, said, “It seems evident that if this situation continues, it will lead fatally to that very cataclysm which one attempts to avoid, the horrors of which cause all human thought to shudder beforehand.”⁴ There were not two opinions among the delegates, except those of Germany, concerning the earnestness of the Czar whom a German-American delegate called, “The August Initiator of the Peace Conference.”⁵ There is no doubt as to the value of the co-operation of Baron de Staal, whom Andrew D. White calls “the foremost diplomatist of this epoch,” or of that of the most renowned authority on international law in the Empire, Fedor de Martens. It would be unjust not to mention the presence there of Jean de Bloch, whose works are said to have converted the Czar to peace

¹ Novicow, *Op. cit.*, p. 245.

² III, 88, 714.

³ V, 18, 315.

⁴ V, 18, 333.

⁵ Holls, F. W., *The Peace Conference at The Hague*, N. Y., 1910.

ideas while he left his fortune to establish the Peace Museum of Lucerne.

Russia espoused with singular devotion the peace and humanitarian ideas discussed at the first conference. She took a scarcely less important place at the second conference in the same city. At all times, she earnestly sustained every move that made for international comity, for the humanization of war, and the permanent establishment of peace by reasonable and rational methods. Dr. Andrew D. White twice suggests, in his *Autobiography*, that the Czar would have shown better his earnestness at the time of The Hague Conference "by dismissing from 200,000 to 250,000 troops" from his army,¹ but this would have been an unwise step, as the Russo-Japanese war has demonstrated. France took such a step, but that only made the Germans more aggressive. Why did not the American Ambassador recommend that course to the Germans? Russia, unfortunately like all other Powers, had moments when she failed to show in practice her pacifistic principles, but her efforts have not been inglorious. "The Franco-Russian Alliance was not an alliance made for revenge," says André Tardieu.² At the banquet given to the Czar, at the time of his visit to Paris, in September, 1901, he said, "No doubt can exist as to the fact that the alliance has its origin in the desire for peace, and no one can deny that the alliance has contributed to the preservation of the balance of European Power—the necessary condition of peace." This peaceful aspect of Russian aims appealed very much to Frenchmen, while the alliance delivered them from the dread of German aggression.

¹ Vol. II, p. 28.

² *France and the Alliances*, p. 12.

This pacifistic tendency gave rise to statements in the German press that Russia was willing to take French money, but would not fight for her ally. Von Bülow asserts almost triumphantly that "England, like Russia, has refused to serve the cause of French revenge."¹ This, meant as a slur upon France, is by ricochet a compliment to the peaceful spirit of England and Russia.

The record of the Czar's Government in the direction of practical pacific action is not insignificant. In 1815, Alexander I, at the Congress of Vienna, defended the neutrality of Switzerland with energy and success.² The Duc de Richelieu received a map from Alexander I showing what the Prussians wanted to secure from France—"a line including a part of Franche-Comté, the whole of Alsace, a great part of Lorraine, the Trois-Evêchés, Stenay, Séダン, Mézières, Givet, all of Hainaut, and of French Flanders to the sea."³ This thirst for territories was not quenched by Russia. Even Nicholas I did much to protect Christians under Turkish rule, and joined France and England on behalf of the Greeks. When Bismarck wished to fight France again in 1875, the French Ambassador, Gontaut-Biron, told the Czar what the situation was. The master of All the Russias answered, "Peace is necessary to the world, and each nation has enough to do at home. Depend upon me and have no fear."⁴ He did what was essential to cause Prince Bismarck to desist from his purpose.

The Treaty of San Stefano, stiff as it was, stipulated valuable advantages for all Christian peoples in Turkey,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

² V, 18, 319.

³ *Nouvelle Revue*, Oct. 15, 1895.

⁴ Broglie, *Op. cit.*, 240.

independence for some of them, and virtual autonomy for others.¹ Russia, in the flush of victory, heeded Europe after San Stefano, and never was a menace to her western German friends. She continued to work for the protection of the Balkan peoples, standing regularly for the principle of nationalities and the respect of sovereignties.² When the Greeks provoked war with Turkey in 1897 they received no encouragement and no support from Russia. In 1899 and 1900 the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was endeavoring to put a stop to the South African war by friendly mediation.³ It was agreed by France and Germany that the offer of good offices should be extended by "Russia alone."

After the Russo-Japanese war, which was largely brought about by the impatience of Japan and the slowness of Russian diplomatic action—a war which would not have taken place had Russia's reply, having already granted Japan's demands, arrived one day earlier,⁴ she not only came to terms with the Japanese, but in 1907 she signed a treaty with Japan which established a perfect understanding between the two countries. Then came the remarkable agreement with England which not only put an end to the historic antagonism in the East, but prepared the ultimate evolution of the *Entente*. In 1908 when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina—when Europe was threatened with the war that has now come, Russia yielded, and in 1911 she reasserted her desire not to interfere with Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵

¹ III, 103, 876.

² III, 103, 411.

³ Mévil, *Op. cit.*, pp. 55-59.

⁴ Mévil, *Op. cit.*, pp. 73-117.

⁵ VI, I, 476.

When Austria mobilized armies on the Servian frontier, she mobilized none. During the first Balkan war "the policy of disinterestedness," presented to all the great Powers, was the proposition of Russia.¹ She yielded also during the London Conference to the unreasonable claims of Austria in the matter of Scutari.² When it seemed necessary to coerce Montenegro to take away all pretexts of interference on the part of Vienna, she asked France and England to join her in a demonstration against the brave little kingdom. When the Servians seemed aggressive against the Dual Monarchy, Russia issued a communiqué to the press which led the Servians to recall their troops. In July, 1913, she sent an earnest appeal to Servia and to Bulgaria, urging them not to fight,³ an appeal from a friendly country which ought to have been heeded.

In Southern Europe she has exerted a kind of Russian Monroe Doctrine, protecting Greek Catholics against the Turks, and against the Roman Catholic inhabitants of Austria-Hungary. One fact is evident. The peoples protected by the Czar have their autonomy and fullest independence—an independence which is far from bowing before everything Russian—while Bosnia and Herzegovina are under the yoke of Austria. In the days of the war crisis, Russia showed a reasonable spirit. She offered to refer the contention to the Court of The Hague, baffled only by the determination of the Dual Alliance to move southward. A fact of great significance is that while Prussia was small and weak, Russia never attacked her. She may become aggressive and

¹ VI, 12, 470.

² V, 15, 234.

³ VI, 16, 233.

military, through the examples and inspiration of her western neighbors. The threats of Pan-Germanists have compelled the Swiss to arm more and more, the Russians may be affected in a similar way. They may follow the example of Japan, which has so completely assimilated Teutonic *Kultur*.

XIII

GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND

FOR some years the scholars of Deutschland have laid stress upon the common ethnological traits of the British and themselves as the strongest assets on the side of peace. On November 16, 1907, the Kaiser, addressing English journalists, said to them, "We belong to the same race and religion. These are bonds which should be strong enough to preserve harmony and friendship between us."¹ In this the Emperor of Germany was, and should have been, disappointed. Race and religion have seldom prevented peoples from fighting; on the contrary they have often brought about the bitterest conflicts. The *ethnocrates* who give prominence to physical kinship ought to remember that, according to their theories, it is the peoples who are most alike who are most opposed to each other. In the struggle for existence the species that are most similar have the same wants, compete for the same food, and therefore are the most destructive of each other.

Germany, as usual, makes others responsible for the war. England, according to the Germans, is the great transgressor. They lay stress upon what they call a "race treason."² Their violent and prejudiced diatribes have revealed the decadence of objective thinking in Germany and the fact that they have been misled by

¹ Gauss, p. 264.

² Münsterberg, H., *America and the War*, p. 73.

the teachings of Gobineau. This man, a mediocre diplomat, advanced theories of races that gave the highest place among the peoples of the world to the Germans. Most serious thinkers in our day have given up the use of the word "race" as ambiguous and deluding, but the Gobinists spoke of what they called by that name as permanent and almost unchangeable. These theories, inadequate from the point of view of facts, ethically bad, and in their application, often ridiculous, have been accepted by almost everyone in Germany, and have fully entered into all the philosophical and literary productions of the country. Anyone with anything like independence of mind knows that the nations of the world are the result of a mixing process which has gone on for several hundred thousand years, and that, as a consequence, almost all of them are the resultants of ages of physical and moral crossings. According to Virchow the fair-haired dolichocephalous type, generally identified with the Germans, is observed only from 33 to 43 per cent. in northern Germany, 25 to 32 per cent. in the center and 18 to 24 per cent. in the south.¹ There is no country absolutely Germanic, or nearly so, in the Gobinian sense of the term, and no ethical judgment can rest merely upon an ethnological basis. Professor Münsterberg and Professor Bergson, both of them Hebrews, have become so permeated with the spirit of the peoples among whom they have lived that at times they outdo them in their national characteristics. Almost all the ethnological twaddle of English and German Gobinists is bad philosophy and worse morals.

The charges of the Teuton allies against England are gratuitous and fanciful. The people really dominated by

¹ *Fouillée, Op. cit., p. 247.*

jealous and aggressive ends have been the Germans. That is the only way to explain their hostility to England and their arraignments of her past. They ascribe the present war to English "jealousy" and to "economic rivalry." We are not ready to say that these feelings did not exist in England and that in some minds they have not determined a hostile attitude, but had they been potent, they would have manifested themselves by means of parties, by some Pan-British or anti-German association, with a program akin to that of Pan-Germanists. No such party or even group existed in Great Britain, where every "ism" from the upholders of the theory of the "Lost Tribes"¹ to every form of theological and social utopias have their organizations. Had there been such a spirit the British would have taken measures in Parliament to check German commercial progress, but where is there a single fact which points to the least truly national attempt to limit or hinder the progressive German exportations? Had there been an aggressive British spirit, the English, who are a practical people, would have prepared for war, would have mustered large armies, their arsenals would have been adequate to war possibilities, their military stores would have been filled with limitless munitions, provision would have been made for the landing of vast military corps on the Continent, preparations would have been in readiness for the use of French, Belgian and German railroads, millions of men would have been trained ready to be rushed for continental service. All this, and much more, was wanting. There can be no better refutation of

¹ Some years ago an organization in Great Britain not only gathered data to identify the British people with the "Lost Tribes" of Israel, but propagated the belief in such an identity.

German accusations. They who of recent years had provided belligerent Japanese, Boers, Tripolitans, Turks and others with all possible implements of war protested against American commercial liberty, and charged the people of this land with a violation of neutrality. The very fact that a country like England lacked munitions of war, when her industrial capacities along that line were so great, is an evident proof that her people could not have planned an aggression against Germany. In any case such a proof is unnecessary since we have conclusive evidence as to who were those desiring the war.

Again, in the Empire of the Kaiser, there were no great protests, similar to those of British scholars, of what the Tory journals called the "Cocoa Press," of the peace societies, and of the Socialists to avert the war as in Great Britain. The general attitude of Germany and her roughshod way of dealing with France inspired great national distrust. The British, whose confidence in German peaceful intentions had been so weakened by the course followed by Wilhelmstrasse, felt that the interests of peace were best safeguarded by France and her ally, Russia. Their attitude was very much assaulted by cosmopolitan financiers of German origin who exerted their efforts in every direction, but especially upon the Cabinet and most of all upon Sir Edward Grey. The Kaiser sent a letter to *The Times* in which were his usual protestations of his love of peace—a letter which was not published.¹ There were the frantic efforts of the good Quakers, of English pacifists and of labor organizations who failed to realize that they were working to hand over France and Russia to

¹ Wickham Steed, Lecture in Paris, May 2, 1915.

the greatest militarists of the world. American peace workers, then in England, were far from neutral. Some of them would have allowed the French, who had taken them at their word, and attempted to introduce their principles into national politics, to be crushed by the mighty Teutons. The British Government did nobly for peace. It had given Berlin the assurance that she would never support any aggression of her allies against the Kaiser's people, and similarly Great Britain, unwilling to encourage a possible "bellicose spirit of the French" or the martial activities of the Russians, declined to promise British co-operation with France. At the same time, Sir Edward had warned the German Ambassador that in case of a conflict in which France would be a participant, England would not remain neutral. No one could have done more to discourage militants on all sides and to avoid the terrible conflict.

It was only on August 2 that M. Paul Cambon secured the pledge from Downing Street that Great Britain, in case of a German attack on the sea, would defend French coasts. For some Gallican critics the apparent hesitation of the Foreign Office was unexplainable; the Germans feel that Britain ought to have been more outspoken, but the friends of peace and humanity are obliged to note that Sir Edward kept to the end his faith in the possibility of avoiding the great international collision. It was only when he saw the evidence of the brutal purpose of Germany to do violence to Belgium that he felt that his country was bound to have her share in opposing this aggression. Sir Edward had earned the gratitude of all peace lovers of the world by his practical tact, his earnestness and his fairness at the London-Balkan Con-

ference.¹ The German Chancellor, speaking of his leadership, at that time, said, "Europe will be grateful to Sir Edward Grey for the exceptional zeal and spirit of conciliation with which he directed the discussions of London."² The same judgment must be passed upon the noble bearing and the remarkable fairness of purpose which he displayed at this time. It is not astonishing that he should have had such support from the British Parliament, nay from the whole British Empire. However, this is the man and his is the people that have been spoken of by German writers in terms that are at once contemptuous and insulting. The Comedy of 1870 was renewed and England was treated with the same detracting spirit wherewith Germany then treated France. Misrepresentations and the sword have ever been two favorite Prussian weapons.

Belgium has not fared any better. The Germans were, and still are, supremely incensed against her people. The writer, acquainted with them for over half a century, has seen them rise from great poverty to an unusual prosperity by hard work, by education and by a strong sense of conduct. No group of men drawn together has had a deeper consciousness of the importance of its unity. *L'union fait la force* is its motto. The national cohesion, overcoming ethnic and linguistic dissent, is paramount with them. They are conscious of their rights as neutrals and also of their obligations. Again and again they have reminded their neighbors of this by the zeal with which they were safeguarding the trust laid upon them by the Powers of Europe. Whenever a Frenchman suggested to Belgians the possible union of

¹ VI, 13, 477.

² VI, 13, 956.

their country with France—the writer has tried it—he would receive an answer that would lead him not to renew the experience. They would not tolerate such suggestions, either, from Englishmen, Dutchmen or Germans. With the exception of a few Socialists, they love their country with a strong, deep and unflinching patriotism, capable of the greatest sacrifices. They were aware that the French and the English were friendly. They trusted the Dutch, whose loyalty is evident. Not so Germany. They remembered the way in which Bismarck threatened them in 1875.¹ The program and the agitation of Pan-Germanists, who, again and again, advocated the annexation of Belgium, the large number of teachers, merchants and laborers settling there, the strategic railroads started after the defeat of the Russians in Manchuria and, about 1912, so completed as to be able to throw an enormous army into this little Kingdom in no time; the doubling of lines having no economic interests, the establishment of enormous military sidings, 600, 700 and 1,000 feet long, the massing of five army corps near the frontier of the neutral country² greatly alarmed the élite of Belgium. No doubt the Government asked England and France what each would do in the event of a German invasion. They began especial works of defense in view of what seemed an impending danger. It would have been almost criminal for them to do less. Led by similar considerations the French General Staff urged France to fortify the north of their country, but the pacifists opposed such a course most violently. They found in the Parliament a majority to prevent this most elementary precaution against the dangerous and

¹ II, 9, 222; Broglie, *Op. cit.*, p. 192.

² *Le Temps*, Dec. 22, 1911.

threatening foe. The pacifists—the writer is one of them—ever pleaded extenuating circumstances on behalf of Germany, and even when she was obviously working at her scheme of invasion of northern France, a fact which most German writers now admit. The arguments of the friends of Jaurès were that the people east of the Rhine would never dare to incur the moral opprobrium that would fall upon them were they to carry out the purpose ascribed to them.

Prussian leaders have never been very considerate for the rights of neutrals. When, in 1856, the Prussians sought a pretext to fight Switzerland they wished very much to go through Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. Bismarck was incensed because Austria supported these states in opposing the transit of Prussian troops through their territories.¹ Then he went upon what he called “a simple holiday trip of pleasure” to France, but what in reality was intended to secure from Napoleon III “the permission to allow Prussian troops to cross Alsace and Lorraine, but the French Emperor declined, as that would arouse too much feeling in France.”² The campaign contemplated toward the Canton of Neuchâtel was as outrageous as that against the Duchies.

In a similar way the Germans planned to reach France by first invading Belgium. We know now how they have dared to do it, how they have burned Louvain, Dinant, Ypres, committed nameless atrocities, shot innocent men in presence of wife and children, executed priests without any form of judgment, laid waste a country cultivated like a garden, destroyed most means of livelihood, requisitioned foodstuffs, subjected the population to

¹ Lowe, vol. I, p. 217.

² Busch, *Bismarck in the Franco-German War*, vol. II, p. 43.

war exactions worthy of a barbaric age and destroyed venerable institutions of a region historically as interesting as classic lands. Some of the worst insults to the good sense of the civilized world are statements like the following, from a Harvard professor, "Belgium chose to put itself on the side of France."¹ According to this writer there were only two sides, the German and the French. He did not think of a third alternative, the pledged duty of remaining neutral. Again, "Germany did not come to Belgium as an enemy." What would Germany have done that she did not do, had she come as an enemy? "Germany could do this with a clear conscience; it did not violate the higher laws of honor."² Not satisfied with statements which betray an ineradicable moral color blindness, the author hints at the duplicity of the Allies, suggests that the Belgians were in league with them prior to the invasion. What could have been their motives for so doing? What gains could they have made? We are not told. His proofs are like the celebrated *rocher de bronze* of King Frederick William and of the Kaiser. A *rocher de bronze* is something like "German Silver," like "Hamburg steak," like "German Delft" something ungenuine. "It was reported," he says, "that fifty automobiles," etc. Reported, by whom? Reported when? Reported where? Again, "Everything suggested that."³ What thing? To people of singular historic misfortunes we should not offer German Tartufe-casuistry. We owe them respect and truth.

Similarly they invaded Luxemburg early in the morn-

¹ Münsterberg, *Op. cit.*, p. 182.

² *Ibid.*, p. 185.

³ P. 181.

ing of August 2, that is, more than thirty-six hours before the declaration of war by Germany upon France. The pretext here, as in Belgium, was that France had previously invaded the Duchy. The French Premier showed the untenability of such an assertion in his protestation to Berlin. France, far from moving forward into others' territories, was keeping her troops at a distance of ten kilometers from the frontier. She had so well shown her intention of respecting the neutrality and the integrity of Luxemburg that she tore up the railroad on her side leading there.¹ With Belgium similar German acts and similar German pretexts. Even before reaching Brussels, the Germans reiterated that they had proofs of Belgium's agreement to have England and France invade the country, but why did they not give those proofs to the public? They ransacked the archives in Brussels and found some correspondence which they considered as incriminating Belgium, but it merely served to show that their evidence is a good deal like that of the Harvard professor. This gentleman has also taxed our credulity by telling us that the atrocities of German soldiers in Belgium—those in France had not taken place as yet—were only "hallucinatory phenomena."² The destruction of Tirlemont, Termonde and Louvain, according to him, were delusions of the Allies. It is remarkable what a great German psychologist can see! It is no wonder that the healthy, honest and energetic Belgians dreaded to see such things and to be compelled by German science to see them like that.

Their manly courage has excited the admiration of the world. What will be the future of that noble land?

¹ *Le Temps*, April 7, 1915.

² *Ibid.*, p. 177.

Will she be allowed to restore her crumbled homes and to resume her normal life so brutally wrecked by her soulless conqueror? That will depend upon the success or failure of the friends of that state. In the case of their success, will the boundaries remain where they have been since Leopold I? It is well known that there is a part of the country east of the province of Liège which is Walloon and given to Prussia by the Treaty of Vienna. Many foreigners have suggested that this territory might be restored to her former owner, but the Belgians are far from wishing to increase the German elements among them, and doubtless would oppose such an annexation. It is to be hoped that Belgium, formerly able to take care of 255 inhabitants to the square kilometer when the Germans complain with their 120 per square kilometer, will soon be able to resume her former life, restore her ruined institutions, live again her strenuous and progressive history and call forth in a greater degree still the admiration of mankind.

XIV

THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE

WE have endeavored to reduce German calumnies against French allies to nought. It is time to show that France also has been treated in a similar manner. As far as the German charges of belligerency on her part during the last forty-four years are concerned, it must be remembered that she was absorbed to the utmost by her burning political and social problems when the people were asking themselves anxiously, Shall we have a republic or a monarchy?—a liberal or a socialistic Republic?—absorbed by colonial expeditions, those of Madagascar, of Indo-China and by the effects of the Panic of Langson;—absorbed by the reform of her education, having to decide whether it should be free, broad, lay and republican or otherwise;—absorbed by the Dreyfus question, when the nation seemed hopelessly divided over a question of practical justice;—absorbed when she attempted to free herself from monastic forces that were tending to stifle her freedom;—absorbed by the gigantic task of the separation of Church and State, when the relations that had so long existed between these two institutions were torn by their very roots;—absorbed by all these issues and reforms which evoked the deepest passions and most dangerous enthusiasms. How, under these circumstances, could the French have thought of waging war upon their mighty neighbor? Would a sensible people have dared so to do, even if that had been

their aim? Again, their economic interests were on the side of peace. "We produce on a small scale," says V. Bérard, "but handsomely, not for the human beast, but for the civilized man; the progress of our wealth is bound up with that of civilization."¹

Their industrial products are mostly for the better classes, so that their fine goods and their financial investments demand peace for their best returns. France was therefore held to a pacific policy by all her most vital interests. All possible evidences of national tendencies point in a similar direction. When, in 1907, the *Petit Parisien* had a *plébiscite* which called forth 15,000,-000 votes upon the greatest Frenchman, the highest place was not given to a warrior but to a scientist who ever preached peace—Pasteur. The second was awarded to Victor Hugo—the poet who, in his best days, exalted peace—while Napoleon came only fourth. Another paper by the same process asked, "Who are the great men not yet in the Pantheon?" The men designated were Pasteur, Gambetta, Thiers, Parmentier, Curie, Denfert-Rochereau, Savorgnan de Brazza, Alexandre Dumas and Lamartine. The only soldier in this list was Denfert-Rochereau, the heroic defender of Belfort. The writer does not produce these names as representing "the greatest Frenchmen" or those worthy to have above them the beautiful inscription, "*Aux grands hommes la patrie reconnaissante*," but as indicating the peace ideals of the voters.

There were many causes at work for peace. Those, even, who are least favorable to pacifism must admit that idealistic sympathies for judicial ways of settling the difficulties of nations indicate unfriendliness to war.

¹ *La France et Guillaume II*, p. 89.

Temperance people do not open saloons to promote the non-alcoholic régime. Orthodox religious people do not encourage radical religious teachings to promote conservative religion and traditional faith. A people that outwardly has risen above aggressive militant feelings to rational ethics that proclaim the bankruptcy of war is more likely to be peace-loving than one that protests that war is "moral," that it is an agent of justice and an historic necessity. That is the case with France as compared with Germany. France, following Enfantin, said, "If you want peace prepare for peace," while Germany has clung to the old Latin irrational motto, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*—in other words, if you want a railroad build a canal. The attitude of Enfantin's country is in keeping with her ancient traditions. It is needless to lay much stress upon the great scheme of peace of Sully¹ and of Henry IV, of the teachings of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, of the utterances of Voltaire and of Madame de Staël, or the eloquent protestations against war of Enfantin and its sublime condemnations by Victor Hugo. France has been led by her idealism to enter into every movement that made men just and on that account lessened the frequency of war. She has been largely represented at every international gathering that made for peace. Judge Holls has praised the great services rendered at The Hague by M. Léon Bourgeois, by Professor Louis Renault of the Paris Law School, and by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant.

At the two conferences French delegates joined with everyone who endeavored to stem the tide of international wranglings. They were as earnest and as active

¹ *The Great Design of Henry IV*, with an introduction by Edwin D. Mead.

at the international peace congresses in different parts of the world as in their national congresses at home. They honored at the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences as well as at the Sorbonne Frédéric Passy, the most distinguished pacifist of France, the courageous prophet of better relations among men, the economist who insisted that by the play of economic and ideal forces the reign of international peace would come, that the utopia of the ideal would be realized. "*L'utopie est le rêve d'aujourd'hui et la réalité de demain.*" They honored one of the noblest sons of France because he voiced her highest aims and her hopes. The strength of the pacifist movement may be measured by the violent utterances of the militarists. The reading of the address of the eminent Catholic educator, Père Didon, on July 20, 1898, shows the power of the ideas which he combated.¹

All the great national organizations were pledged to peace by judicial and not by martial methods. The ideal of most of them was: *la paix par le droit*. All the men who joined Waldeck-Rousseau, Briand and Jaurès as the mouthpiece and leaders of Socialism were equally decided against militarism, armaments and war. This was an essential part of their programme. Can the Germans point to a movement in France similar to that of Bismarck, his alliances and his Berlin Congress that were war machines? Can they show in France anything like the Navy League of Germany with its millions of members and with a paper, *Die Flotte*, having a circulation of over one-third of a million?² Can they suggest anything which corresponds to the push of the Colonial Society or to the Pan-Germanists? The *Ligue des*

¹ *Le Temps.*

² Barker, J. Ellis, *Modern Germany*, p. 235.

patriotes was never more than a loud-talking and parading society. In a dozen of the best books, written by Americans and by Englishmen, discussing contemporary France there is not a single reference to it. The leading societies of France, whatever else they were, were pacifistic. Hence the policy of a virtual disarmament.

The term of military service was reduced, after 1870, from seven years to three, and in 1900 from three to two. General Gallieni told the writer shortly before the war that he had been consulted by the Government about the possibility of reducing their service further to one year. Within a brief period, the military drill of reservists was shortened from sixty-nine days to forty-nine. The Minister of War, a pacifist like the rest of the Cabinet, managed for some time to keep the contingent of men in service to 65 per cent. of legal requirements. Classes of men that should normally have been held in the barracks were allowed to go home. France not only decreased her army, but it was permeated by the most positive and extreme spirit of pacifism and on that account hostile to any bellicose end. Colonel Bonysson reports that one of his lieutenants, addressing soldiers, began by saying: "I am an anti-militarist."¹ A large number of the troops were not only socialists but positive internationalists.²

In 1913, there were military uprisings in Toul and Belfort.³ The Germans then denounced France as a unit of aggressiveness and as a hotbed of anarchy. Whatever she was, she could hardly have been both. She was not in the race for armaments; for while, in

¹ V, 41, 950.

² VI, 15, 710.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 712.

1870, her navy came only second, now it stands fourth or fifth.¹ This was not because she lacked money. Under the Combes Cabinet, Camille Pelletan, Minister of the Navy, had the audacity to postpone indefinitely the building of warships voted by the Parliament.² Thus while France was considering war as an anachronism, as a relic of barbarism, was having the principle of arbitration and conciliation accepted by the majority of her people, Germany was idealizing war, defending its utility as a force of justice and was arming to an extent only now—it never was before—revealed to the world by her limitless resources on the battlefield.

At last, but too late, France woke up, and began to restore the three years' military service, which was accepted as a natural necessity by the people. The Parliament voted \$100,000,000 for armaments and for war credits. It recognized that while pacifism is right, that it is the only compass whereby a nation may steer its ethical life, it is a signal folly for a neighbor of a mighty warlike and belligerent Power to be alone in disarming. Thanks to the intelligence and patriotism of the nation much was done to regain lost time. The world at large may not have given France credit for heeding absolutely principles that seemed premature, but recognized her pacific and reasonable spirit.

The leading nations of Europe, aware of the danger that threatened that land, became more sympathetic. This was especially true of English-speaking peoples and particularly of Great Britain. Von Bülow recognizes this evolution. "For many reasons," he says, "English public opinion is more favorable to France than to us,

¹ V, 56, 953.

² V, 24, 719.

for England no longer looks upon her as a rival, and certainly not as a competitor at sea.”¹ Again we have the German monochord idea, ever ascribing one motive for an action that may have one hundred, but never giving the most evident one. In the same way he deals with France. The armaments are made because of her “hypersensitive national pride” or upon national resentment against Germany, “the soul of French policy.”² “So far as man can tell, the ultimate aim of French policy for many years to come will be to create the necessary conditions, which today are still wanting, for a settlement with Germany with good prospects of success.”³ Another interested calumny, “France would attack us if she thought she were strong enough.”⁴ She is a nation that for “a whole generation has cherished one hope and one ideal,” the *revanche*.⁵ He expresses the charitable thought that she will ruin herself in her competition for armaments. “It is just possible,” he says, “that the effect of convulsively straining her military resources to the utmost may, by reacting on the economic and social conditions of France, hasten the return of pacific feelings, and that once again the French proverb may prove true, *Que l'excès du mal amène la guérison.*”⁶ When “pacific feelings” were absent it was because German Chancellors, and foremost among them Prince von Bülow, had done their best to drive them away. A most certain fact is that her armaments did not precede but succeeded those of Germany. It was

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁴ P. 108.

⁵ P. 106.

⁶ P. 103.

impossible for her to do aught that could compare with the results of a country that had centered its national energies upon the production and accumulation of war implements. Her people remained pacific and, as a whole, pacifistic, but the course of Germany united Frenchmen under the sense of danger as they never had been. Their feelings were not unlike those of forty years ago. The old spirit of *revanche* which had died away was revived. The Alsatian Question, considerably in the background, came again to the front. A sense of a deep German ill-will prevailed and there was the conviction that the mighty and remorseless Goth was about to strike, and so he did.

France had not only professed sound principles of international relations at home but had practiced them abroad. In the splendid movement of international understandings which led the most civilized nations between 1904 and 1910 to sign over one hundred treaties of arbitration, Germany signed none,¹ but France was foremost. She did much to reconcile Russia and Japan. She herself drew nearer to the land of the Mikado and contributed to the *rapprochement* and *entente* between England and Russia after having done great things to help the settlement of the Dogger Bank Anglo-Russian incident. "There can be no doubt," said two English writers, "that French influence was largely responsible for the gradual reconciliation of England and Russia in those years, for the growth of a feeling in both countries that their Asiatic interests, hitherto the main cause of disputes, were by no means irreconcilable."² She has dealt with Italy and Spain so as to win their respect and their

¹ Muir, R., *Op. cit.*, p. 177.

² *French Policy Since 1870*, Oxford Pamphlets, p. 22.

friendship. She had no great success in the Balkans—no one of the great Powers had—but she did all she could to prevent the first war, and when it was on, to prevent it from bringing the whole of Europe into a gigantic conflict. M. Poincaré, then Prime-minister, on the first report of a silent compact for a war against Turkey by the Balkan states, summoned the leading bankers of Paris to him and urged them not to lend the sinews for an aggressive war even against the Turks. As president, he centered all his efforts upon a policy of peace. The Quai d'Orsay sided with every proposal, even those of Count Berchtold,¹ that tended to restore normal relations. At the London Conference, in conjunction with other Powers, she moved in line with the peacemakers, humoring the Austrians so as to keep them from the Balkan fray. When Europe was menaced with the greatest catastrophe of history, she was one with England, Russia and Italy to try to avert the nameless crime which has soiled the escutcheon of the two Teutonic Powers. In the conflict which was forced upon her, she deserved fully the judgement passed by the editor of the *New York Evening Post*, "The onlookers abroad know that France has borne herself with rare dignity and restraint; that her moral position is clearer and more shining than that of any other of the combatants; that she has revealed a fortitude in defeat and a resoluteness to succeed in the end which, together with unexpected qualities of self-control, command the admiration of all who behold with unprejudiced eyes. The nation of Lafayette, of De Grasse, of Rochambeau, has lived up to its best."²

¹ VI, II, 237.

² Villard, Oswald Garrison, *Germany Embattled*, p. 101.

XV

AUSTRIA AND THE GERMAN PROVOCATION

WERE the Austrians to hate France they would not be without good reasons from some points of view. One of the great services rendered by her to Germany was the weakening of the power of the Hapsburgs. The deliverance of Italy from its cruel rule was accomplished by the co-operation of Napoleon III's soldiers, who helped to drive the Austrians from that fair land. The work done so well and so long by France was continued by Prussia, practically driving out Austria from Germany. After Sadowa, Austria was collecting her thoughts. Bismarck made efforts to attract her and to prevent an alliance with Napoleon III. With his usual far-sightedness after the Austrian defeat, Bismarck realized the importance of Austria as an ally, and pleaded for gentle treatment. After the Franco-Prussian war, he drew the Emperor of Austria as well as the Emperor of Russia into the Three Kaiser League. Austria, doomed to ultimate disruption on account of the many conflicting ethnic elements within her borders and feeling her insecurity, yielded. The Iron Chancellor had a twofold policy with these strong neighbors. He wished to change the course of their interests. He urged Russia to move eastward, to extend her sway as far as possible in Asia, to establish herself there so as to weaken her hold in the West. This Bismarckian policy was also that of the Kaiser, who encouraged the Czar in the same direction. Four months

after the occupation of Kiao-Chou, the Russians were entering Port Arthur, where they were bound to meet Japanese opposition. The French Government warned St. Petersburg of the grave danger of a collision with the Empire of the East. In a conversation with President Loubet, the Czar recognized the seriousness of the situation, and said that never would Russia declare war upon Japan.¹ He was sincere in his purpose, but the force of events was stronger than he. The disaster of Port Arthur followed, and the policy of Germany bore its intended fruits. With this came the elevation of Japan to the rank of a great Power.

As to Austria, now that she had given up her aspirations to the hegemony of German states, Bismarck wanted to prevent the return of her former ambition and also to have her forget Sadowa. Accordingly he led her to give a complete reversal to her traditional policy and to try to expand in the direction of Slavdom. This policy, if successful, would increase the importance of the Slav element in the Dual Monarchy, and ultimately might release the German populations of Austria and incorporate them into the Empire. For him the true goal for Austria was the Ægean Sea, and the ideal seaport for her was Salonica. At the Berlin Congress von Moltke urged Count Karoly to advise his Government to go to Salonica. The tempter added, "We will approve you; better still, we will sustain you."² As a matter of fact the Ballplatz did not need these counsels. It had long coveted Bosnia and Herzegovina. As early as 1867, von Beust had his eyes turned toward those provinces, and this had long been known not only in Berlin but

¹ Mévil, *Op. cit.*, p. 79.

² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

also in Saint Petersburg.¹ The Iron Chancellor had prepared everything before so that the two Teutonic Powers should be gratified at the Berlin Congress. The population of the provinces was practically handed over to Emperor Francis Joseph. Having been oppressed so long by the Turks they deserved a better fate. They were denied the right to live their own national ideals. They unquestionably gained in the transfer by coming under a Christian Power, but the consoling prospects of former days that there were independence and freedom ahead for them had vanished. Bismarck, on the other hand, demanded his pay for his services in the form of an alliance by which Austria was compelled to defend Germany in case she were attacked, but the terms were far from reciprocal.² Many Austrians, but chiefly the Young Czechs, were eloquent in their denunciation of this agreement.³

In November 1896, Bismarck, with his usual cynicism, revealed to the world that, while he had made a treaty with Austria involving her support of the new German Empire against the possible attacks of the Czar, he had at the same time a secret treaty with Russia, against Austria, covering the same period. Why the unscrupulous statesman made this other startling revelation no one can absolutely tell. It is thought by many that he wished to show the Germans that in losing him they had been deprived of a valuable ally. He furthermore may have wished to have France doubt the sincerity of Russia.⁴ Austria, however, knew nothing of this double-dealing.⁵

¹ III, 74, 413.

² III, 103, 883.

³ III, 87, 233.

⁴ III, 138, 470.

⁵ III, 138, 715.

Professor Münsterberg accuses Russia of "playing a double game" of late.¹ That would be natural, as the Czar had so long learned practical lessons from Berlin.

Then there was the abrogation of Article V of the Treaty of Prague. France, who in 1866 had mediated between Prussia and Austria, succeeded in having inserted in this treaty a clause whereby the inhabitants of Schleswig should have a vote to decide to what country the province would belong. During twelve years, the Iron Chancellor had held that population in subjection without ever keeping his promise. By a preliminary treaty, October 1878, published in February 1879, the two Powers abrogated that part of the Treaty of Prague² and doomed the Danes of the province to become German subjects.

Meanwhile, Austria unquestionably made improvements in the Balkan provinces, but left no stone unturned to assimilate and Germanize them. The promises of virtual autonomy and of a liberal administration were never kept. The Germanic elements of the Dual Monarchy, ever seeking preponderance over other races, continued after the virtual protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1908, the Austrian Government proceeded to annex the two provinces. Turkey and Russia protested. England practically did the same thing. Prince von Bülow sums up the reasons for his militant attitude at this time as follows: "The antagonistic policy of England seemed aimed less against Austria than against Germany, Austria's ally. For the first time, the Austro-German Alliance was to prove its durability and strength in a grievous conflict.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

² III, 31, 953.

"In my speeches in the Reichstag, I made it clear that Germany was resolved to preserve her alliance with Austria at any cost. The German sword had been thrown into the scale of European decision, directly in support of our Austro-Hungarian ally, indirectly for the preservation of European peace, and above all for the sake of German credit and the maintenance of our position in the world."¹ Of the right and wrong of the case, not a word, but, to test the Alliance and for national credit, he was willing to plunge Europe into a war. No one will be deceived by his German cant about "the preservation of European peace," which no one disturbed except Austria and Germany. Furthermore Wilhelmstrasse and the Ballplatz declined every proposal of a conference to deal with this matter.² As we have seen, Russia yielded.

The Government of the Hapsburgs laid its hands upon the Serbs of the annexed provinces. It had previously endeavored to have Servia gravitate within the Austrian orbit. The wretched King Milan and his ill-fated son had been used to keep Belgrade under Austrian influence, but all in vain. The people on both sides of the frontier knew full well that the Dual Monarchy would not respect them nor their ideals and traditions. After the annexation Servia, feeling that she had been wrongly dealt with, assumed that she was entitled to some compensations, toward the Adriatic, and had Austria been generous she might have humored her, but she did the opposite.³ The Ballplatz did not object to having Servia reach the Ægean Sea, for, in attempting so to do, she would have been

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

² V, 49, 234.

³ VI, 12, 479.

crushed by the Turks, and then Austria would have had her opportunity. It was the Adriatic that Servia needed¹ to escape from her economic dependence on Austria. The Dual Monarchy never tried, we do not say gentleness, but fairness, with Servia, and was bitterly opposed to two essentially modern principles that govern the political life of the most progressive countries, first, the rights of democracy, and second, the building of a Government either upon the consensus of wills or upon ethnological affinities. When, in 1859, Prince Napoleon had an interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph to settle peace conditions, he presented the French memorandum in the following words, "The Emperor of Austria surrenders his rights upon Lombardy to the Emperor of the French, who, according to the *wishes of the populations*, transmits them to the King of Sardinia." The Austrian Emperor protested against the clause which we have italicized and said, "What you call 'the wishes of the populations,' I call revolutionary rights which I cannot admit. I only recognize the rights inserted in treaties. From them, I possess Lombardy. I am willing, as a consequence of the fate of arms, to surrender my rights to Napoleon, but I cannot recognize the wishes of populations nor anything like that."² According to him, then, peoples are perfectly helpless in presence of the decisions of their supreme owner. As a consequence the Dual Monarchy holds, by force, "seventeen nationalities."³ On the other hand, Servia, notwithstanding her limitations, stands for a

¹ VI, 12, 473.

² *Journal de ma mission auprès de l'Empereur d'Autriche. Revue des Deux Mondes*, Aug. 1, 1909, p. 489.

³ *Le Temps*, March 3, 1915.

modern principle, the rights of those that are governed. As a rule she modestly asserted her claims to existence and her wishes to open the door wide to her kinsmen. At the London-Balkan Conference she showed an admirable spirit, placing her case in the hands of the Powers,¹ while her opponent was the only aggressive nation.

Austria, in the south of Europe, land-locked on all sides, without a seaport except Trieste, which remains a part of *Italia Irredenta* and an object of Italian desires, was unsatisfied. That she should by loyal means have sought a way south either by Avlona to the Adriatic, or by Salonica to the Ægean Sea, would have had the approval of all liberal-minded men. The difficulty with Avlona was that the Italians desired it also, and that at best any seaport in the Adriatic was practically bottled up by Italy. By an act of able and frank diplomacy, Austria years ago could have worked her way to Salonica. The Murzsteg Agreement between Russia and Austria, in 1903, might by its *condominium* have paved the way for such a consummation. Mutual concessions of the two Powers involved might have secured that end. A nation of 50,000,000 of inhabitants should have its own free broad access to the waterways of the world. Her efforts to realize this desideratum came too late, and the methods employed were arrogant and dishonest. After the occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar by Montenegro and Servia, the accepted time had passed. The way to Salonica was blocked. Hence the greater earnestness not to let Avlona escape—Avlona, one of the finest natural harbors of the Mediterranean.

For years, Austria had, by her missionaries and by

¹ VI, 12, 955.

other agencies, attempted to penetrate Albania. Everything that could be done was tried to secure a great influence there, but Italy was watching and made it a matter of important parleys with Vienna. The agreement reached by the two Powers was that neither of them would lay their hands upon Albania and that both of them would exclude others from the coveted land.¹ Austria and Italy, sustained by Germany, considered that if their scheme as to Albania succeeded, it was important that that kingdom should be as large as possible as a field of Austro-Italian influence. If the program failed, both countries would claim the fragments—the larger the better.² In either case Austria wished to keep her own way clear along the Adriatic while still clinging to the forlorn hope of the Ægean Sea through Servia. During the Balkan war she assembled an enormous army on her southern frontier and showed her impatience to move ahead. When the Powers were asked by Russia for a pledge that they would keep the peace in this campaign, Austria refused to give hers.³ Count Berchtold again and again stated that she “reserved to herself the defense of her interests.”⁴ He maintained the liberty of fighting if it was for his advantage, or of sharing the Balkan spoils, and above all he was not willing to commit himself to the policy accepted by all the great Powers when they promised to make no territorial extension, to live up to what they called “the policy of territorial disinterestedness.” He was satisfied with the prolongation of the war, because it would weaken the Balkan

¹ VI, 12, 474.

² VI, 17, 475.

³ VI, 11, 958.

⁴ VI, 12, 240, 471.

peoples that stood in Austria's path.¹ He encouraged Bulgaria to resist the legitimate claims of Servia, bringing about the war against Greece and her ally. He similarly acted at Bucharest to conciliate Rumania. He wished to break the Balkan alliance, he did break it, but in it Rumania took the place of Bulgaria, and the alliance continued. Then there was the miserable affair of Prochaska, the Austrian Consul in Servia, and his scandalous attempts to blackmail the Servians so as to create a *casus belli*.² Independent judges found in such acts an explanation of the gigantic army which Emperor Joseph kept along the Servian frontier, and of his purpose.³ Austria was ready at any instant to fall upon the Servians or the Montenegrins if they dared to cross her prospective designs. She was, as already said, the cause of the second Balkan war. In the compact of the Balkan allies, they had agreed to a partition of conquered territories on the assumption that no European Power would interfere; but, now, as Austria had prevented Servia from having her hypothetical share, she demanded—and rightly too, if we admit these principles of territorial partition—to have a revision of the agreement. At the moment of hesitation Count Berchtold advised Bulgaria not to yield, and she did not. War followed, an Austrian-Balkan war by proxy. When King Ferdinand was defeated Vienna and Rome threatened to interfere to protect the treacherous aggressors.⁴

During the London Conference Austria did not become more pacific. Her belligerent purpose seemed firmer.

¹ VI, 12, 713.

² VI, 13, 237.

³ VI, 13, 237.

⁴ VI, 16, 718.

That she wanted a clash with Servia seemed more and more evident. Sig. Giolitti at a very important sitting in the Italian Chamber, early in December, 1914, created a violent commotion by an important communication. The disclosure which he made was that during the second Balkan war Austria intended to crush Servia. During this period, on August 9, 1913, the Marquis di San Giuliano had sent a dispatch to his colleague reading as follows: "Austria informs us, as well as Germany, of her intention to act against Servia, and declares that such a step on her side could only be considered as defensive. She hopes to make the *casus fæderis* of the Triple Alliance work, but I think this cannot be made applicable under present circumstances." No reasonable doubt can be entertained now that at the same time Rumania was informed of the aggressive purpose of Austria against Servia.¹ The Government of Bucharest took the same stand as that of Rome.² Austria's mobilization seemed plausible so long as the Serbians had not given up their purpose to have a foothold upon the Adriatic, but afterward she did not dismiss one man. How can that be explained on the basis of a peaceful purpose? At the London Conference, the Powers made concessions, even against their better judgment, to prevent her from aggressive action. She asked that the Servian territory should not reach the Adriatic, it was granted. She demanded the independence of Albania, an independence which its people did not desire, it was granted. She made gigantic exertions to have Ipek, Prizrend and Diakova included in this fictitious state, but while she failed in that she succeeded in maintaining Scutari in it. She

¹ *Le Temps*, Jan. 10, 1915.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1915.

took the initiative of a naval demonstration.¹ Its purpose was not doubtful, but its obviously dangerous character was eliminated by having other Powers take part in it. In the matter of Scutari, she wanted to use force against King Nicholas, demanding that he relinquish it, but the Powers settled it by diplomatic action.² She antagonized the Servians at every point. Their legitimate ambition to reach the sea was foiled, while her pet scheme to create an Albanian state was carried out, to prove a most humiliating failure.

¹ VI, 13, 235.

² *Ibid.*, 473.

XVI

THE INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR

THE provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austria had the benefit of a government that could not but be an improvement upon that of the Porte, but they did not enjoy self-government. They were treated as the Italians had been, in an oppressive way and as conquered peoples. The national attainments of Servia in various ways and her recent victories made the Serbs of these provinces proud. They naturally enough wished to be united with the Serb family politically represented by Servia. It would be impossible to prevent a certain agitation among such a population and to banish proselytizing. A people like this, largely kept by themselves, despised by haughty masters indifferent to their interests and their aims, could not but be hostile to their oppressors. There, as in all countries under similar circumstances, the *Tugendbund* in Germany in 1808, and the *Carbonari* in Italy, secret societies were working in concealment to secure justice refused to them openly, and which could not be obtained in any other manner. It would have been impossible to cut off Servia from sympathetic touch, and from social co-operation, with these peoples. Fear could not be a permanent barrier. One can no more crush these deep national desires and longings by force of arms than eradicate, by the same means, their language and their religion.

Austria was bitterly disappointed with the Bulgaro-

Turkish Treaty¹ and perhaps even more so with the Treaty of Bucharest. She displayed her insincerity to the extent of objecting to it on the ground that it was a violation of the terms of the Berlin Congress. Her friends disregarded them in 1886² and she herself had been the flagrant delinquent in that respect by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina.³ She blamed Servia for most of her own failures, for only a war that would have shattered the Belgrade Government and opened the way to Salonica would have satisfied the belligerent clique of Vienna. She was hostile to her nominal Serb subjects, who generously retaliated. The contempt for these men, voiced in many ways, expressed itself in most of the schools. In some of them the language against the Servians exceeded all measure. Feelings ran high, especially among the young. Borne onward by the sense of injustice and outrage, thousands of young people were ready to give their lives to avenge the wrongs done to Servia and to themselves. The Austrians were not calmer. Having been baffled all along, they had expected to secure a footing in Servia during the two wars. Then they had some hope of penetrating by means of a Roman Catholic protectorate over Servia, that is, to be made the custodians of Catholics in that Orthodox country. Here again the Ballplatz men missed their mark. The Vatican signed a Concordat with Servia regulating the affairs of the Church in that country. This added to the Austrian anger. The Archduke Ferdinand was known as an anti-Serb. He was going south to direct Austrian maneuvers close to the country to which

¹ VI, 17, 716.

² III, 73, 234.

³ VI, 16, 955.

he was hostile. This was enough to make him the butt of the murderous aims of Bosnian avengers. The prince and his wife lost their lives in the city of Serajevo, June 23, 1914. The violence of the Serbs was more than matched by that of the Austrians.¹

Notwithstanding the inquiries and explanations of Belgrade, the repeated assertions of its Government that it had nothing to do with the events of the Bosnian capital and that it was ready to punish any of its subjects, a party to the crime, the Ballplatz remained mute as death. What could Servia have gained by such a monstrous act? It was cruel to let this painful period of suspension oppress those who had so many reasons to fear. The pretext so long sought for the invasion of Servia had come at last. Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard, in his remarkable book, *Germany Embattled*, says, "It is beyond all question that the Austrian military party sought war with Servia not once, but three times, and finally brought it about, thanks to the Archduke's assassination."² We would say that for a long time the ravenous wolves of Vienna were constantly watching for an opportunity. Now circumstances seemed favorable. The representatives of most Governments were away. The nations of the *Entente* were harassed by vexatious problems, finances in Russia, the Irish question in Great Britain, the Caillaux excitement in France, and the labor difficulties in all of them. This seemed for her the time to strike. Therefore, she sent the famous, or infamous, ultimatum so much in keeping with her ways. After the settlement of the Balkan conflicts, the Albanians attacked the Servians in their territories. They were defeated, and

¹ VI, 22, 470.

² P. 164.

in their retreat they were pursued by the Servians, who then occupied insignificant parts of the fictitious Albania, and made the statement that this was temporary. Austria, without consulting the Powers, sent Servia an ultimatum to leave the occupied points within eight days.¹ She acted in the same way with Greece in reference to Epirus.² When Prince von Wied went to Albania he seemed the agent of the Dual Monarchy rather than that of the Powers.³

The fatal ultimatum of July 23, 1914, was the culminating point in the unreasonable course of Austria, and was calculated to bring war, and war it did bring.⁴ It had been prepared by Count Tisza, the Hungarian statesman, more Austrian in his foreign politics than the most Chauvinistic Austrian, by Count Forgach, the former Minister to Servia, celebrated for the Friedjung forgeries, and by Tchirschky, the German Ambassador,⁵ but it was a virtual repetition of a similar message sent to the King of Sardinia in 1859. This also accused Sardinia of being the home of conspirators and assassins.⁶ In this document, probably sketched before the tragedy of Serajevo, Austria boldly asserted the guilt of Servia without giving any fair and adequate evidence. She condemned Servia's anti-Austrian tendencies, but this little country could have turned the tables upon Austria on reciprocal grounds. The charges were in themselves acts of international courtesy. The acts of the Serbs under Austria and of the Servians were manifestations

¹ VI, 18, 237.

² VI, 18, 473.

³ VI, 22, 240.

⁴ VI, 22, 711.

⁵ *Le Temps*, Jan. 29, 1915.

⁶ *The Times*, July 30, 1914.

of public opinion that no country, except Austria, would have attempted to stop. The accusations against Servian officials were merely the assertions of Austrian agents that had nothing judicial in them. Among other things she demanded the suppression in Servia of anything hostile to her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would have been like the Germans demanding in France the suppression of papers hostile to their possession of Alsace. She enjoined the dissolution of the *Narodna Odbrana*, the removal from the army of anyone implicated in the Bosnian agitation of the Serajevo murder, and the acceptance of "agents of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against" Austria, etc. The Ballplatz gave Belgrade just forty-eight hours to answer this humiliating order. The difficulties for the friends of peace were increased by the fact that the ultimatum was communicated to the Powers only twenty-four hours after it was sent to the Servian Government. When the document was received, one of the ambassadors asked that the time be extended, but the Austrian official answered that the note to the Powers was only for their information, and that the question was exclusively a matter between the Dual Monarchy and Servia. Conscious of the strength of the *Triplece*, he practically said to the Powers, "Hands off!" There was in Vienna the usual diplomatic cant about having sufficient territory and coveting none—the usual formula of all land grabbers in all countries. We know what that means. There has not been, in recent times, such an unscrupulous and arrogant proceeding.

The poor Servians, poor at the outset, impoverished by two wars, were in a most trying position. The ultimatum

would tolerate no delay, and their answer must be yes or no. In either case their independence seemed in hopeless danger. They were conciliatory to the utmost. They granted all demands except those involving sovereign rights. These they were ready to discuss in a friendly way or refer them to The Hague. Never did a little people humble itself more to placate a great Power. It was the old story of the Wolf and the Lamb. The Austrians, like the Germans, repeated that it was a question of life and death, a most absurd assertion. A great, rich people of 50,000,000 of inhabitants having enjoyed half a century of peace and prosperity could not resist the action of 4,500,000 Servians exhausted by two terrible wars! It was as if the old whale had said, "I must swallow Jonah, otherwise Jonah will swallow me." In all her steps Austria was supported, and possibly inspired, by Germany from the Conference of Berlin to this time. There was the same concerted purpose among these Teuton allies to put down Servia, to reach the *Ægean* Sea, and some think, Constantinople.

A study of all the diplomatic documents will convince one that the Teutonic Alliance was unfriendly to international action for peace. Germany maintained that the Austro-Servian quarrel was eminently Austria's concern, while modern opinion more and more claims that war is everybody's business. The whole human society suffers from it, and hence has a right to protect itself. Four of the Great Powers, Italy, France, England and Russia, did their utmost to avert the conflict. Sir Edward Grey proposed many ways out of the situation which would have succeeded with Governments really desiring peace. After great efforts for an honorable and just solution, the English statesman asked Germany to propose some

means whereby the situations might be saved, but she showed a faint-heartedness which cannot be explained except on the assumption that she was bellicose. One is forced to agree with M. René Viviani, who said, "If Germany really loved peace she might have had it simply by accepting pourparlers at London on July 29, or two days later by accepting the Czar's call for an appeal to The Hague Tribunal, or on July 31, Great Britain's call to suspend military operations in view of negotiations at London."¹

In her diplomatic papers Germany claimed to have exerted all possible influence for peace in Vienna, but none of her dispatches to that effect has been published in her *White Papers*. Would it not be remarkable that in such a publication, to justify her pacific attitude, to exhibit her work in avoiding the present war, there should not be a document showing that she even tried to influence the war clique of Vienna? She became menacing when the Powers were only taking the most elementary precautions in view of all possible war eventualities. On July 27, Francis Joseph published a manifesto addressed "To my peoples" which also resembles that of 1859 to Sardinia. The documents are almost identical in spirit, in the statement of grievances and in their abusive language.² On the next day, he declared war on Servia. On July 29, the Kaiser demanded that Russia should suspend her mobilization and on August 1 he declared war. Three days after, he attacked France, whose troops, notwithstanding German concentration of forces, had remained at a distance of ten kilometers from the frontier. On August 2, the imperial troops entered

¹ Statement in Paris, Feb. 25, 1915.

² *The Times*, July 30, 1915.

Luxemburg and then Belgium. Then followed the unspeakable horrors of the present war.

Germany had hoped that the land of Cavour would join the Teuton allies, but in this they were disappointed. The Quirinal was perfectly aware of the aggressive move of the two Powers. The withdrawal of Italy from the Alliance was a virtual proclamation that the act of Germany and of Austria was criminal. With this there was a growing national consciousness that the Germans had already made the economic conquest of their country, had secured the control of their banking institutions and of their navigation companies, had done there what they had already accomplished in Belgium and in Turkey. They remembered how, in former days, Austria had treated them as now she wished to do with Servia—they remembered the inhuman torments of many victims such as Maroncelli and Silvio Pellico, condemned to death, and when this was commuted, subjecting them to moral tortures a hundred times worse than death—they remembered that the Dual Monarchy still holds under her sway their kindred who long to be under the green, red and white flag of Italy—they remembered that France had helped them to secure their independence, and that both lands were among the best supports of liberal civilization. National feelings were deepened by appeals of leading literary men, among whom was Gabriele d'Annunzio. The movement became hostile to neutrality and demanded action to such an extent that the Government had to heed it and to head it.

To oppose this really national movement, Germany sent to Rome her ablest Dernburg, Prince von Bülow. Ever ready for concessions at the expense of the Dual Monarchy, he attempted to bring back the Italians, by

making promises to them which were far from agreeable to Vienna. He did not ask them to join the hosts of the Kaiser, but attempted to make their neutrality a virtual adherence of Italy to a fictitious *Triplex*. The end of this was not only to stem the movement of practical sympathy with the Allies, but it looked beyond also to the conclusion of the war. In the international congress which will unquestionably modify the map of Europe, Italy would support Germany. Austria was equally desirous of securing this peculiar kind of Italian neutrality, but in the diplomatic conferences which took place she asked for "freedom of action in the Balkans," showing that whatever was her attitude toward *Italia irredenta*, she had not given up her purpose of a move southward to the Ægean Sea. The aged Austrian Emperor made a positive refusal as to the concessions proposed by the German Envoy on behalf of the Italians, who were not asking favors, but the restitution of their own kindred, not lands so much as men. They demanded for these the right to live under institutions of their choice—a contention similar to that of France for Alsace. They asked military frontiers taking the place of those imposed upon them in 1866, and their preponderance in the Adriatic. They were true to their old vindications against Austria and perhaps to their old hatred. At last, they broke off all relations and took their stand by the Allies.

The spirit of hatred and aggressive purpose so strenuously cultivated first in Prussia, and then in Germany, has borne its fruits. The long and systematic provocation of France has brought allies to her side. The German abuses against them have been as painful to Frenchmen as those against themselves. The awful crash so desired by the enemies of the land of Poincaré

has come. The civilized world has expressed its judgment upon those responsible for the Great War. The manner of waging it has met with a similar condemnation. Denials of atrocities were to be expected. These abominations have been established by evidence which no philosophical-minded man will refuse to accept. The countrymen of Bismarck will discover now—if not now, some day—that there is a sovereign justice which has its supreme hour of reckoning. Has that hour come? Events will soon tell. General Joffre, avaricious of words, has said that it would be *long, dur, sûr.*

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